The Palestinian Authority's application to become a full member state at the United Nations represents the latest stage in its "alternative peace strategy" born of the collapse of the U.S.-sponsored Oslo peace process. But—argues the author—the new strategy remains overly dependent on diplomacy and uncertain Palestinian allies like the European Union. If it is to achieve a balance of power for future negotiations more favorable to the Palestinians, however, it will need to be anchored in a greater national consensus at home and in the diaspora, and allied more closely to the emerging democratic forces in the region.

Obama's first veto in defense of Israel at the UN was of a Security Council draft resolution that condemned Israeli settlements in language reflecting the administration's own stated policy. The draft, supported by all other UNSC members, forced the U.S. to choose between undermining its credibility internationally and alienating constituencies at home. For the Palestinians, insistence on tabling the draft in defiance of Washington was seen by some as a first step in an “alternative peace strategy” involving a turn away from the Oslo framework in favor of the UN. After reviewing the context of the resolution, the author analyzes the stakes for the various players, the repercussions of the veto, and the diplomatic prospects in its wake.

This article examines the lead-up to the recent Palestinian legislative elections, looking especially at the Fatah's long-brewing internal crisis, born of Fatah's inability to reconcile its role as a national liberation movement with that as ruling party of the Palestinian Authority. The author assesses the impact of the new reality presented by Hamas's victory on Hamas, Fatah, and the international community, specifically addressing the post-election strategy put forward by certain Fatah elements, and backed by the United States, to undermine Hamas's victory by shifting power away from the Hamas-dominated legislative branch to the executive under the presidency of Mahmud Abbas.

The death of Yasir Arafat in November 2004 has given newly elected PA president Mahmoud Abbas the chance to pursue his strategy of cease-fire (with Israel), reform (of PA institutions), and negotiations (over the Quartet-sponsored road map and final status issues). In assessing the prospects of success for this strategy, the author examines three main obstacles: opposition from Hamas and other Palestinian groups; disunity within Abbas's own Fatah movement; and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's agenda, which is totally at odds with the PA's vision of a Palestinian ““state.”” The dilemma facing Abbas is that the final status issues must be confronted as soon as possible if there is any chance for a viable state, but the kind of struggle necessary to negotiate successfully requires thorough-going reform, which takes time the Palestinians do not have.

Placing Israel's separation wall in the continuum of the Zionist project in Palestine since the late nineteenth century, this essay sees the wall as the latest component of long-held policies of exclusion, control, and containment. In particular, it sees the wall as the culmination of Israel's quest to deal with its ““native problem,”” which had been largely solved with the 1948 war, but which returned full force with the 1967 conquests. The author traces the evolution of Israel's approach to this problem, from ““partial integration”” (and direct military rule) to separation (with indirect military rule and limited Palestinian self-government); settlement and land alienation have been constants. After deconstructing Sharon's current policy, the essay ends by examining Palestinian options for confronting a bleak future, focusing in particular on an as-yet inchoate strategy of nonviolence, campaigns for enforcing international law, and nurturing the most important potential alliance in the struggle against occupation: the Israeli peace camp.

This overview of the intifada gives special attention to the intra-Palestinian dimension, notably the rise of the tanzim that preceded the uprising and, once the uprising began, the evolving inner dyna mics of the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority (PA) under the impact of the crushing Israeli assault, international pressures, and so on. The author shows how, as the intifada enters its third year, the national movement is essentially split into three wings——the PA leadership, the young and still emergent Fatah leadership, and the armed resistance led by Hamas and Fatah offshoots——all following mutually incompatible strategies. In the author's view, democratic elections, if allowed, could provide one way out of the impasse.

The reason for Hizballah's poor showing in the recent Lebanese elections was the subject of speculation. Formed after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah acquired renown as a militia force against Israel. Since the 1992 Lebanese elections, it also has acquired a reputation as an effective opposition to the Hariri government, challenging Amal's hegemony over Lebanon's Shi'i community. The mobilization of Lebanon's main political forces against Hizballah in the elections has underscored the likelihood that Hizballah's role in the future will remain what it was in the past: less a domestic challenge to Amal and more a force for military resistance against Israel.