Beyond Technology and Development: Reflections on the Digital Double Bind

The widespread adoption of digital technologies has brought about significant changes in the Middle East, spawning transformations across various sectors, fostering avenues for political participation, boosting economic diversification, and inducing broader societal changes. Governments throughout the region are making substantial investments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their infrastructure, including next-generation networks and data centers, to support digital transformation initiatives. The market has pivoted toward digital sectors, from e-commerce to innovative applications, providing resources to develop an emerging digital economy. Concurrently, publics, particularly younger generations, are leveraging digital technologies for self-expression, leisure, political engagement, and entrepreneurship. For many observers and analysts, the Middle East’s digital turn avowedly holds great promise for the region. Yet the hype surrounding digital transformation often obscures disjunctures that affect the nature, pace, and depth of these changes. At the core are conflictual pulls and contradictory dynamics that simultaneously drive change and maintain stasis, generating new momentum while reaffirming existing structures. The same forces that embrace, deploy, and use digital technologies simultaneously strive to mitigate or control their impacts. In its most pointed manifestation, this asymmetrical dynamism can best be described as a “digital double bind,” a concept we introduced in The Digital Double Bind: Change and Stasis in the Middle East (Zayani and Khalil 2024b), which is the focus of this review symposium. Occasioned by the release of the open-access edition of the book, this article reiterates the need to revisit the question of how digital transformations manifest beyond what is typically experienced in the “network society” (Castells 1996, 2023). Motivating this inquiry is also an invitation for a critical reflection on and a conceptual recalibration of the relationship between technology and socioeconomic and political change in the Arab Middle East and, more broadly, in the Global South.

In recent years, the Middle East’s information and communications landscape has undergone dramatic change. The region’s embrace of the digital can be readily observed across various spheres. At the infrastructure level, several states have invested in building the ICT systems crucial for achieving digital readiness. On the user end, smartphone penetration rates in the region are among the highest globally, indicating a large potential market for mobile-based services and applications. In 2022 three of the top five 5G leaders globally were from the Middle East (Kechiche 2023), highlighting the potential of the region’s expanding telecom market, which is projected to reach USD 29.57 billion by 2026 (Technavio 2022). This high penetration rate and economic promise have contributed to the expansion of established sectors such as media industries and telecommunications and facilitated the adoption of a wide range of digital services, from telehealth portals to e-court platforms. The region also boasts a highly engaged social media user base, with platforms like Facebook, Snapchat, and TikTok experiencing rapid growth across various segments of the population, especially youth. Thirty percent of the Middle East’s population is aged fifteen to twenty-nine, representing a significant potential base of both social media users and digital content consumers. Saudi Arabia ranks sixth globally with 21.2 million Snapchat users, while Egypt stands as the ninth-largest national market globally for Facebook, with 44 million users (GO-Globe 2023). This widespread use of social media facilitates digital consumer engagement and offers new avenues for businesses to reach target groups.

Demographic considerations, ubiquitous smartphone ownership, and high mobile internet connectivity are expected to drive significant growth in e-commerce and fintech, among other IT-centered sectors, projected to reach USD 49 billion, USD 3.45 billion, and USD 95 billion, respectively, by 2025 (Mofeez 2023; Matsagou 2023). Industry reports estimate that the Middle East’s digital economy could reach a staggering USD 780 billion by 2030, significantly outpacing the global average growth rate (UBS 2023). This increase translates to potential GDP per capita growth of 46 percent over thirty years, partly driven by expanding digital sectors, an energized job market, and increased productivity (Cabral 2023; Mathew 2023).

In addition to undertaking large infrastructural investments, several states are developing ambitious national digital strategies and rolling out initiatives that position them well to capitalize on the benefits of future digitization and yield “digital dividends” (World Bank 2016). For example, the Digital Egypt Strategy aims to transform the country into a digital society by enhancing digital infrastructure, promoting digital literacy, and supporting the ICT sector, including establishing technology parks and expanding broadband (Egyptian Ministry n.d.). Qatar’s National Vision 2030 emphasizes ICT infrastructure advancement through smart cities, fiber-optic networks, and digital innovation. Jordan’s REACH 2025 initiative focuses on enhancing digital infrastructure and skills, aiming to position the country as a regional ICT leader (int@j n.d.). Morocco’s Digital Morocco plan seeks to boost the digital economy by enhancing ICT infrastructure, promoting e-government services, and supporting digital entrepreneurship (Morocco Ministry n.d.). These national strategies underscore the region’s commitment to technological advancement and economic diversification. However, achieving an equilibrium that promotes sustainable and inclusive growth remains challenging due to the complex interplay of rapid technological changes, sociopolitical constraints, and entrenched economic structures.

The region’s expanding digital economy is indicative of the complex dynamics of a digital turn, marked by both rapid advancement and resistance. According to industry analysts, the rise of e-commerce has contributed significantly to economic growth and job creation (Deloitte 2023). The e-commerce market in the Middle East and North Africa is estimated to be worth USD 27 billion, highlighting the sector’s rapid expansion (Bekker 2023), facilitated by online retail and digital payment systems (Aqlan 2020). At the same time, the proliferation of digital banking and fintech solutions is revolutionizing the financial services sector, offering greater accessibility and convenience to consumers through mobile payments and digital lending (Ahmad 2023). These developments bode well for financial inclusion, seamless service delivery, and economic growth in the region.

