In this article, it is argued that an application of the harm principle to many forms of nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery shows that these procedures are a form of physical harm, not a form of medicine, and therefore ought to be criminalized. Not only does the harm principle support the case for criminalization, but so too do the relevant precedents. This article focuses on the general moral justifications (wrongful harm to others) for criminalizing unnecessary harmful cosmetic surgery, but legal doctrine is also invoked to demonstrate that there is a legal justification for criminalization. The famous English case of R. v. Brown will be discussed to outline the core legal case for criminalization. This article does not aim to provide a comparative study of the U.S. and English authorities, but rather aims to make theoretical arguments for criminalization, and thus, works from the legal premise that in most states the U.S. courts have taken a similar position to that taken in the seminal English House of Lords decision in R. v. Brown.

We question the justice of using prison sentences to control hate speech. It is argued that prison sentences should be used only to deter offensive and hateful speech that harms others. However, the harm requirement cannot be satisfied merely by demonstrating theoretical harm in the abstract, as Jeremy Waldron does in his recent book. Instead, factual harm has to be demonstrated because prison is in fact very harmful for the expresser of the offensive and hateful speech. There is noting wrong with penal measures being used to deter this kind of speech, but harmful prison sentences should not be used to deter harmless speech. Waldron asserts that the United States should follow the British model, among others, of using prison to control and chill free (hate) speech. Waldron wants a model of unfree speech for some. We aim to show that the United States should resist enacting hate speech laws similar to the unjust laws found in Britain, where people have received long prison sentences for uttering offensive and hateful thoughts. To use prison sentences is to use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut: it is a grossly disproportionate and unjust penal response. Particular issue is taken with Waldron’s harm theory. The core element of the paper is the Waldron debate, because the type of vacuous harm theory he puts forward has the potential to be used by lawmakers to justify unjust penal responses such as harmful prison sentences for harmless (even though grossly offensive) speech.

This paper evaluates proportionate punishment and fair labelling in the context of complicity liability. It is argued that only full intentional and extreme (subjective) reckless assistance or encouragement is sufficient for holding a secondary party equally responsible for the principal's primary wrongdoing. It is also submitted that lesser mens rea states such as mere knowledge or belief provide a justification for grading certain forms of complicity as independent and less serious forms of criminality. More specifically, I examine the new provisions found in the United Kingdom's Serious Crime Act 2007 and argue that those provisions could be used in place of the older provisions dealing with accessorial liability to ensure that those who are only subjectively reckless in contributing to the criminality of others are punished less than the principal. If a person is going to be sent to prison for life for merely supplying a gun to a principal, then justice and fair punishment require that the assistance be intentional or at least extremely reckless

In this paper I aim to examine the objective limitations of consent as a defense to criminal harmdoing. This paper starts by briefly outlining the idea of objective morality (critical morality) as the proper basis for criminalization decisions and argues that there are also objective rather than mere conventional reasons (positive morality) for limiting the scope of consent as a defense in the criminal law. The idea of consent is in itself an objective reason for excusing wrongful harmdoing to others. However, it can be overridden by other objective considerations of greater importance. In this paper, I argue that it is only wrongful harmdoing that is criminalizable, as we do not criminalize mere accidents. Furthermore, I argue that a person can as an exercise of her personal autonomy consent to certain harms. But I note that there is a crucial difference between waiving rights that are grounded in an exercise of personal autonomy and waiving rights that violate a person's human dignity: rational autonomy. I conclude that regardless of consent, certain grave harms violate a person's dignity as a human being and therefore are wrongful and criminalizable.

I draw on accessorial liability jurisprudence in an attempt to outline the moral limits of criminalizing people for merely influencing the criminal choices of others. A person's conduct is a "remote harm" when it is harmless "but for" the fact that it encourages another independent party to commit a harmful criminal act (a primary harm). For example, the "broken windows" thesis holds that minor incivilities (such as passive begging) are a precursor to more serious crime. Passive begging allegedly sends a signal to criminals that the broken windows area is unpoliced and is an easy target for crime. The beggars are criminalized to deter independent parties from committing crimes in the broken windows area. In this paper, I object to this kind of criminalization because it contravenes the requirements of fairness and individual responsibility, because it aims to punish people for the inadvertent consequences of their actions. I argue that a person should only be held responsible for another's criminal harm when she is normatively involved in it. What is needed are normative reasons for stating from an ex ante perspective that it will be fair to hold X morally responsible for S when it causes Y to do harm N. If this requirement is satisfied then there will be a prima facie case for criminalization. I argue that a person is normatively involved in another's crime when she knowingly assists or intentionally encourages that crime. In addition, a person can become normatively involved in another's criminal harm by underwriting it. I also assert that the fairness constraint should only be overridden as a matter of necessity to prevent harm of an extraordinarily grave kind and that the broken windows harm does not satisfy this requirement.