The first book of medieval Latin beast epic, Ysengrimus , relates imaginary trials. In the episodes of the stolen ham and the fishing, the characters, Ysengrin and Renart, imagine that they would convene an ecclesiastic assembly, a synod, and that they would plead their case. Their plead reverses right and wrong ( translatio criminis ), invents speeches to denigrate each other ( sermocinatio ), and seems to take the form of large digressions. These speeches, which have been considered as “interminable” and “wordy” by J. Mann and É. Charbonnier, can be reassessed through classical rhetoric. This paper aims to demonstrate that, in spite of the extent of these speeches' apparent rambling, we can extricate some rhetorical structures ( constitutiones ) from the judicial oratory. This is the first point of a speech that also uses prolixity as an “art of being right.”

In Plato's early dialogues, the impossibility of talking to the crowd appears as a constitutive element of the opposition between rhetoric and dialectic and raises the understudied question of the role of the audience in Socratic thought. However, Xenophon's Socrates constantly identifies public and private speech. But this likening is also found in the Alcibiades Major , which gives a key to understand the true meaning of this assimilation: one can convince an audience, by talking to each individual in the crowd. The need to address each one implies an adaptation of language that can be found in the texts of different disciples of Socrates. The rhetorical aspects of the Phaedrus ' psychagogia should then be understood, not as a new Platonic concept which allows the good orator to address the many, but rather as a new formulation of a well-known and shared Socratic ideal.

This essay argues that Madeleine de Scudéry's engagement with the early modern dialogue genre in Conversations sur Divers Sujets reflects and strengthens the conversational theory that scholars have pinpointed as an important feminist rhetorical strategy. By imagining and constructing the dialogue to function as a metadiscourse on the conversational theories that provide the speaking points of her characters, Scudéry enacts her rhetorical theory of sermo in addition to describing it. After an overview of varying forms of the dialogue genre in Renaissance Europe, a comparison between Scudéry's Conversations and Sir Thomas Elyot's The Defence of Good Women illuminates Scudéry's feminist construction of the genre and exemplifies her choice to use the dialogue to both perform and advance her theories on conversational practice.

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss parrhesia (literally “free speech”), in the rhetorical theory of Bartholomew Keckermann ( Systema rhetoricae , Hanau 1608) with particular attention to its nature, forms, and functions. For Keckermann, parrhesia is not only one of the rhetorical figures related to expressing or amplifying emotions, but also may be considered as a regulative idea of speech best epitomized in the postulate, to speak “everything freely and sincerely,” since the term includes the Greek notion. Aside from such ancient authors as Quintilian, the major source of theoretical inspirations for Keckermann are the textbooks written by Melanchthon (on the relations between parrhesia and flattery), Ramus (on parrhesia as a kind of exclamation) and Sturm (on the critical power of parrhesia ). With a firm grounding in this contextual background, this analysis elucidates Keckermann’s contribution to the Renaissance debate on this rhetorical schema.

This article argues that Kant's attack on the ars oratoria in §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is directed against eighteenth-century school rhetoric, in particular against the “art of speech” ( Redekunst ) of Johann Christoph Gottsched. It is pointed out that Kant suggests a revision of Gottsched's conception of “true eloquence,” which was the predominant rhetorical ideal at the time. On this basis, and in response to recent discussions on “Kantian rhetoric,” Kant's own ideal of speech is addressed. It emerges that he favors a culture of speech embedded in moral cultivation, which excludes any disciplinary form of rhetoric.

In this paper I discuss Lorenzo Valla's criticism of the traditional Square of Opposition displayed in the second book of the Dialectica . I show that, according to Valla, the opposition rules of the propositions must take into account both common speeches and the correct use of Latin language, not the formal link occurring between the parts of propositions. In Valla's perspective, this theoretical change is carried out through rhetoric and philology, and it involves a reassessment of the arts of the trivium . As regards this topic, I argue that Valla aims niether to reduce dialectic to rhetoric nor to replace the former with the latter, but rather to establish some rhetorical principles as a better-suited way to set the opposition rules, because they take into account the linguistic context in which these rules apply.

