When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalization is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defense to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.

The American legal system currently tends to excuse sleepwalking killers, particularly based on the involuntary act defense, more so than the insanity defense. By contrast, the law generally does not excuse psychopathic murderers. However, the status quo may not be the optimal or most just solution to this legal dilemma; depending on one’s philosophical beliefs regarding the tension between society’s interest and the accused’s rights, one can identify various flaws within the prevailing application of the insanity defense in cases involving sleepwalking and psychopathy. As the law is constantly evolving, there is space for growth in this area, especially with the advancement in neuroscience, which can offer more insight into sleepwalkers’ and psychopaths’ brains. In approaching the complex questions of whether and how the law should excuse sleepwalking killers and psychopaths from punishment, this article turns to relevant findings from neuroscience for support and focuses on one particular approach, that of the Model Penal Code (MPC) insanity defense. We begin with an overview of the relevant criminal law doctrine in contextualizing the MPC’s approach to insanity defense. We then apply the relevant MPC section, § 4.01, to the sleepwalking killer and psychopath contexts, bearing in mind relevant studies and findings in neuroscience and related scientific disciplines, as well as their limitations at this stage. Part of the analysis considers the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest insanity law decision, Kahler v. Kansas (2020), in relation to the subject matter of this article.

The main argument of this article is that only a clear conception of the purpose of punishment can orient the debate about the positioning of the fault requirement and strict liability doctrine in criminal law. A categorization of the varieties of strict liability offenses, as well as an adequate model for normatively appraising the legitimacy of these deviations from the principle of culpability, should be based on a systematic analysis of criminal law’s role and function in society. As is argued, the original purpose of criminal law consists in the stabilization of norms by means of punishment. Taking up that finding, this work provides a detailed view of the distinct mechanism of placing blame, allowing for the presentation of a clear scheme for categorizing and appraising the variety of strict liability offenses. It is stated that offenses substantively deviating from the standard mechanism of placing blame can potentially result in over-punishment, which is dysfunctional and not justifiable. Properly placing blame is essential for the appropriate fulfillment of criminal law’s purpose in society. Therefore, the claim of the principle of culpability and critiques of strict liability doctrine find their basis not only in considerations of fairness, but also social necessity. By presenting a systematic categorization of strict liability offenses, this research offers a clear approach to a frequently discussed doctrine and establishes new arguments against its legitimacy.

Crime-control utilitarians and retributivist philosophers have long been at war over the appropriate distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, with little apparent possibility of reconciliation between the two. In the utilitarians’ view, the imposition of punishment can be justified only by the practical benefit that it provides: avoiding future crime. In the retributivists’ view, doing justice for past wrongs is a value in itself that requires no further justification. The competing approaches simply use different currencies: fighting future crime versus doing justice for past wrongs. It is argued here that the two are in fact reconcilable, in a fashion. We cannot declare a winner in the distributive principle wars but something more like a truce. Specifically, good utilitarians ought to support a distributive principle based upon desert because the empirical evidence suggests that doing justice for past wrongdoing is likely the most effective and efficient means of controlling future crime. A criminal justice system perceived by the community as conflicting with its principles of justice provokes resistance and subversion, whereas a criminal justice system that earns a reputation for reliably doing justice is one whose moral credibility inspires deference, assistance, and acquiescence, and is more likely to have citizens internalize its norms of what is truly condemnable conduct. Retributivists ought to support empirical desert as a distributive principle because, while it is indeed distinct from deontological desert, there exists an enormous overlap between the two, and it seems likely that empirical desert may be the best practical approximation of deontological desert. Indeed, some philosophers would argue that the two are necessarily the same.

It is often maintained that the criminal law is supposed to intervene only when a certain social norm has become so significant within a given society to justify its protection by means of penal sanctions. The criminal law is thus thought to mirror a hierarchy of values it neither shapes nor contributes to building; rather, it is required to stand at least one step behind social change. This article challenges this view, presenting a normative account that contributes to the debate on what is permissible for the criminal law to try to achieve. It does so by defining and theoretically substantiating the “transformational function” of the criminal law. The term refers to the use of criminalization and punishment to change, rather than merely reflect, social norms, attitudes, and beliefs alongside, and combined with, non-penal policy-making tools in contested domains. Four operational conditions of legitimacy are identified and discussed. Within such operational boundaries, this article contends that the criminal law can play an important role in promoting social change—i.e., the establishment of new norms and values—as well as helping the coagulation of norms, attitudes, and beliefs not yet fully entrenched within the societal body.

