This paper discusses factors limiting the development of a modern, quantum-based chemistry in Nazi Germany. The first part presents a case study of industrial research in Nazi Germany that suggests the delayed introduction of space-filling molecular models into structural analysis and synthesis in industrial organic chemistry, almost a decade after their invention by a German physicist. Was this symptomatic of a broader pattern of neglect of quantum chemistry in Nazi Germany? To answer this question this paper examines the origins of such models, and their appearance (or not) in selected textbooks and monographs dealing with problems in the interdisciplinary borderland between the physical and organic dimensions of chemistry. While it appears that those on the physical side were more comfortable with such models than those on the organic side, it is also clear that even a theoretically unsophisticated organic chemist could learn to use these models effectively, without necessarily understanding the intricacies of the quantum chemistry on which they were based. Why then were they not better integrated into mainstream chemical education? To this end the second part discusses three phases (pre-1933, 1933–38, 1939–43) of the broader scientific, institutional, and political contexts of efforts to reform or “modernize” chemical education among many groups in Germany, particularly through the Association of Laboratory Directors in German Universities and Colleges, the autonomous group that administered the predoctoral qualifying examination (Association Examination) for chemistry students until its dissolution in 1939 by the Education Ministry and the establishment of the first official certifying examination and associated title for chemists, the Diplom-Chemiker (certified chemist). Continuing debates modified the examination in 1942–43, but given the limitations imposed by the political and wartime contexts, and the need to accelerate chemical training for the purposes of industrial and military mobilization, the resulting chemical education could not produce students adequately trained in the modern physical science emerging elsewhere in the world. Quantum chemists remained missing in action in Nazi Germany.

During the Third Reich, the biological institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWG, Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft) underwent a substantial reorganization and modernization. This paper discusses the development of projects in the fields of biochemical genetics, virus research, radiation genetics, and plant genetics that were initiated in those years. These cases exemplify, on the one hand, the political conditions for biological research in the Nazi state. They highlight how leading scientists advanced their projects by building close ties with politicians and science-funding organizations and companies. On the other hand, the study examines how the contents of research were shaped by, and how they contributed to, the aims and needs of the political economy of the Nazi system. This paper therefore aims not only to highlight basic aspects of scientific development under Nazism, but also to provide general insights into the structure of the Third Reich and the dynamics of its war economy.

The peasantry played a central role in National Socialist ideology, as both a source of racial strength and a foundation of the economy. In this paper I explore the extent to which the regime's policies actually favored peasant farming. The first section looks at the overall character of agricultural policy and demonstrates that although peasant farmers were targeted for special assistance from 1933 until 1936, they were neglected thereafter as the economy geared up for war. In the second section I focus upon a particular set of policies——-the regime's attempts to promote the use of high-quality seed——-and show that while farmers as a whole probably gained from these measures, peasants appear not to have benefited differentially. In the third section I examine agricultural officials' attempts to establish a "division of labor" between public-sector plant breeding institutions and commercial breeders. I demonstrate that although the former had been successfully developing new varieties specifically designed for peasant farmers since the turn of the century, this work was henceforth to be curtailed so as not to "compete" with the private sector. In the conclusion I argue that neither the regime's policies on plant breeding nor the highly centralized character of agricultural policy-making can be regarded as specifically fascist.