The Middle East also has a burgeoning start-up ecosystem driven by advances in technology and increases in government support. Leading the charge are Gulf economies like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which aspire to become innovation hubs. Initiatives such as Dubai’s Future Accelerators and Saudi Arabia’s Tech Champions program exemplify their commitment to fostering digital entrepreneurship and innovation. Although the start-up scene is still developing, the availability of venture capital is energizing homegrown deligital innovations, resulting in high-profile acquisitions of these start-ups by global platforms. For instance, Souq⁠.⁠com, founded in Dubai in 2005, became one of the largest e-commerce platforms in the Arab world before its acquisition by Amazon in 2017 for USD 650 million (Amaro and Acton 2017). Similarly, Careem, a ride-hailing app founded in Dubai in 2012, was acquired by Uber for USD 3.1 billion in 2019 in what was then the largest technology-sector transaction in the Middle East (Uber 2020). Dynamic start-ups that attract both local and international investments represent an important part of the region’s digital turn. However, sustaining this type of momentum requires a comprehensive approach that fosters inclusive growth and addresses socioeconomic disparities, which will be discussed in greater detail later.

At the broader societal level, increased access to the internet has empowered citizens by facilitating their access to diverse forms of information and enhancing public discourse. It has also helped promote civic engagement and participation in governance (Yassin and El Nahlawy 2023). Where these spaces of engagement are either foreclosed or scarce, digital resistance has increased (Wheeler 2017), prompting states to adapt to the disruptive potential of emerging technologies. Notably, digitization has implications for how states define their relationships and interactions with their citizens. For example, the transition to e-government services in several countries has streamlined public administration, increased transparency, and improved citizen satisfaction. Many Middle Eastern countries have made significant strides in digital government services, with online platforms for tax filing, passport renewal, and other services becoming increasingly common (Boughzala, Janssen, and Assar 2015). This, in turn, has heightened the need for states to invest strategically in digital infrastructure, bolster cybersecurity, enhance protective capabilities for personal and financial data, and establish adequate legislative frameworks. These efforts are crucial in order to keep pace with rapidly unfolding digital developments and effectively address associated challenges.

The preceding analysis of a Middle East that is forging ahead with the “digital revolution” overlooks the reality that the digital turn involves incremental societal changes that are irreducible to technological transformations. Despite the region’s investment in digital infrastructure and its concerted efforts to reorient itself toward an innovation-based knowledge economy, the effectiveness of digital technologies in achieving sustainable development and economic diversification remains uncertain, as does the ability of the digital to bring about meaningful sociopolitical change. The digital turn is far from transforming Middle Eastern societies into smoothly gliding network societies. While the hype around a digital Middle East evokes an image of a region on a direct path toward a technologically connected future, the reality is more complex.

To start with, consider the specter of homogenization. As a referent, the designation “Middle East” obscures geopolitical realities, overlooks sociocultural diversity, and reduces historical complexities (Amanat 2012; Kurzman 2007). We use the term “Middle East” interchangeably with “Middle East and North Africa” (MENA) to designate a geographical region comprising twenty-two contiguous Arabic-speaking countries defined by vast cultural, economic, and political diversity. This Arab Middle East is divided into three subregions: the Gulf, the Levant, and North Africa, each with distinct characteristics and histories. The Gulf states, rich in oil and gas reserves, have pursued rapid modernization and economic diversification. In contrast, the Levant, with its historical significance and ongoing conflicts, presents a complex mosaic of ethnicities and religions. North Africa, straddling both Arab and African identities, adds another layer of complexity with its unique sociopolitical dynamics. The term “Middle East” itself carries colonial connotations, having been popularized during the British Empire to describe regions of strategic interest (Maxim 2017). Any analysis focusing on the Arab Middle East must navigate these nuances, acknowledging the distinctiveness of each subregion while understanding their shared histories, common challenges, and interconnected trajectories.

When it comes to the digital Middle East, fascination with information and communication technologies is part of long-held imaginaries that consider technology an expedient fix, an empowering tool, and an equalizing force (Wilkins 2021). Discourses about the digital are often constructed around these internalized imaginaries. Embedded in many accounts that champion digital technologies as a transformative force are presumptions about technology’s inherently modernizing abilities and the idealized nature and process of progress. These imaginaries hark back to the region’s colonial past and, along with it, contested notions of modernization (Zayani and Khalil 2024a). The extent to which technology is embedded in colonial expansionism has been widely studied (Arnold 2006). In fact, the West has long appropriated its technologies to influence, change, or dominate the Middle East region, from Napoleon Bonaparte’s introduction of the printing press in Egypt during his 1798 expedition to Britain’s launch of the BBC Arabic Radio Service (1938–2023) as a projection of its power in the region.