Starting in the 1970s, frame analysis became a popular technique of textual analysis in different disciplines (communication, mass media, sociology). There is no agreed-upon definition of frame analysis or of ways of measuring its key concepts. This paper explores the relationship between frame analysis and rhetoric. The paper reviews all main concepts developed in frame analysis. Concept after concept, it maps the correspondence between frame analysis and rhetorical concepts. It shows how frame analysis stopped short of developing what was really required to measure frames: tropes and figures. The analysis of a specific text confirms the power of rhetorical analysis for teasing out meaning systems and argumentative structures.

A peculiar feature of the philosophy of Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777) lies in its being based on rhetorical principles. We are in front of an important construct that claims for attention in the context of the growing literature on eighteenth-century rhetoric. The syntagm ‘rhetoricised logic’ indicates a specific function of rhetoric as the basis for rethinking philosophical discourse. The paper shows that Meier's philosophical programme is consistently based on the trivium . On top of this, the paper compares Meier and Immanuel Kant on the ancient topos of the artes liberales , thus making it clear that the position of Meier can be assessed as a model for a rhetorically founded theory of knowledge, which was transformed and overcome by Kant.

This article seeks to view Augustine's early work as a form of revelatory rhetoric where the aim is to define and express the nature of the divine. This aim contrasts with Augustine's post-ordination work where the aim is more deliberative in nature through a language that instructs and moves his audience. While the contexts and rhetorical purposes of these eras are distinct, there is a continuity in terms of Augustine's theology. I argue that it is Augustine's rhetorical context that distinguishes his early and later work through an analysis of De libero arbitrio .

This essay situates the political thought of the French Renaissance prose writer Jean Bodin within the dual tradition of political theory and epideictic rhetoric. Bodin's pragmatic reappraisal of superstition, as a bulwark against atheism and anarchy, represents a sort of convergence of paradoxical encomium and political realism in the service of religious pluralism and pacification of civil war. When juxtaposed with his more famous predecessor Niccolò Machiavelli and more renowned contemporary Michel de Montaigne, Bodin's treatment of superstition, both in his vernacular masterpiece Les six livres de la République and in his neo-Latin works, emerges as a timely intervention in confessional strife and a classical adaptation of epideictic wisdom.

Messalla Corvinus, celebrated as one of the greatest orators of the generation after Cicero, offers an ideal case study for political life in the triumviral period and early principate. His distinctive style is reminiscent of what Cicero described as the middle style, exemplified by Marcus Calidius and Cicero's Pro Lege Manilia and Pro Marcello . This style complemented his mild, accomodationist political persona, evident especially in his support of Augustus and his rejection of the office of urban prefect, in a synergistic fusion of style and ethos .

Notwithstanding its value as the earliest extant New Persian treatment of the art of rhetoric, Rādūyānī's Interpreter of Rhetoric ( Tarjumān al-Balāgha ) has yet to be read from the vantage point of comparative poetics. Composed in the Ferghana region of modern Central Asia between the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century, Rādūyānī's vernacularization of classical Arabic norms inaugurated literary theory in the New Persian language. I argue here that Rādūyānī's vernacularization is most consequential with respect to its transformation of the classical Arabic tropes of metaphor ( istiʿāra ) and comparison ( tashbīh ) to suit the new exigencies of a New Persian literary culture. In reversing the relation between metaphor and comparison enshrined in Arabic aesthetics, Rādūyānī concretized the Persian contribution to the global study of literary form.

This paper deals with the conception of rhetoric of one of the most prominent Renaissance scholars, Francesco Robortello, and focuses in particular on his vernacular manuscript entitled Dell'oratore , probably his final statement on the topic, the transcription of which is included in the appendix. The study of the manuscript will be integrated with the examination of Robortello's Latin published works on rhetoric, that is De rhetorica facultate (1548) and De artificio dicendi (1567), as well as of some of his schemes in printed and manuscript form.