This article examines the rule on transferred intent under Italian criminal law and argues that such rule does not only concern the mental element of the crime ( mens rea ), as generally considered in both Italian and Anglo-American literature, but also involves a multiple offense scenario in which a willful offense attempted against the intended target coexists with a negligent one actually carried out against an unintended victim. According to the rule on transferred intent, the two offenses should be considered as a single offense for the purpose of sentencing.

Emoji and emoticons are becoming increasingly prevalent in criminal law cases around the world, although some judicial officers currently have no experience of them or of interpreting them. This article offers an in-depth examination of the area of emoji and emoticons in criminal law. It provides an overview of emoticons and emoji, including their history, their global popularity of use in modern communication, and their particular interpretative difficulties. It canvasses and analyzes international criminal cases involving emoji and emoticons. It provides a valuable table that lists each such case in which emoji and emoticons are present. In reviewing the existing international case law, this article identifies the handful of cases in which judicial officers have attempted to interpret emoji and emoticons in the criminal law context. However, it also demonstrates the absence of clear guidance on methods of interpreting emoji and emoticons. Most importantly, this article aims to assist filling this void by proffering important recommendations regarding interpreting emoji and emoticons in the criminal law context.

Across societies labels rarely are met with the degree of contempt and hatred that has become inherent in the label of “sex offender,” applied to those who offend the morals, ethics, and values of citizens because of the actions (or sexual affinities) in which they are believed to have engaged. In the current article, we examine the diverse ways the sex offender is assembled, drawing on assemblage theory. We examine the signifiers attached to bodies suspected, accused, and convicted of sex offenses and the material connections that come together as part of the chimeric sex offender assemblage. We demonstrate that the arrangement of signifiers and materiality reflects the complex landscape that is expressed in the image of the monstrous sex offender. Our contribution to the literature on sex offenders lies in demonstrating the chimeric nature of the sex offender.

Our sexually violent predator (SVP) laws are a miserable failure. We suggest a turn to international human rights law (IHR) as a source of rights for this population, and consider this matter from the perspective of comparative law . Many nations have enacted laws that both mirror and contradict early developments in United States jurisprudence, but there, challenges to community containment and preventive detention laws have been more successful when based upon IHR law. Also, registry notification is generally far more limited, and details are usually confined solely to police agencies. We must consider laws and court decisions from other nations when implementing US law reform in this area. In Part I, we consider the implications of IHR law , and assess how realistic it is that such law be embraced by domestic jurisdictions in dealing with relevant cases. We also consider the human rights issues and violations that have resulted from domestic enactment of International Megan’s Law. In Part II, we apply comparative law in an effort to determine how other nations have struggled with some of the basic issues that have been focused on by domestic jurisdictions since the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997). In Part III, we assess the application of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) to the legal and human rights issues discussed prior, in an effort to determine whether other nations have more successfully implemented TJ principles to combat some of the seemingly-intractable problems raised in SVP cases. We conclude by offering suggestions for US-based policymakers.

Across societies labels rarely are met with the degree of contempt and hatred that has become inherent in the label of “sex offender,” applied to those who offend the morals, ethics, and values of citizens because of the actions (or sexual affinities) in which they are believed to have engaged. In the current article, we examine the diverse ways the sex offender is assembled, drawing on assemblage theory. We examine the signifiers attached to bodies suspected, accused, and convicted of sex offenses and the material connections that come together as part of the chimeric sex offender assemblage. We demonstrate that the arrangement of signifiers and materiality reflects the complex landscape that is expressed in the image of the monstrous sex offender. Our contribution to the literature on sex offenders lies in demonstrating the chimeric nature of the sex offender.

Our sexually violent predator (SVP) laws are a miserable failure. We suggest a turn to international human rights law (IHR) as a source of rights for this population, and consider this matter from the perspective of comparative law . Many nations have enacted laws that both mirror and contradict early developments in United States jurisprudence, but there, challenges to community containment and preventive detention laws have been more successful when based upon IHR law. Also, registry notification is generally far more limited, and details are usually confined solely to police agencies. We must consider laws and court decisions from other nations when implementing US law reform in this area. In Part I, we consider the implications of IHR law , and assess how realistic it is that such law be embraced by domestic jurisdictions in dealing with relevant cases. We also consider the human rights issues and violations that have resulted from domestic enactment of International Megan’s Law. In Part II, we apply comparative law in an effort to determine how other nations have struggled with some of the basic issues that have been focused on by domestic jurisdictions since the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997). In Part III, we assess the application of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) to the legal and human rights issues discussed prior, in an effort to determine whether other nations have more successfully implemented TJ principles to combat some of the seemingly-intractable problems raised in SVP cases. We conclude by offering suggestions for US-based policymakers.

