In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, several states introduced and expanded regulatory frameworks for screening (and potentially blocking) inward foreign direct investment. This shift accelerated a preexisting trend in the global political economy, as states have been widening their understanding of “national security” risks arising from foreign investment. The result is that such screening mechanisms are evolving from a niche subject to a broader regulatory tool that touches an expanding share of global economic activity. The tensions inherent in this shift—including how firms will respond, how states can evaluate systemic (rather than transactional) risk, and the potential and limits of international cooperation in investment screening—have not yet been resolved.

This essay revisits the developed/developing country division in the global economy in the light of the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. A trend that precedes the pandemic has been a seeming detachment of the binary distinction between “developed” versus “developing” countries and what has been described as growing economic diversity in the so-called “developing world.” While emerging markets such as Brazil, India, or China have been able to catch up economically with the “developed” world, many African, Middle Eastern, or South Asian countries are increasingly marginalized in the global economy. At the same time, there is an increasing recognition that poverty is rising within the so-called “developed” world. Against this context, we investigate whether the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforce this trend and further blur the developed/developing country divide in the global economy. We find a nuanced picture that contains elements of both continuity and change: while the short-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic cut across the developed/developing country distinction, its long-term economic repercussions largely reiterate the divide—with the exception of China among the emerging markets.

The global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 brutally exposed the vulnerabilities of hyperconnected just-in-time production networks. It was met by prominent calls by business and political leaders to prioritize resilience over efficiency and to reshore global production. About one year later, this commentary provides an early assessment of the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic has altered the political economy of globalized production. Rather than fundamentally changing the structural organization of multinational corporations, it is argued, the pandemic highlighted and accelerated important trends that were already well underway before the outbreak of the pandemic. Even though the COVID-19 crisis has not fundamentally altered infrastructures of global production, there are indications that transnational production networks may be in the process of bifurcating further into US- and China-centered spheres—with more cross-border integration within but less across the two—in the years to come.

A study conducted in March 2021 by the United Nations Development Programme and the Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver estimated that the multi-dimensional effects of the Covid-19 crisis could drive over 1 billion people to be living in extreme poverty by 2030 (UNDP 2021) if no action is taken to mitigate the impacts of the crisis. This echoes wider concerns about the impacts of the pandemic on global needs and transnational solidarity. Against this background, this commentary proposes IPE research draws on analytical distinctions between (1) public and private aid; (2) the quantitative and qualitative aspects of aid projects; and (3) the different motivations driving aid to analyse the evolution of aid flows in times of pandemic. With these distinctions in mind, I argue that there are reasons to believe that, despite the global economic depression, aid volumes may remain relatively stable over the coming years. Nevertheless, the current pandemic may re-orient aid flows away from the most urgent needs, requiring scholars to focus more on the quality than quantity of international aid flows in the era of Covid-19.

What is the relationship between the global COVID-19 pandemic, the economic recession that followed in its wake, and the ongoing degradation of the global environment? What are key takeaways from this relationship for scholars of international political economy? This article identifies a trialectical relationship between these three forces, addresses ways that the trialectic presents moments of both continuity and change in the trajectory of the global political economy, and invokes Arundhati Roy’s concept of “the pandemic as portal” to foreground the need for scholars of international political economy to tease out and promote new political economic ideals that improve humanity’s resilience to future destabilization risks.

Since the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the European Union has taken tentative steps toward the issuance of joint debt. This progress is significant but puzzling: the technical value of such instruments has never been in doubt; however, the political will to move forward has always been lacking. What changed? This short article argues that contemporary political economy research points us toward the role of ideas and identity in explaining this shift.

This commentary for the “Political Economy Section COVID-19 Collection’’ discusses ideational continuity and change at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that, despite an initial advice to increase the government spending, the Fund has later reverted back to the market orthodoxy recommending fiscal discipline and balanced government budget in the longer-term. The piece argues that, although a global crisis and increased government spending by influential member states such as the United States might have prompted an ideational shift at the Fund, a lack of clear theorization of longer-term Keynesian policies in academic circles and in the economics profession, prevented a paradigmatic change at the Fund.

This essay argues for the need for research into multispecies relations at the intersection between international political economy, ecology, and disease emergence. It draws attention to the conditions of intensive agribusiness and modern livestock, which alter human-animal-microbe relations, facilitating the emergence of infectious diseases such as the case of mink farms and COVID-19. It also highlights the impact of infection on animals and farming economies. Through a discussion of the ways anthropogenic activities have historically changed the kinds, scale, and spread of human disease, the essay concludes with an appeal to rethink international political economy.

The sense of extreme disruption brought by Covid-19 led to the fast adoption of unprecedented containment policies. Central banks played a key role in this regard by adopting bold and unprecedented forms of financial stabilization as well as support for government debt in the bond markets. The overall effect has been the blurring of the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy, a key pillar of the “neoliberal” era. Furthermore, the Fed acted as a de facto lender of last resort in dollars of the global financial system, thus playing a global stabilization role even as the Trump administration worked to weaken traditional US ties to global economic governance.

