At first glance the story of the Intense Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS), an accelerator-driven neutron source for exploring the structure of materials through neutron scattering, seems to be one of puzzling ups and downs. For example, Argonne management, Department of Energy officials, and materials science reviewers continued to offer, then withdraw, votes of confidence even though the middling-sized IPNS produced high-profile research, including work that made the cover of Nature in 1987. In the midst of this period of shifting opinion and impressive research results, some Argonne materials scientists were unenthusiastic, members of the laboratory's energy physics group were key supporters, and materials scientists at another laboratory provided, almost fortuitously, a new lease on life. What forces shaped the puzzling life cycle of the IPNS? And what role——if any——did the moderate price tag and the development of scientific and technological ideas play in the course it took? To answer these questions this paper looks to an ecosystem metaphor for inspiration, exploring how opinions, ideas, and machinery emerged from the interrelated resource economies of Argonne, the DOE, and the materials science community by way of a tangled web of shifting group interactions. The paper will conclude with reflections about what the resulting focus on relationality explains about the IPNS story as well as the underlying dynamic that animates knowledge production at U.S. national laboratories.

In the early 1980s, David Shirley tried to launch a new synchrotron light source for materials science at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL). Building accelerators was LBL's stock-in-trade. Yet with the Advanced Light Source (ALS) nothing proceeded as in the past. Whereas nuclear and high energy physicists had been happy when funding was procured for new machines, materials scientists were irritated to learn that Shirley had brokered a deal with Presidential Science Advisor George Keyworth to fund the ALS. Materials scientists valued accelerators less because materials science had benefitted less from large-scale devices; such devices were therefore uncommon in their field. The project also faced competition and the criticism that LBL managers wanted it only to help their laboratory weather the threatening times that came with Ronald Reagan and his promise to cut the size of government (and in fact that was a part of the rationale). The ALS also suffered because Shirley's deal was ill-suited for Washington in the 1980s. Scientists were less influential than in previous decades and a more robust federal bureaucracy controlled funding. Other ALS advocates eventually crafted a convincing scientific justification, recruited potential users, and guided the proposal through materials science reviews and the proper Washington channels. Although one-on-one deal making àà la Ernest Lawrence was a relic of the past, Shirley did bargain collectively with other directors, paving the way for ALS funding and a retooling of the national laboratories and materials science: in the 1990s and 2000s the largest Department of Energy accelerators were devoted to materials science, not nuclear or high-energy physics.