Which interpretive tasks should be delegated to machines? This question has become a focal point of “tech governance” debates. One familiar answer is that while machines are capable of implementing tasks whose ends are uncontroversial, machine delegation is inappropriate for tasks that elude human consensus. After all, if human experts cannot agree about the nature of a task, what hope is there for machines? Here, we turn this position around. When humans disagree about the nature of a task, that should be prima facie grounds for machine delegation, not against it. The reason has to do with fairness: affected parties should be able to predict the outcomes of particular cases. Indeterminate decision-making environments—those in which human disagree about ends—are inherently unpredictable in that, for any given case, the distribution of likely outcomes will depend on a specific decision maker’s view of the relevant end. This injects an irreducible dynamic of randomization into the decision-making process from the perspective of non-repeat players. To the extent machine decisions aggregate across disparate views of a task’s relevant ends, they promise improvement on this specific dimension of predictability. Whatever the other virtues and drawbacks of machine decision-making, this gain should be recognized and factored into governance. The essay has two parts. In the first, we draw a distinction between determinacy and certainty as epistemic properties and fashioning a taxonomy of decision types. In the second part, we bring the formal point alive through a case study of criminal sentencing.

Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, degrading treatment and punishment is absolutely prohibited. This paper examines the nature of and wrong inherent in treatment and punishment of this kind. Cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) as amounting to degrading treatment and punishment under Article 3 include instances of interrogation, conditions of confinement, corporal punishment, strip searches, and a failure to provide adequate health care. The Court acknowledges the degradation inherent in imprisonment generally, and does not consider this to be in violation of Article 3, but it also identifies a threshold at which degradation is so severe as to render impermissible punishments that cross this threshold. I offer an account of the Court’s conception of impermissible degradation as a symbolic dignitary harm. The victims are treated as inferior, as if they do not possess the status owed to human beings, neither treated with dignity nor given the respect owed to dignity. Degradation is a relational concept: the victim is brought down in the eyes of others following treatment motivated by the intention to degrade, or treatment which has a degrading effect. This, so I will argue, is the best account of the concept of degradation as deployed by the Court when determining punishments as in violation of Article 3.

“Limiting retributivists” believe that the vagueness of retributive proportionality represents a moral opportunity. They maintain that the state can permissibly harm an offender for the sake of crime prevention and other nonretributive goods, so long as the sentence resides within the broad range of retributively “not undeserved” punishments. However, in this essay, I argue that retributivism can justify only the least harmful sentence within such a range. To impose a sentence beyond this minimum would be cruel from a retributive perspective. It would harm an offender to a greater degree without thereby increasing the realization of our retributivist ends. Thus, if our nonretributive policy aims required a harsher sentence, the offender’s retributive desert could not provide the rationale, and we would need another theory that explains why, if at all, harming an offender as a means of realizing the desired nonretributive good is permissible.

The tailwinds might be behind criminal justice reform, but American mercy power remains locked in a sputtering clemency model. Centralized leadership should be braver or the centralized institutions should be streamlined, the arguments go—but what if the more basic mercy problem is centralization itself? In this essay, I explore that question. In so doing, I defend the normative premise that post-conviction mercy is justified, and I address the questions of institutional design and political economy that follow. I ultimately encourage jurisdictions to layer decentralized mercy powers on top of their clemency mechanisms, and for the newer authority to be vested in local prosecutors. I present less a single proposal than a collection of principles for mercy decentralization. Governors and presidents simply cannot deliver the punishment remissions appropriate for an American prison population bloated by a half-century love affair with over-criminalization, mandatory minimums, and recidivism enhancements.

A recent wave of expressive accounts of corporate criminal law operate on the promise that corporate punishment can express a unique form of condemnation not capturable through civil enforcement. Unfortunately, the realities of corporate sentencing have thus far failed to make good on this expressive promise. Viewed in light of existing conventions that imbue meaning into our practices of punishment, corporate sentences rarely impose hard treatment in a manner or degree that these conventions seem to require. Accordingly, standard corporate sanctions turn out to be ill-suited to deliver—and, often, will likely undermine—the stigmatic punch upon which expressive defenses of corporate criminal law depend. A common response to this conventional problem with corporate sentencing has been to propose more, and harsher, corporate punishments. However, this approach overlooks the extent to which corporate punishment derives its stigmatic force from preexisting norms and conventions concerning individual punishment. If trying to improve corporate punishment, then, expressivists might instead seek either to leverage or to dismantle the underlying conventions that give existing sanctions meaning. An example of the former strategy would be to revitalize long-neglected proposals for corporate shaming by adopting a criminal convention currently absent from the corporate space—namely, the pervasive, stigmatic application of epithets like “thief” or “felon.” An example of the latter would be to join criminal justice reformers in targeting conventions that, in recent decades, have enabled increasingly draconian sentencing practices. On this view, dissolving corporate sentencing’s conventional problem may represent a further, incidental benefit of systemic criminal justice reform.