During the decolonization era of the 1950s and ’60s, newly independent states faced the challenge of embracing Western technology while resisting Western hegemony. Accessing advanced technology was central to modernization and development plans, spanning areas such as industrial production, irrigation, oil enterprises, communication infrastructure, and transport services. But technology is not neutral, and many critics have questioned the efficacy of technological dependency in driving substantial change given the structural barriers in the Global South, many of which are themselves vestiges of colonialism (Unwin 2017). These critics advocated for socioeconomic development fostering enduring social change within local communities (McAnany 2012). Nonetheless, the economic globalization of the 1970s and ’80s, rapid innovations, and accelerated urbanization have made the transfer of technology and expertise increasingly urgent for the region (Stetter 2012).

Fast-forward to the digital era, and confidence in the transformative potential of rapid information and communication technologies remains undiminished. For some, it amounts to a “digital sublime” (Mosco 2004) or “imaginaire” (Flichy 2007). Enthusiastic proclamations about sweeping transformations across the region fail to capture the complexities of the digital Middle East and the significant discrepancies from state to state in ICT adoption and development.

The Middle East’s digital transformation has not been uniform, unilateral, or systematic (Zayani 2018). A few states in the region consistently meet or exceed international standards and benchmarks for digital readiness; others have made modest progress, and some consistently trail behind. The same pattern is evident in ICT development markers across the region. Emerging Gulf states, such as Qatar and the UAE, have positioned themselves at the forefront of ICT-driven change in the region, vigorously pursuing digital transformation agendas integral to their strategic plans to achieve economic diversification and transition from hydrocarbon-dependent economies toward sustainable growth. In contrast, Egypt and Tunisia have adopted digital technologies selectively and realized a more limited degree of transformation, while countries such as Syria and Yemen continue to struggle in their transformation efforts.

There are telling differences even within subregions and among states from comparable income categories. In the Levant, for instance, there are notable disparities between Jordan’s and Lebanon’s digital readiness. Jordan thrives on state-supported ICT development led by the private sector (Al-Bakri 2015) and has pursued a digital economic strategy that enabled it to be a player in the region’s soft infrastructure (including software and game design as well as web development and hosting). Conversely, neighboring Lebanon lacks a developed telecommunication infrastructure and competitive services, yet these did not prevent it from achieving widespread internet access or the development of an ICT sector (Ben Hassen 2018). Confronted with a government monopoly over communication, unreliable internet services, and overpriced internet connections, many users in Lebanon resorted to a sprawling network of illegal internet providers (Ayton 2017).

Harnessing the full potential of the digital requires a comprehensive, interconnected, and highly functional ecosystem. This includes adequate frameworks (technologies, policies, regulations, human capital skills), digital participation (accessibility, affordability, inclusion), digital government, and supportive financial structures. Such enabling conditions cannot be assumed. Unequal access, constrained affordances, limited digital literacies, and disparate deployment of technologies result in asymmetrical techno-cultural geographies, even if these asymmetries are often overlooked. These digital inequalities are a reminder that the region has yet to achieve much-hyped technology-driven transformation, highlighting the limitations of technology benchmarks, indices, and scales that provide only a partial understanding of the complex processes of digital adoption and adaptation. Where the digital has been widely adopted, it has ushered in complex and, at times, contradictory dynamics that require rigorous analysis. These dynamics raise critical questions about the nature of digital transformation, given the region’s propensity for, or resistance to, change in the face of entrenched political structures, established economic systems, and ingrained sociocultural norms.

Making sense of these competing assessments of the Middle East’s digital turn calls for a conceptual recalibration. Instead of dwelling on the manifest outcomes and measurable effects of ongoing technological changes, we consider the logics and dynamics that animate the digital turn. This approach shifts the debate away from generic affordances of digital technologies to focus on the uneven yet productive tensions that give the digital Middle East its defining character. Informing this recalibration is the premise that change and stasis are not mutually exclusive; rather, they coexist in a tenuous balance, shaping how the digital Middle East unfolds. Such a formulation transcends simplistic binaries that deem these developments as inherently beneficial or dismiss them as inevitably detrimental, providing a more nuanced understanding of their workings and implications. It complicates our understanding of the region’s encounter with the digital and redefines development as a nonlinear process that conjures both change and stasis at once.

A nuanced approach to the Middle East’s digital turn requires careful consideration of the conjunctures and disjunctures that constitute the digital double bind’s logics and structure its dynamics. The double bind theory is credited to Gregory Bateson, who, along with his team, set out to study the relationship between behavior and communication (Bateson et al. 1956). Bateson’s theory soon became foundational to social psychologists, who adopted it to posit a communicative situation involving contradictory messages wherein responding successfully to one message necessitates failing to respond to the other. This necessarily entails a breakdown in communication, leading to a no-win situation. When this breakdown is constant, it becomes accepted as a fact of life, even if the bind could be loosened with a change in relational patterns.

Notably, the double bind is not a simple contradiction, mere opposition between two conflictual realities, or even a paradox. Whereas a paradox is characterized by the incomprehensibility of a contradictory state (Stevens 1996), a double bind designates an insoluble complexity arising from conflicting demands and expectations. This complexity makes it virtually impossible to devise straightforward solutions, particularly in contexts with deeply entrenched political, economic, and sociocultural systems. The double bind thus depicts a range of everyday situations we learn to navigate, accept, overcome, or ignore. What defines the double bind is the coexistence of competing and seemingly incongruous logics that are irreducible to a mere paradox.