While George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric is widely recognized as one of the most influential treatises in the history of rhetoric, little critical attention has been paid to one of his most famous sermons: "The Nature, Extent, and Importance of the Duty of Allegiance." Delivered on December 12, 1776, "being the fast day appointed by the King on account of the rebellion in America," this sermon exemplifies a key contention in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric —that the species of rhetoric "calculated to influence the will, and persuade us to a certain conduct" is "that artful mixture" of "the argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together" (2–4). Taking its cue from the importance of style in Campbell's conception of rhetoric, this essay examines the significant role played by style in both the argumentative and pathetic dimensions of Campbell's sermon and reminds us that rhetorical theories have historically been conceived as means of managing social tensions and the uncertainties within which they arise.

This paper examines Abelard's engagement with disputation ( disputatio ) from the vantage point of twelfth-century scholasticism. Eschewing the well-worn details of Abelard's personal life and philosophical positions, analysis is instead focused on two parallel dimensions of his career: the manner in which he attempted to face-off with his adversaries through public debate and his underlying theory of disputation. It is argued that Abelard's theory is to be found not in his theological or logical works, but in his polemical letters and his ethical dialogue, the Collationes , which together offer a coherent hermeneutical strategy for discerning truth. Abelard's contribution to the art of disputation needs to be assessed in light of his broader involvement in the scholastic method and contemporary Jewish-Christian relations.

Notwithstanding the widespread assumption that Aristotle forges a better relationship among rhetoric, the emotions, and political morality than Cicero, I contend that Cicero, not Aristotle, offers a more relevant account of the relationship among these terms. I argue that, by grounding his account of emotional appeals in the art of rhetoric, Aristotle does not evade the moral problems originating in emotional manipulation. Moreover, Aristotle's approach to emotional appeals in politics is, compared to Cicero's, static, unable to adapt to new political circumstances. I suggest that Cicero's approach to the rhetorical emotions is more acceptable to a modern audience than Aristotle's because it is ethically based while also responsive to political realities. Cicero accommodates emotional appeals to circumstance based on his belief in decorum as a moral principle. Further, I show that emotional manipulation in Cicero is not as problematical as it initially appears.

During the last three decades research in the rhetoric of natural science has established itself as a prominent topic in the history of science, culture, and society. Despite this overall success, the status, function and place of rhetoric in the process of knowledge production is still ambivalent and disputed. While some scholars place rhetoric right in the centre of the construction of scientific knowledge, others support the view that scientific knowledge is epistemologically privileged. Based on research done by the prominent sociologist, philosopher, and historian Bruno Latour, the article argues that rhetoric plays a minimal role in the production of knowledge but is crucial in the dissemination and (successful) implementation of scientific results.

Plato's chief argument against rhetoric is epistemological. Plato claims that rhetoric accomplishes what it does on the basis of experience, not knowledge. In this article I examine Plato's criticisms of rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus . I argue that Plato is right to identify rhetoric's empirical basis, but that having this epistemic basis does not constitute an argument against rhetoric. On the contrary, Plato's criticism of rhetoric serves to give us an epistemological explanation of rhetoric's success.

This essay argues that Plato's use of narrative conceals within Socrates' explicit rejection of rhetoric an implicit authorial endorsement, manifested in the dialectical and rhetorical failures surrounding Socrates' deliberations over logos . I suggest that Aristotle's Rhetoric is consonant with Plato's view in its general affirmation of rhetoric's power, utility, and necessity as well as in its specific recommendations regarding logos . I employ Martin Heidegger's explication of logos in Aristotle to illuminate how the term conforms to Plato's implicit position regarding logos and rhetoric. This interpretation entails an expanded meaning of logos as it is found in Rhetoric , assigning it a more primary, pre-logical, oral content.

This article studies the essays of Michel de Montaigne in the context of the tradition of epideictic rhetoric from antiquity to the Renaissance, with particular attention to the humanist reception of Aristotle's Rhetoric . The focus of this attention is the relationship between epideictic and consensus, which proves to be more problematic than Aristotle seems to have anticipated. If we read Montaigne's essay “Des Cannibales” as a paradoxical encomium and compare it to Plutarch's declamation on the fortune of Alexander, we can see how epideictic works to undermine consensus and even to challenge the very impulse to conform to social and ethical norms.