Although an offender’s conduct before and during the crime is the traditional focus of criminal law and sentencing rules, an examination of post-offense conduct can also be important in promoting criminal justice goals. After the crime, different offenders make different choices and have different experiences, and those differences can suggest appropriately different treatment by judges, correctional officials, probation and parole supervisors, and other decision makers in the criminal justice system. Positive post-offense conduct ought to be acknowledged and rewarded, not only to encourage it but also as a matter of fair and just treatment. This essay describes four kinds of positive post-offense conduct that merit special recognition and preferential treatment: the responsible offender, who avoids further deceit and damage to others during the process leading to conviction; the debt-paid offender, who suffers the full punishment deserved (according to true principles of justice rather than the sentence actually imposed); the reformed offender, who takes affirmative steps to leave criminality behind; and the redeemed offender, who out of genuine remorse tries to atone for the offense. The essay considers how one might operationalize a system for giving special accommodation to such offenders. Positive post-offense conduct might be rewarded, for example, through the selection and shaping of sanctioning methods, through giving preference in access to education, training, treatment, and other programs, and through elimination or restriction of collateral consequences of conviction that continue after the sentence is completed.

This article examines the rationales to exclude evidence before International Criminal Tribunals that has been illegally obtained by private investigators. The appeal of private investigations has now reached the level of international criminal justice, with the establishment of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability. Investigative staff at the International Criminal Court and other International Criminal Tribunals are dependent on the work undertaken in the field by human rights monitors as fact finders, employed by IGOs, NGOs, and, in some cases, by governmental agencies. Considering the importance of private investigators for the administration of those Tribunals, potential dangers of such a cooperation easily take a backseat in a car that is driven by the anti-impunity agenda. Scenarios of investigators offering money to witnesses in return for information about a suspect and his or her criminal activities are a reality. While case law has addressed the topic of illegally obtained evidence by national authorities, the fate of evidence collected by private individuals in breach of human rights has rather been neglected. This article provides a conceptual basis for the exclusion or admission of this evidence.

Algorithmic risk assessment is hailed as offering criminal justice officials a science-led system to triage offender populations to better manage low- versus high-risk individuals. Risk algorithms have reached the pretrial world as a best practices method to aid in reforms to reduce reliance upon money bail and to moderate pretrial detention’s material contribution to mass incarceration. Still, these promises are elusive if algorithmic tools are unable to achieve sufficient accurate rates in predicting criminal justice failure. This article presents an empirical study of the most popular pretrial risk tool used in the United States. Developers promote the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) as a national tool. Little information is known about the PSA’s developmental methodologies or performance statistics. The dearth of intelligence is alarming as the tool is being used in high-stakes decisions as to whether to detain individuals who have not yet been convicted of any crime. This study uncovers evidence of performance accuracy using a variety of validity metrics and, as a novel contribution, investigates the use of the tool in three diverse jurisdictions to evaluate how well the tool generalizes in real-world settings. Policy implications of the findings may be enlightening to officials, practitioners, and other stakeholders interested in pretrial justice as well as in the use of algorithmic risk across criminal justice decision points.

This article, prepared for the special issue on investigations, presents an original empirical analysis of the role of the motor vehicle in shaping how officers describe experiencing violence and perceiving danger during vehicle stops. Tens of millions of traffic stops occur every year, making vehicle stops the most common interaction that civilians have with law enforcement. Although traffic stops are commonly described as dangerous settings for police officers, little is known about how the motor vehicle itself shapes officer descriptions, perceptions, and experiences of danger and harm during these stops. The presented findings make at least four key contributions to scholarship and policing law and policy. First, the findings inform unfolding criminal law reforms surrounding the policing and criminalization of traffic offenses, which are major sources of racial disparity in, and net-widening of, the criminal justice system today. Second, the findings prompt questions about whether and when legal actors, and especially actors that regulate the police, should defer to officer danger narratives involving motor vehicles. Third, the findings prompt novel questions about technology and the law, and more specifically, the ability of new motor vehicle technologies to help diffuse officer perceptions of danger that stem from motor vehicles. Fourth and finally, the findings illustrate a need to pay greater attention to the motor vehicle as a source of officer danger and harm in official policing data in order to accurately measure the risks and costs of policing during vehicle stops.

