This introduction examines the growing interest in science diplomacy and the parallel lack of in-depth historical studies on this new concept. In particular, we first show how the recent attention toward science diplomacy has led to a proliferation of hagiographic accounts reflecting the urgency to support its growth rather than truly investigate its ancestry. We then turn to consider how our historical understanding of science diplomacy could be improved, and how this knowledge could equally be of significance to science diplomacy practitioners today. This essay is part of a special issue entitled Science Diplomacy , edited by Giulia Rispoli and Simone Turchetti.

The US monopoly of information regarding nuclear weapons was one of the distinctive features of the early Cold War. It encouraged US officials to bolster their country’s hegemonic role in post-war affairs, something that scholars have previously referred to in terms of “atomic diplomacy.” This paper shows that Cold War atomic diplomacy originated in an ancestral form of what we call today “science diplomacy,” distinctive of wartime allied relations during WW2. It first explores how science became a distinctive feature of wartime diplomacy by looking at agreements regarding exchanges of information and collaboration that shaped the relations between wartime allies (US, UK, and the Soviet Union). It then shows that their signing (and, at times, their rejection) eventually paved the way to conflicting views within allied administrations on what to share, making their officials less inclined to pool more knowledge toward the end of WW2. In conclusion, US monopolistic stances and atomic diplomacy originated in these disagreements, also marking the demise of wartime science diplomacy. This essay is part of a special issue entitled Science Diplomacy , edited by Giulia Rispoli and Simone Turchetti.

After World War II had ended, Italy, not unlike other developed countries, held the ambition to establish an atomic energy program. The Peace Treaty of 1947 forbade its administration from seeking to acquire atomic weaponry, but in 1952 a national research committee was set up to explore the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in particular with regard to building nuclear reactors. One of the committee’s goals was to use nuclear power to make the country less reliant on foreign energy provisions. Yet, this paper reveals that the atomic energy project resulted in actually increasing Italy’s dependence on overseas assistance. I explain the reasons for this outcome by looking at the unfolding of U.S.–Italy relations and the offers of collaboration in the atomic energy field put forth by the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. I argue that these offers undermined plans to shape the nuclear program as its Italian architects had envisioned, caused them to reconsider the goal of self-sufficiency in energy provisioning, and reconfigured the project to be amenable to the security and economic priorities of the U.S. administration. In this way, I conclude, the path for the Italian project to “de-develop” was set.

ABSTRACT In the 1930s the production of patents for the protection of intellectual rights became central to the research activities of Enrico Fermi and his group, consistently with a research policy emerging within the Italian Fascist Regime. Behind their work was an international network consisting of businessmen, industrialists, and multinationals who helped them patent their method for the production of artificial radioactive elements and to promote its industrial exploitation. The lack of research funding combined with a more aggressive foreign policy of the regime made it impossible for the group to continue these activities in Rome, and in 1938 the promulgation of racial laws forced them to migrate abroad.