This conceptual standpoint facilitates our understanding of the complexities of the Middle East’s digital turn. A digital double bind is bound to occur when the conditions, situations, or circumstances in which the state’s embracing of, the market’s alignment with, and the public’s immersion in the digital create conflictual pulls. The region’s encounters with the digital represent an ongoing process that manifests itself as a multilayered transition interlinked with technological dimensions but riven with conflicts and contradictions. Embracing the digital is thus fraught with seemingly irreconcilable tensions. As such, the Middle East’s immersion in the digital turn unfolds along a course that simultaneously extends and delimits, animates and inhibits, drives and disrupts ongoing transformations. Accounting for the productive tension between a growing impetus for change and counter-dynamics that impede such change illuminates the double bind that characterizes the Middle East’s digital turn. Importantly, what is of interest—besides how the digital double bind manifests—is how the ensuing complexities become embedded, how they are navigated, and how they are accommodated.

The state’s relationship with digital technologies is multifaceted and fraught with contradictions. To varying degrees, states in the region promote digitization as a means of economic diversification and development, investing significantly in digital infrastructure. Complicating these efforts is the states’ concurrent attempt to control and restrict access, content, and use. States promote digital initiatives and advancements in part to meet the aspirations of a young population, while simultaneously limiting digital access when open communication and the unhindered circulation of content in cyberspace risk undermining their control over the public sphere. Governments invest in next-generation networks and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to boost economic productivity and innovation, while implementing stringent regulations and surveillance measures to monitor and restrict online activities. The irreconcilability of these pursuits often results in policies that both encourage and restrict digital activities, again reflecting the tension between social change and control.

The implications of these conflictual dynamics are also readily observable at the state-market nexus. Market forces align with the demands of the knowledge economy, often with state support, to drive productivity, enhance competitive advantage, and foster sustainable growth. However, the legacy of state-centric economies and patronage networks continues to shape economic development in the region, creating tension between efforts at economic liberalization and the deeply entrenched systems of clientelism and patronage (Schwarz, Schwarz, and Weipert-Fenner 2019). Market forces capitalize on the digital wave, crystallizing new avenues for profit and global integration, which in turn challenge widely adopted practices and necessitate an overhaul of existing policies. Such endeavors, though, often lead to the active re-creation of conditions that foster dependency and stasis, thereby perpetuating existing power structures and limiting the potential for genuine innovation and progress. These dynamics are such that the same forces that drive technological innovation and economic growth also reinforce traditional dependencies and inhibit transformative change.

These contradictory pulls are also evident in various forms of individual and group engagement with the digital. Since the late 1990s, digital technologies have transformed communities within the Middle East in profound ways, reshaping social dynamics and introducing novel cultural practices. The digital turn has provided critical platforms for diasporic communities, marginalized groups, and social movements to articulate their cultural politics. From blogging to social media, these technologies facilitate various forms of community building and political activism, enabling different voices to be heard and fostering a sense of solidarity and collective identity. During the initial Arab uprisings (2010–11) and subsequent social movements, digital activists used platforms for mobilization and information dissemination, knowing full well that the same tools would be used to track and sanction their activities.

Over the last decade or so, digital platforms have become essential tools for communication, entertainment, and information, particularly for youth and women, providing spaces for sharing, influencing, and cultural expression. Additionally, mainstream news organizations and political elites now use the same platforms that once constituted a source of competing news and information, often leading to disinformation. For the more savvy and talented users, social media have enabled new avenues for talent development, personal branding, and financial rewards. However, this potential is often constrained by state-imposed restrictions that limit freedom of expression and access to information and reaffirm societal norms as a bulwark against nonconformity.

These challenges are compounded by the rapid pace of technological development, particularly with the rise of AI, which has outpaced the knowledge economy’s traditional promise. This shift confronts the Middle East with the pressing question of how to best address a post-knowledge economy: Can the region foster innovation and develop unique AI applications rather than rely on Western-based solutions or settle for peripheral roles (whether it is data processing or outsourcing centers)? AI challenges the foundational principles of developing human capital and generating value from intangible assets, such as copyrights and patents, by automating tasks traditionally performed by humans. Moreover, AI’s implications for job displacement are profound in a region already facing high unemployment and a significant digital skills gap. Addressing these challenges requires honing local talent, cultivating knowledge clusters, and devising frameworks for innovation that align with the region’s cultural and economic contexts, rather than merely replicating existing models such as Silicon Valley.

The interlacing of state policies, market dynamics, and public engagement within the digital turn reveal a complex matrix marked by conflicting pulls. While digital platforms offer avenues for self-expression and social mobility, they also expose users to risks of censorship and legal sanctions. Further complicating these dynamics is the encroachment of global tech companies within national contexts. States tend to maintain regulatory silence when it comes to global platforms’ operations within national borders while blocking access to what they deem as disruptive digital tools and sanctioning non-conformist individual users. This ambivalence underscores the inherent tension between the pursuit of market-driven digital innovation and the imposition of restrictive measures that ultimately curtail open access and hinder genuine progress.