This study looks at the principles that shape the structure of the whole of Thai criminal procedure law. It examines how the search for truth is attempted to be reconciled with the idea of a fair trial or procedural fairness. The conflict between the search for truth on the one hand and guaranteeing procedural rights of the accused on the other is particularly problematic in the Thai context. Thai law affirms that some evidence cannot be admissible if it is obtained by a violation of certain procedural norms. At the same time, the law allows judges to admit some unlawfully obtained evidence in the interest of justice. The conflict between various legal norms cannot be solved without permitting judges to exercise broad discretion in striking the right balance between discovering the true facts and protecting the rights of the accused. Thai legal education and practice does not allow a broad judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting evidence on the grounds that it was obtained unlawfully. As a result, there is an attempt to build a sophisticated system of rules to accommodate the interests of justice and fairness in different situations. This system, however, lacks clarity and consistency.

This article discusses flaws of Indonesia’s criminal procedural laws through an analysis of the Jessica Wongso case. After a televised trial in 2016, Wongso was convicted of murdering her friend Salihin, by putting cyanide in her coffee at a Jakarta café, and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on appeal in late 2018. The police obtained very limited evidence against Wongso, leaving prosecutors unable to determine the cause of Salihin’s death, much less to prove convincingly that Wongso was the perpetrator. By contrast, the defense mustered significant exculpatory evidence. But the judges, at first instance and on appeal, took an uncritical view of the prosecution evidence and ignored the defense case. Throughout the investigation and trial, Wongso was not accorded the presumption of innocence, partly because of Indonesia’s flawed or absent formal legal infrastructure for arrests, detentions, searches, and disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense. It is also because highly prejudicial press coverage before and during trials is not prohibited and because judges lack professionalism. All this suggests a strong need for reform—not only to Indonesia’s criminal procedure law, but also to the way it is applied in practice.

Singapore is well known for its harsh stance against drug traffickers, with drug trafficking carrying some of the most severe penalties available in law. This includes the mandatory death penalty where the weight of the drug exceeds a statutory threshold. The act of trafficking is also broadly defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 and can encompass a wide range of activities. In a series of authoritative decisions since 1994, this has also included the act of safekeeping drugs for another. However, the Singapore Court of Appeal revisited this definition in the recent decision of Ramesh a/l Perumal v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 1003, finding that the act of safekeeping drugs does not fall under the definition of “trafficking.” As this paper argues, this new definition is an attempt by the Court of Appeal to better delineate the varying roles and culpability of those involved in the drug trade, but will have future implications for drug prosecutions and enforcement.

When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalization is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defense to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.

The American legal system currently tends to excuse sleepwalking killers, particularly based on the involuntary act defense, more so than the insanity defense. By contrast, the law generally does not excuse psychopathic murderers. However, the status quo may not be the optimal or most just solution to this legal dilemma; depending on one’s philosophical beliefs regarding the tension between society’s interest and the accused’s rights, one can identify various flaws within the prevailing application of the insanity defense in cases involving sleepwalking and psychopathy. As the law is constantly evolving, there is space for growth in this area, especially with the advancement in neuroscience, which can offer more insight into sleepwalkers’ and psychopaths’ brains. In approaching the complex questions of whether and how the law should excuse sleepwalking killers and psychopaths from punishment, this article turns to relevant findings from neuroscience for support and focuses on one particular approach, that of the Model Penal Code (MPC) insanity defense. We begin with an overview of the relevant criminal law doctrine in contextualizing the MPC’s approach to insanity defense. We then apply the relevant MPC section, § 4.01, to the sleepwalking killer and psychopath contexts, bearing in mind relevant studies and findings in neuroscience and related scientific disciplines, as well as their limitations at this stage. Part of the analysis considers the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest insanity law decision, Kahler v. Kansas (2020), in relation to the subject matter of this article.

The main argument of this article is that only a clear conception of the purpose of punishment can orient the debate about the positioning of the fault requirement and strict liability doctrine in criminal law. A categorization of the varieties of strict liability offenses, as well as an adequate model for normatively appraising the legitimacy of these deviations from the principle of culpability, should be based on a systematic analysis of criminal law’s role and function in society. As is argued, the original purpose of criminal law consists in the stabilization of norms by means of punishment. Taking up that finding, this work provides a detailed view of the distinct mechanism of placing blame, allowing for the presentation of a clear scheme for categorizing and appraising the variety of strict liability offenses. It is stated that offenses substantively deviating from the standard mechanism of placing blame can potentially result in over-punishment, which is dysfunctional and not justifiable. Properly placing blame is essential for the appropriate fulfillment of criminal law’s purpose in society. Therefore, the claim of the principle of culpability and critiques of strict liability doctrine find their basis not only in considerations of fairness, but also social necessity. By presenting a systematic categorization of strict liability offenses, this research offers a clear approach to a frequently discussed doctrine and establishes new arguments against its legitimacy.