This article examines the relationship of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) during the 1970s, the period when the PLO reached the zenith of its power in Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Levant. Based on archival United Nations (UN) and UNRWA documents, as well as the PLO's own communications and publications, the article argues that the organization approached its relationship with UNRWA as part of a broader strategy to gain international legitimacy at the UN. That approach resulted in a complex set of tensions, specifically over which of the two institutions truly served and represented Palestinian refugees. In exploring these tensions, this article also demonstrates how the “question of Palestine” was in many ways an international issue.

The September 2018 decision by the administration of U.S. president Donald Trump to close the offices of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Washington and expel the PLO ambassador and his family was the latest chapter in the long and difficult history of Palestinian efforts to maintain information and diplomatic offices in the United States. From the opening of the first Arab information office in the United States in 1945, to the establishment of the first specifically Palestinian information center in 1955, to the creation of the first PLO office in 1965, the Palestinians’ twin goals of representing their people and providing information about their cause on the soil of Israel's greatest ally has been hindered by challenges and threats from a variety of sources. Indeed, the long saga of trying to maintain an official presence in the United States is a microcosm of the wider Palestinian national drama of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, replete with Zionist attacks, debilitating inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian rivalries, political ineptitude, the struggle to achieve diplomatic legitimacy, and hostility from the U.S. government and its pro-Zionist politicians.

This paper seeks to show how Israel has deployed Occupation Law in strategic ways to incrementally take the land of Palestine without its people. It argues that Israel has used UN Security Council Resolution 242 to retroactively legitimate those colonial takings in a political framework shaped by U.S. intervention. In themselves, the constituent pieces of the argument are not new and they have been extensively discussed in legal, political science, and historical literature. Rather than consider them as the sum of their parts, this paper attempts to view the issues that have been kept distinct and separate within disciplinary silos as a mutually-reinforcing whole, demonstrating that the United States' political position made an otherwise bankrupt legal argument effective and showing how the Security Council's deliberations gave Israel ample room for maneuver in spite of the drafting parties' original intent. In examining the relationship between law and political power, the article points to the ways in which the balance of power bears upon the meaning and significance of law in international conflict. Thus, the failure of Occupation Law to regulate the occupation of the Palestinian Territories ultimately reflects the outcome of a political, not a legal, contest: Israel's legal argumentation that the territories are merely under its administration would have no value were it not for the power politics that shape international relations in the region.