These dynamics suggest that the digital turn is not merely a technological transformation but a techno-cultural transition reshaping geopolitical landscapes, social dynamics, and individual capabilities. This turn affects states, markets, and publics along different temporalities and moves at different speeds. States grapple with the tension between promoting digitization and maintaining control, markets capitalize on rapid technological advancement while maintaining entrenched economic practices, and publics experience both the empowerment potential and the inevitable risks that come with the increased exposure on digital platforms. Collectively, these dynamics make the digital double bind the most salient feature of the digital Middle East.

To illustrate the intricacies of the Middle East’s digital turn, the following section unfolds along three lines of analysis that probe how the double bind manifests at the level of the state, market, and publics, respectively. This analysis explores how states leverage new technologies to reshape geopolitical realities, assesses the promises and challenges of AI-driven integration, and examines the youth-centered creator economy. These illustrations reveal the tensions spawned by the digital turn, offering insights into the challenges and opportunities of navigating the digital era in a region marked by profound social, economic, and political transitions.

Information technology, particularly infrastructure, plays a central role in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Prior to the internet era, the state was at the center of media infrastructure with the substantial investments required for legacy media technologies and the strategic importance of information as a political instrument. This often resulted in a state monopoly, with government, for the most part, acquiring a felt influence and an unchallenged authority over media infrastructure, institutions, and content. This dual imperative of economic exigency and national security control positioned the state as the primary actor in media and information operations, shaping the technological landscape (communication infrastructure) and defining the content disseminated to the public (mass communication). As the 1980s drew to a close, and in reaction to stalled national development efforts, several states in the region started to liberalize long-held étatist systems by relaxing protectionist policies and reorienting state-centered economic development toward private-sector initiatives at a time when globalization processes favored economic privatization and eroded the power of nation-states.

Capitalizing on the experience of an established émigré press and the transnational broadcasting capabilities of the newly launched ArabSat (1985), Saudi entrepreneurs with royal connections set up satellite media operations in European capitals such as London and Rome. The 1990s was marked by the “satellite revolution,” which loosened the grip of governments on the telecommunications sector. The reduced barriers to entry and the affordability of satellite technology contributed to the proliferation of media actors and the expansion of satellite channels, including dissident channels, which then altered media consumption practices. The perceived influence of media on public opinion, especially during periods of intensified instability in the Middle East, prompted regional governments, state proxies, and foreign players with strategic and economic interests to invest in satellite television. This influx led to a multitude of voices and heightened competition for audiences.

For key media players in the region, adjusting to these developments necessitated the repatriation of European-based media channels and the creation of Arab media networks—a process favored by developing homegrown media capabilities and acquiring a voice from within the region (Kraidy and Khalil 2009). By the late 1990s, Egypt, with its long-standing media tradition, launched NileSat and licensed private channels to regime proxies. To capitalize on the growing demand for media production and distribution, countries such as the UAE and Jordan established media cities. In these economic free zones, local and foreign media investors benefited from an enabling ecosystem in which to establish various media institutions, from satellite channels to digital publications. These openings required reducing regulatory demands, easing business requirements, streamlining the licensing process, and offering various other incentives. Gradually, these changes empowered media outside the influence of the state, making media as much liability as asset. By investing in the spaces, technologies, and regulatory frameworks necessary to support private commercial media, states have strategically repositioned themselves to mitigate the disruptive potential of new technologies and their sociopolitical consequences (Khalil 2019).

The digital turn prompted various states to invest in the requisite ICT infrastructure and to capitalize on the economic opportunities of digital technologies while simultaneously resisting the development of a market-driven telecommunications sector in which states assume the role of mere regulators. Today, states remain dominant players as the leading financiers, regulators, and controllers of digital infrastructure, thereby maintaining significant control over the communication sphere. Even so, the disruptive potential of the internet poses an enormous challenge. Unlike satellite technology, the inherent nature of the internet—its decentralized digital network—makes it difficult for any particular authority to exert complete control. This decentralization precludes states from replicating the same monopolistic oversight they maintained over legacy media. The role the digital played in the Arab uprisings made patent to those in power the destabilizing nature of open communication, complicating state efforts to embrace digital advancements while heeding security concerns. With many states reverting to tighter controls over the internet, the specter of “digital authoritarianism” (Woodhams 2019; Uniacke 2021; Jones 2022) risks ensnaring them in a double bind, embracing the economic modernizing potential of the internet while walling it off from their citizens.

To control the internet and monitor online activities, states rely on sophisticated ICT infrastructures from Western-based companies and manufacturers, which also supply surveillance equipment to regimes throughout the region. Whether such technological solutions dampen digital contention or impel savvy users to devise new ways to bypass the system is debatable. What is certain is that cybersecurity poses a serious challenge with far-reaching political and economic implications. With the growing sophistication of AI, the stakes are even higher, raising concerns about cybersecurity threats and the potential for deepfakes to manipulate content and stoke division. A case in point is the Gulf crisis, which erupted in 2017 when key Gulf states and their regional allies declared a blockade on Qatar. That the blockade was triggered by the hacking of the Qatari national news agency and the publishing of fake news underscores the complex role of digital technologies in reinforcing and, at times, extending existing regional geopolitical rivalries (Miller 2018).

