Women’s equality has been positively linked to household food security in many countries. Since women still do the bulk of food labor, women’s empowerment can lead to an increase in the allocation of resources toward food, improving food security. However, we do not know how country-level laws of gender equality intersect with household-level actions. This study examines household food insecurity from a cross-national and multilevel perspective. I explore the relationship between gender inequality (in terms of both opinions and laws) and household food insecurity. I use household data from the World Values Survey, Wave 6, collected in 2010 through 2014. The analytic sample includes 42 countries and 37,152 individuals. My country-level data come from the World Bank and the Social Institutions and Gender Index. I find that positive measures of women’s empowerment at the household level reduce a household’s likelihood of food insecurity. Surprisingly, I find that country-level policies do not always create the intended outcomes of increased equality. Legal equality between men and women at the country level (financial, legal, and land ownership) does not have a direct relationship with food insecurity. However, legal equality moderates the relationship between food insecurity and country-level variables (agricultural exports and urbanization) and household-level variables (income). The research suggests that the inclusion of gender equality complicates development theory.

How does a standard-setting body based in the United States influence domestic regulatory contests in rising powers like China and India? And why might it be more successful in imposing its norms in one country or another? This paper answers these questions through a comparative analysis of domestic regulatory contention over pesticide residue standards for soft drinks in India and over nutritional standards for infant formula in China. Drawing together insights from science and technology studies, political economic approaches to standards and science, and the institutional approach to hegemonic transitions, I make three arguments. First, standard-setting bodies are increasingly available for hire by transnational firms; however, as their authority is not automatic, they are strategically cultivating scientific and policy networks in rising powers. Second, states in rising powers respond differently to the advocacy of standard-setting bodies, depending on distinct patterns of inter-firm and inter-state competition across the sectors to be regulated. Finally, because both standard-setting bodies and states in rising powers are compelled to build new coalitions of scientific and political actors to wield influence, these struggles are recasting the geographies of institutional power over standards in new ways.

The impact of globalization on the enactment and practice of collective labor rights (CLR) in the global South remains a contested issue in the global political economy literature. Some scholars suggest southern firms and states suppress CLR to maintain global competitiveness in labor-intensive manufacturing. Other scholars contend that globalization improves CLR as globally integrated firms increasingly “upgrade” to more capital- and skill-intensive manufacturing. This study empirically adjudicates these claims by examining whether the integration of southern firms into global production networks indirectly affects CLR through the skill upgrading of the industrial labor force. I test this proposition using unbalanced panel data on collective labor laws and practices in 55 low- and middle-income countries from 1985 to 2002. Estimates from generalized path models show that greater manufacturing exports to northern countries and inward foreign direct investment stock are directly associated with a decrease in collective labor practices net of institutional, political, and macroeconomic conditions. Most importantly, I find that manufacturing exports indirectly reduce collective labor practices by decreasing the skill composition of the industrial labor force. Overall, this study provides novel evidence that the globalization of production directly reduces collective labor practices in the global South and indirectly reduces these practices through hindering skill development in industrial labor.

Coercive capitalism is development based on the use of force to dispossess either land or labor. Early macrosociologists, both functionalist and conflict-oriented, believed that feudal systems were based on the use of force but that capitalism is based on coercion-free free markets. Wallerstein argued that coercive capitalism exists in the periphery of world systems. We argue that coercion is endemic to all capitalism. Much of the land on which capitalism is based, including all of the Western Hemisphere, was seized from aboriginal populations. Land seizure was common in historic Europe. Forced labor existed until very recently in both bound apprenticeships and prison work crews. Coercion is used extensively in land acquisition for contemporary capitalism. It can take the form of legal sanctions exerted against the defenseless, or the use of paramilitaries and gangsters to exert pressure on the landholding poor.