In the spring of 2020, South Korea became the second most infected country in the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid spread of the virus was attributed to a Christian religious group known as Shincheonji. The association of this already controversial religion with the spread of the virus quickly led to public condemnation of the group. The public response to the group’s association with the virus was, in part, built on an existing foundation of distrust and suspicion. In this paper, I examine the details of Shincheonji’s association with the coronavirus and the public reaction to it. I show the political work done by classificatory language pertaining to religion, specifically as it influences perceptions of the legitimacy of marginal religions and how the public should treat them. I also examine how public discourses on what religion should or should not do shape the definitions and boundaries of religion and associated categories.

Much has been written about the South Korean government’s repression of Shincheonji after the COVID-19 epidemic, which the movement was accused of having contributed to spreading. Less attention has been paid to Shincheonji opposition that started decades before the pandemic, rooted in campaigns by the Korean Christian countercult movement aimed at eradicating “heresies” and fast-growing competitors. This article discusses the history of Christian countercultism in South Korea, the rise of Shincheonji, and why it became a main target of the countercultists who opposed the movement both through deprogramming and by calling for its suppression by the authorities. Finally, this article addresses the countercultists’ hopes that Shincheonji will disappear when its founder, believed to be immortal by devotees (based on their interpretation of the Book of Revelation), will die.

Historically, Korea and Vietnam have been in the unenviable position of being surrounded by powerful neighbors who at times descend upon them as colonizers or occupying forces. East Asian new religious movements such as Daesoon Jinrihoe and Caodaism offer unique insights into each country’s national sentiments regarding such historicities. In particular, the painting in Daesoon Jinrihoe titled Five Immortals Playing Baduk (五仙圍碁 Oseon Wigi), and the painting in Caodaism titled The Three Saints (三聖 Tam Thánh) are strikingly similar in the manner in which both countries depict a national representative alongside foreign representatives. Generally speaking, Five Immortals Playing Baduk can be seen as providing a subtle and provocative critique of foreign interference, whereas The Three Saints has integral, reconciliatory, and diplomatic overtones. Sociological insight can be gained from analyzing the national sovereignty depicted in these paintings and related scriptural passages as a supernatural compensator as understood in Rational Choice Theory.

Numerous contemporary Pagan groups conduct their ritual ceremonies outside, communing with nature. This essay describes research conducted in a small, eclectic group following the Wiccan wheel of the year in Warsaw, Poland. It focuses on the places used by the group, applying Edward Casey’s phenomenological approach to understand an encountered place, and examines what constitutes a good ritual place according to the group members. The initial supposition was that technical aspects would prevail: privacy, accessibility, and proximity of the four elements. However, the participant observation and semi-structured interviews proved that choosing the right place was primarily based on the experience and interpretation of the feeling evoked by the place: namely, whether the atmosphere was right and the entities dwelling there were seen as welcoming or not.

This issue of Nova Religio explores the success, in several cases spectacular, of different new religions in South Korea, and the controversies they generated. In this introduction I suggest that, notwithstanding their different Christian and non-Christian backgrounds, most Korean new religions share some common features, including messianism, millenarianism, and proposals for social reform. I introduce a typology of four major groupings: Christian new religions, “traditionalist” groups that call for a restoration of Korea’s ancient spirituality, Won Buddhism, and Jeungsanism. Finally, I suggest that both political and religious factors contributed to the flourishing of new religions in twentieth and twenty-first century Korea.

Despite its small size and unconventional doctrines, the Korean new religious movement, “Rectified Confucian Way” (Kaengjŏngyudo), exerts considerable influence on Korean society today. Members of the group operate dozens of children’s camps and other educational programs aimed to promote traditional moral behavior among the population, in line with their millennial vision of an evolving Confucian era. This article offers the first English-language introductory investigation of this fascinating movement. It reviews the early twentieth-century mystical genesis of the religion, its development of scriptures and rituals, and its members’ active, optimistic attempts to lead the world into the Confucian millennium. Based on this data, the paper suggests that this group offers a unique model of a long-term, gradualist—rather than imminent—millennial expectation.