Dependence on foreign ICT infrastructure goes beyond nefarious technology. A central component of several Middle Eastern nations’ digital strategies is the ability to access, acquire, and deploy the requisite infrastructure, from mobile networks to cloud servers and data centers, much of which they do not produce, as they lack capacity in high-tech manufacturing. This dependency underscores the critical role of geopolitics in the region’s digital transformation efforts. The Middle East continues to be a contested area between external powers at a time when digital technology has emerged as a new battleground. The colonial legacy aside, the region is of global strategic importance largely due to its natural resources.

In this respect, the US-China rivalry exemplifies the strategic importance of digital infrastructure in global politics and its ripple effect on the region. In one of its dimensions, the raging tech war between these two states manifests as a contest for a more robust technological presence in the region. Just as the United States—the largest weapon supplier to the Middle East—seeks to maintain its long-standing dominance, China—the Middle East’s largest oil importer—strives to expand its presence globally and claim a foothold in the region. For its part, the Middle East finds itself anew at the center of geopolitical and infrastructural interests, aiming to leverage these dynamics toward its modernization plans and development goals. With some countries aspiring to develop technological hubs capable of transforming the region, navigating the geopolitics of ICT infrastructure has become of paramount importance.

In this regard, two external blueprints are unfurling over the so-called “new Middle East,” neither originating from within the region: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-American Green Corridors Initiative. Their proclaimed objective is economic prosperity. Enabled by coveted digital infrastructure and premised on geopolitical (re)alignments, these transnational projects do more than redefine trade routes; they adumbrate reconfigurations of global power politics. Situated at the crossroads of three continents and continuing to be a contested strategic area between external powers, the Middle East is central to these two initiatives just as the latter’s technological, economic, and geopolitical significance acquires a particular importance for the region. Envisioned as a strategic foreign policy approach and an economic plan, the BRI aims to unite Asia, Africa, and Europe with a vast web of infrastructure projects, including the Digital Silk Road. Countering China’s growing influence is the Green Corridors Initiative, born out of Indian and American ambitions and aspiring to connect the Indian subcontinent with the Middle East and Europe through advanced telecommunications infrastructure.

The extent to which these competing grand initiatives, which reinforce Asian (Chinese and Indian) and Western (American and European) infrastructural dominance, contribute to the region’s development goals remains uncertain. For aspiring Gulf states, whose digital readiness efforts are unfolding at the intersection of technological infrastructure and geopolitical considerations, a persistent question arises: Will economic involvement and geopolitical alignment with these initiatives enable them to foster local digital innovation and emerge as critical players in the global digital economy, or will they be confined to the role of mere intermediaries in a global digital network, facilitating flows between two continents? While initiatives grounded in economic cooperation and political alliance may provide a framework for innovation-based development, they do not necessarily unsettle existing structures of dependency, which ultimately undermines the prospects for substantive change. If anything, geopolitical challenges and economic dependencies further complicate the region’s pursuit of technological integration and advancement.

The strategic claim to and development of digital networks in the Middle East underscores the region’s dual role as aspiring player and consumer in the digital realm, reflecting further the broader geopolitical implications of digital advancements. On one hand, the region is positioning itself as a burgeoning player and an aspiring hub for digital innovation. In particular, Gulf countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are investing heavily in digital infrastructure and entrepreneurship, aiming to become regional tech leaders. On the other hand, the region stands less for technological innovation than for digital consumption. Navigating the digital turn has further accentuated the asymmetry inherent in the duality of innovation and consumption.

Like the rest of the world, the Middle East is eyeing the potential of AI, which is heralded as the next frontier in digital technology, promising to revolutionize multiple sectors by enhancing individual capabilities and driving economic growth. For some Gulf countries, investing in developing AI capabilities is elevated to a priority in their digital national strategies to reduce dependence on oil revenues and diversify their economies. The potential financial impact of the AI boom in the Middle East is substantial, with projections that it could contribute an estimated USD 320 billion to the region’s economy by 2030 (Azoury and Yahchouchi 2025; Deloitte 2020).

However, much like previous technological advancements including satellite television and the Internet of Things (IoT), the race for AI also introduces complex dynamics. On one hand, states and businesses embrace AI as a key strategy to rid the region of its development predicament and unlock its economic potential by developing technology-intensive sectors, boosting job creation, and enhancing national competitiveness. On the other hand, these same stakeholders grapple with AI’s reliance on foreign technology and expertise as well as the risks associated with increasing access and enabling local groups that could act against the state’s national security interests. Concerns about job displacement, algorithmic bias, and the potential misuse of the technology for surveillance deepen the sense of unease with AI. This dual role of AI as a beacon of hope and a source of anxiety underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of its implications. While it is premature to assess AI’s impact and parse its long-term consequences for the region with confidence, recognizing the signs of its mixed promise is crucial if we are to eschew common perspectives of new technologies as either boon or bane.