Before the covid-19 pandemic, significant advances have been made in the advanced industrialized economies toward greater gender equality in the workplace, especially since the 1990s. However, the first year of the pandemic has led to dramatic backsliding in gender equality even among countries that have adopted sizeable relief packages to combat the devastating economic effects of the pandemic. This commentary argues that the pandemic has reinforced existing vulnerabilities in IPE. The essay takes stock of government economic support measures in selected OECD economies. It then compares the government responses in two representative cases with very different welfare state legacies—Denmark as a case representative of the Nordic welfare state model and the USA as a case representative of the liberal welfare state model. The main finding is that the Nordic welfare state model has been more successful in protecting vulnerable social groups, such as women, in times of severe crisis. The contrast is especially visible if we compare the performance of Denmark in terms of maintaining female labor force participation during the pandemic with that of the USA, where women as a social group have been set back decades in terms of exit from the formal labor market as well as loss of job and career opportunities.

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerates and exacerbates many preexisting tendencies in the global political economy. Consequently, the crisis of the liberal international order (LIO), which has been ongoing for several years, is also being affected by the pandemic. These effects are, however, not uniform: some aspects of the crisis of the LIO, as a multidimensional phenomenon, are under more pressure than others. In this article, I detail these varied effects with a specific focus on questions of geopolitics and hegemonic change. I argue that especially the societal level, where socioeconomic distortions and popular discontent are long-existing drivers of crisis, will be severely hit by the social and economic fallout of the pandemic. I conclude by suggesting a set of hypotheses regarding the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the crisis of the LIO that can be tested once more data becomes available.

What happens to remittances, an important feature of the global financial system, when a pandemic strikes? Despite early predictions of significant drops in volumes, flows have been affected less than expected. This commentary explains that this outcome is attributable in part to a renewed focus on the infrastructure of global finance and an accelerated development and use of digital solutions, but that it is mostly a result of the individual efforts and resilience of migrants.

This forum contribution highlights the confluence of two distinct trends in the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. On one hand, many of the worst socio-economic costs of the virus and control measures have been disproportionately borne by marginalized workers, primarily in the global south. Often these impacts have not overlapped with the public health costs of the virus itself. In this sense the pandemic has highlighted the ways that risks in the global political economy are unevenly and systematically distributed. On the other, early indications are that highly individualized notions of ‘risk management’ and ‘resilience’ will be central to post-crisis global development agendas. At the same time as the COVID-19 pandemic has made the systemic and unequal nature of risks in the global political economy visible, then, many of the most marginalized segments of the world’s population are being asked to take responsibility for managing those risks.

Introduction to Race and Identity in the Study of International Political Economy Global Research in International Political Economy (GRIPE) Webinar and commentaries Organized 30 September 2020

On September 30, 2020, several of us dialed in to attend a webinar panel discussion on “Race, Identity and Culture in the (Post-)Globalization Era.” The participants shared their thoughts on how and why race factors into international political and economic processes. In the spirit of addressing the topic from a political economy perspective, it seems worthwhile to outline the decision calculus that determines why considering race in international political economy (IPE) research is a good idea. If the benefit b of accounting for race times the probability p of success outweighs the costs c weighted by the probability (1 - p ) of failure, race should be a key component of IPE research moving forward.

This comment elaborates on and extends the roundtable’s discussion by turning to the context of Indigenous peoples. Even setting aside normative motivations, expanded study of Indigenous peoples provides clear opportunities for theory development in international political economy and international relations more broadly. For example, the legal status of American Indian Nations’ 326 unique political jurisdictions can inform the political economy of marginalized identity groups in a non-Westphalian but nonetheless international context.

This comment responds to the recently held Global Research in International Political Economy roundtable on race in IPE. In particular, it argues that scholars of political economy could draw fruitfully on the notion of “whiteness as property” from the critical race theory subfield of law in order to trace the workings of whiteness, and race more broadly, as a material force in the economy.

This is a comment on Katharina Lima de Miranda and Dennis Snower’s multidimensional approach for the assessment of human well-being. It applauds the authors for looking “beyond GDP” but urges them to go one step further and replace GDP as a measure of material well-being by growth national income and actual individual consumption. Unlike GDP, these alternative measures for material well-being can be used to single out activities by multinational entities that are largely unrelated to domestic well-being. I will show that multinational entity activities, like the relocation of corporate headquarters and IP assets to Ireland and Luxembourg, have grown in such a substantial way in recent years that they can bias assessments of both material and human well-being.

Compelling visions of how political institutions can be effective and democratic in handling globalization problems is one of our most important predicaments. Political institutions always were deficient in that they were hardly fully effective and democratic. During the prime of liberal democracies, their problem-solving capacity was limited, and the process of making decisions approached democratic ideals at best. Yet the current predicament goes deeper. We lack a compelling vision of ideal political institutions for handling global problems such as climate change. In order to develop this argument, first two criteria for a compelling vision of ideal political institutions are identified. In a second step it is argued that the two currently most crucial institutional visions do not provide convincing accounts for fulfilling these criteria. The paper concludes by suggesting that these weaknesses of both sides of the debate contribute to polarization, thus making the predicament worse.