On 1 May 2017, Hamas released its “Document of General Principles and Policies” following years of periodic speculation that the movement was working on a new political platform. Heralded by some as a significant milestone in Hamas's political thought and practice, the document reiterates longstanding positions but also lays out some new ones. Given the timing of its release, as well as its contents and possible implications, the document could be considered Hamas's new charter: it details the organization's views on the struggle against “the Zionist project” and Israel and outlines its strategies to counter that project. This essay aims to provide a fine-grained analysis of the substance, context, and ramifications of the recently released document. The discussion starts with an overview highlighting aspects of the document that could be considered departures from Hamas's original 1988 charter, and pointing to changes in the movement's discourse, both in form and substance. A contextual analysis then probes the regional, international, and internal impetuses behind the issuance of the document. Finally, the discussion concludes with a look at the possible implications for the movement itself, as well as for the Palestinians and for Israel.

Since Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, its political positions as presented in the Western media hark back to its 1988 charter, with almost no reference to its considerable evolution under the impact of political developments. The present article analyzes (with long verbatim extracts) three recent key Hamas documents: its fall 2005 electoral platform, its draft program for a coalition government, and its cabinet platform as presented on 27 March 2006. Analysis of the documents reveals not only a strong programmatic and, indeed, state building emphasis, but also considerable nuance in its positions with regard to resistance and a two-state solution. The article pays particular attention to the sectarian content of the documents, finding a progressive de-emphasis on religion in the three.

This article paints a broad canvas of Hamas after almost four years of intifada and a relentless multipronged Israeli-U.S. assault against it. The movement's views and strategies are discussed with regard to suicide attacks, the intra-Palestinian dialogue and cease-fire negotiations, and conditions for a peace settlement. While Israel's assassination of leadership cadres has unquestionably dealt the movement a serious blow, the author argues that Hamas has nonetheless made three significant strategic gains: its ““resistance project””——contrasting with PLO negotiations policies——has gained ground as a ““national agenda””; Arab and Muslim support, fueled by rising outrage at U.S. and Israeli policies, has grown; and, most importantly, Palestinian support at the grass-roots level has never been greater, resulting in increased political weight even as the movement's military strength has declined.