Developing local talent and skills is a critical focus for Middle Eastern countries aiming to harness AI’s potential. Spearheading these regional efforts, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in education and training programs to build a workforce capable of supporting AI advancements. These include collaborations with academic institutions and the establishment of dedicated AI ministries and departments to oversee and steer these initiatives (Chandran et al. 2023). With the support of global consulting firms, these countries aim to create an attractive value proposition for international AI professionals and develop national training programs toward overcoming the talent gap in AI expertise within the region (McKinsey 2023). Complicating these endeavors is the steep global shortage of AI talent and skills, considering the demands of AI’s exponential growth worldwide (Deloitte 2020). Even when these industry hurdles are overcome, relying on migrant technical labor to accelerate the region’s integration into the global AI market often hinders the development of local AI capabilities and the upskilling of the local workforce, further entrenching the region’s dependency on foreign technology, talent, and know-how. These considerations are critical for Middle Eastern states with technological aspirations to become competitive AI players (Chandran et al. 2023).

Prosperous technology-oriented states in the region view AI as the ultimate driver of economic growth. For example, in its bid to reduce dependency on oil revenue, the UAE has vigorously pursued a national AI strategy designed to foster innovation and attract global tech investments (Microsoft 2019). Launched in 2017, considerably before the recent global fixation on AI, the UAE’s strategy emphasizes AI’s transformative potential and anticipated benefits for government operations, public utilities, and health care. In its latest iteration, this strategy aims to position the UAE as a global hub for AI by 2031, with initiatives like the Smart Dubai 2021 Strategy focusing on transforming the city through digital innovation (PwC Middle East, n.d.). However, the rapid implementation of AI technologies also comes with conflictual pulls. To start with, the integration of AI has revealed infrastructural inefficiencies. Additionally, there are growing concerns about privacy and data security that are as much geopolitical as they are technical in nature (Kreacic et al. 2024). For instance, the United States has raised concerns about transferring advanced American technologies and sensitive data to China via Gulf-based firms, pressuring the UAE, for instance, to steer clear of Chinese companies, potentially impacting its AI development strategies, initiatives, and partnerships (Kreacic et al. 2024; Perrigo 2024). In the job market, the fear of job displacement due to increased automation is matched only by concerns over the challenges of attracting enough skilled professionals to fully leverage these emerging technologies (Perrigo 2024). These tensions and impediments underscore the inherent obstacles to achieving ambitious technological advancement in the Middle East.

Equally noteworthy are the ethical and bias-related challenges AI poses. Globally, concerns are growing about the underrepresentation of minority viewpoints and the perpetuation of biases across language, demographics, and cultural contexts due in part to the algorithmic configurations that power AI systems and the nature of datasets, reflecting how machine-learning models are trained (Lindgren 2023). Regionally, AI systems trained on predominantly Western data may perform poorly in Arabic contexts or reinforce existing cultural stereotypes and biases. Addressing these biases requires a concerted effort in massive, diverse, and representative Arabic data collection and model training to ensure that AI systems are both accurate and inclusive. Another critical challenge is data quality and technology infrastructure. Building high-quality data pipelines and modern technology stacks is a significant challenge in the Middle East, as in the Global South in general. Effective AI systems rely on vast amounts of high-quality data, but inconsistencies in data collection and limited infrastructure can impede its development. This disparity in data readiness further complicates the region’s ability to leverage AI effectively (PwC Middle East, n.d.). Short of developing capacity in AI and related industry sectors that support it, these considerations portend yet another phase of data colonialism (Couldry and Mejias 2019). In this phase, existing and deep-seated power imbalances inherent in the relationship between the Global South and the Global North are further perpetuated through technologically engineered processes.

Compounding these disparities is the rapid pace of AI advancements and subsequent integration that often outstrips the development of regulatory frameworks, engendering a gap between technological capabilities and regulatory oversight (Chandran et al. 2023). Ensuring that AI technologies are used ethically and responsibly requires a proactive approach to regulation and governance, which has been slow to develop. These considerations raise the question of whether the Middle East can innovate without producing the necessary technologies and developing its skilled talent. In effect, dependency on global AI players perpetuates local reliance on external technology providers, thwarting efforts to achieve competitive status. This scenario elucidates the hollowness of “liberation technology” (Diamond and Plattner 2012) discourses that tend to resurface with every new digital technology (Mosco 2009; Arora et al. 2023).

Examining the historical trajectory of technological innovations offers valuable insights into how AI might unfold in the Middle East. Initially hailed as revolutionary, earlier technologies were eventually integrated into everyday life, often creating new dynamics and dependencies. For instance, satellite technology expanded global communication but also brought about geopolitical tensions over satellite control and usage. Similarly, the internet, while democratizing access to information, has led to digital surveillance and data privacy issues. The Middle East has historically adopted new technologies but lagged in creating original innovations, except when these technologies were integrated into the region’s techno-cultural geographies and tailored to meet its specific needs. With its rapid development and high stakes, AI presents an even more acute challenge.

The increasingly pervasive nature of AI necessitates a balanced approach that considers both its potential and its pitfalls. States, markets, and publics must navigate this complex landscape, balancing AI’s promises with the need for ethical, equitable, and sustainable development. The same forces that promote and expedite the use of AI simultaneously maintain stasis by ignoring structural, labor, ethical, and regulatory challenges. These dynamics ensnare the region in a digital double bind, where the push for technological advancement is countered by the reluctance to address its broader implications, thereby making the tension between change and stasis even more pronounced.