Public policies requiring individuals convicted of sex offenses to register with law enforcement authorities, and in some cases granting public access to certain registry information, have been adopted by dozens of nations and provincial governments across the globe. Within the United States, sex offender registration and notification (SORN) policies are primarily established at the state level, but have come under increasing federal purview since the 1990s. Arising from a perceived need for improved interjurisdictional consistency and coordination, the 2006 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) significantly broadened the scope and range of federal requirements for SORN systems operating within the states. Yet fourteen years following the law’s passage, a significant majority of states have yet to meet SORNA implementation thresholds, amidst an array of legal, political, fiscal, and practical challenges. Prior research has offered aggregate-level insights concerning the barriers to SORNA implementation, but has not captured the “back stories” of state policy experiences. Addressing this knowledge gap, the current study offers an in-depth examination of state experiences in aligning their policies with federal mandates. Drawing on data gathered from a diverse sample of ten states, the analysis reveals significant variation in the breadth and extent of required system changes and in the legal, political, and organizational dynamics surrounding state responses to federal oversight. Ultimately, the study offers insights and perspectives that can inform the continued refinement of federal and state policies, and improve the public safety effectiveness of the nation’s SORN systems.

In May 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of McCoy v. Louisiana , holding that defendants have a constitutional right to maintain their innocence at trial. Under McCoy , lawyers may not concede their clients’ guilt during trial when their clients insist on maintaining innocence, even if doing so would be a reasonable tactical decision. In this paper, we show how the case implicates an array of common problems concerning lawyer-client disagreement, and we argue that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer deficient guidance in this area. In particular, in relying on lawyer withdrawal as a remedy for lawyer-client disagreement, the Model Rules neglect to recognize that lawyers may have an obligation to stick with their clients despite serious disagreements over aspects of the representation. The Rules also gloss over the considerable administrative burden associated with withdrawal. After delineating some problems with the Model Rules’ approach to lawyer-client disagreement, we propose a set of revisions to the Model Rules that address the ethical and practical concerns we elaborate.

Public prosecutors are a key element within the legal complex, and crucial to the effective implementation of legal reforms. China’s procurators (public prosecutors) have previously colluded with local governments, police, and courts to “strike hard” against crime while overlooking systemic beating and torture of detained suspects to obtain confessions, shoddy investigative practices, and frequent miscarriages of justice. However, fifteen sets of Guiding Cases issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate since 2010 promote an unprecedented change in Chinese procurator culture away from “striking hard” to substantive protection of criminal suspects’ rights and exclusion of tainted evidence. They reinforce criminal procedure reforms since 2010 by demonstrating how procurators should protect innocent people against wrongful convictions and police brutality. They also stress the broader duty of China’s procurators to uphold the public interest against corrupt businesses and officials, especially in food safety, land-taking, and environmental protection cases. With other key actors in China’s “legal complex”—rights lawyers and civil society groups—still suppressed by the government, this effort to transform procurator culture is an essential, though still incomplete, step on China’s tortuous path toward a fair and just legal system.

This article examines how the perestroika gave rise to a new legal thinking that helped spark a broader transformation of international law and governance. Building on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, the article analyzes the emergence and short-lived influence of the professionals behind the new legal thinking of the perestroika. This elite operated at the crossroads between international and domestic law and politics. At this juncture, and in an attempt to safeguard and solidify their own position, they promoted the primacy of international law over politics by calling for, among other things, the establishment of an international criminal court. Building on the thinking of this elite that coexisted with concurrent streams of investments into international law from both East and West, a geopolitical window for new criminal law initiatives beyond the state was opened. It was in this brief window of opportunity that the field of international criminal justice was developed as a reflection of a wider universalist promise of establishing legal primacy in international governance.

This article sets out guidelines for law reform processes to account for the challenges that terrorism may pose to the rule of law and democracy. As a response to terrorism, an increase in reforms of laws and administrative measures has been seen across jurisdictions. The substantive offenses themselves have been criticized, but as of yet, the theoretical issues that may arise during processes of reform have not been considered. However, law reform as a direct and immediate response to such events may curtail the rule of law and democracy: there may be inadequate time for debate in the legislature regarding proposed measures, or the debate may be centered on arguments based on fear and hate toward perpetrators. This article argues that this may curtail individual autonomy of citizens and truncate democracy. It sets out guidelines for how processes of law reform may treat people as capable of self-moderation.