These conflictual pulls are even more pronounced at the sociocultural level. Internet connectivity, mobile penetration, and platform adoption have reached levels where many of the contentious cultural issues society reckons with are played out online and reverberate in everyday life. As digital spaces increasingly become arenas for public discourse and cultural negotiation, the resulting dynamics reflect and amplify societal tensions, making the virtual sphere a critical battleground for cultural and social conflicts. Particularly revealing are social media controversies around online activities on TikTok (HRW 2020), which are emblematic of broader challenges faced by young, particularly female digital content creators in restrictive environments.

In recent years, and in line with evolving global social media usage trends, TikTok has experienced significant growth and influence in the Middle East. The platform has garnered immense popularity, especially among younger users, making it one of the region’s most influential social media apps. In one year, TikTok experienced a 50 percent growth in user numbers, with the average daily time spent on the app being eighty minutes—the highest among social media platforms (Ganediwalla 2022). Considering the app’s uptake by country reveals notable trends. In Egypt, the region’s most populous country, TikTok boasts a large and active user base, with more than 33 million monthly users aged eighteen and above (Kemp 2024). In the Gulf region, TikTok has achieved even higher penetration rates, with substantial user interaction and content creation. For example, Saudi Arabia has the highest TikTok penetration rate globally, with a remarkable 88 percent of the population using the app. The platform’s ad reach in the kingdom exceeds 110 percent, which suggests that many users have multiple accounts (Harper 2023; Communicate Online, n.d.). Similarly, the UAE has 8.23 million users aged eighteen and above, with the platform’s ad reach attaining 105 percent (Global Media Insight 2024).

To enhance its popularity in the region, TikTok adapted its business strategy and diversified its offerings beyond music and dance. Popular categories such as FoodTok, FashionTok, and LearnTok helped the platform boost content engagement (Cherian 2020). This variety helps cater to the diverse interests of Middle Eastern audiences. The platform has introduced initiatives like the Creator Fund and Creator Hub to support and monetize content creators. To that end, TikTok also provides various monetization tools, such as the tip jar and video gifts, which allow creators to earn directly from their content. Additionally, brand collaborations have become lucrative, with creators earning significant sums from sponsored posts and campaigns (Lakhpatwala 2023). This trend is expected to continue as more businesses recognize the potential of TikTok for marketing and customer engagement (Singh 2020).

At the same time, TikTok faces challenges related to content moderation and regulatory compliance. The platform needs to navigate local laws and cultural norms successfully in order to maintain its growth trajectory. Whereas international controversies involving TikTok have been largely framed in the media around Western concerns over Chinese influence and security breaches, in the Middle East, the platform’s struggles emanate primarily from the fear of content being deemed inappropriate by local standards. So far, TikTok’s popularity in the region appears unabated. The platform’s simplicity and focus on engaging content have allowed it to maintain its market dominance, even as competitors introduce similar features the app pioneered.

Nowhere, perhaps, are these dynamics at play more than in the controversy surrounding what came to be known in Egypt as the “TikTok Girls,” which underscores the complex relationship between digital expression, social norms, and gender politics in the Middle East. Several young women were arrested and charged with violating public morals after posting videos on TikTok that were deemed inappropriate by Egyptian authorities. This case became a battleground for broader societal issues, underscoring the tension between the necessary and rapid adoption of digital platforms on one hand and the maintenance of traditional societal values and the challenges to state control on the other. This situation exemplifies how the intersection of technology, economy, culture, and state dynamics creates a complex and multifaceted landscape that cannot be reduced to simple binaries.

The case began in 2020, when prominent TikTok influencers Haneen Hossam and Mawada al-Adham were arrested, fined USD 20,000 and sentenced to two years in prison for “violating family values” through their content on TikTok and other platforms (Al Jazeera 2020). In addition to common scenes of dancing and singing, some of their activities advertised for other young women to join in making money chatting virtually with men. This drew the ire of the authorities, which considered such online activities as promoting immorality and corrupting young people. The legal action against the two young women was part of a broader crackdown on social media influencers in Egypt, reflecting the state’s attempt to regulate online behavior and enforce traditional values (BBC News 2022).

The arrests sparked a backlash on social media, with many users and activists arguing that the charges were excessive and decrying what they perceived as a double standard in enforcing public morality laws. The case even drew international attention, raising concerns about freedom of expression and women’s rights in Egypt (Walsh 2020). Legal advocates and human rights organizations called for the release of the influencers and an overhaul of the laws used to prosecute them, as these reflected anachronistic state control practices inherited from the era of legacy media.

The widespread adoption of TikTok in the Middle East has engendered contradictory pulls, whereby the users’ needs and the market’s logics are often at odds with the state’s interests. TikTok offers users a platform for creativity, entertainment, and potential financial gain. In turn, the market represents a conduit for attracting potential users and a lucrative opportunity for digital advertising and brand engagement upon which digital content creators thrive. However, for the state, popular platforms such as TikTok—which teems with content, some of which the state views as challenging cultural norms and undermining public morality—chip away at their ability to maintain authority over the public sphere.

Because the governance and regulation of global digital platforms are elusive at best, and existing regulatory frameworks are inadequate, the state typically targets individual content creators to manage online activities, induce acquiescence, and enforce societal norms. This approach reflects a broader strategy in the Middle East, where states often sanction users rather than attempt to regulate the platforms themselves, which they reluctantly restrict when severely challenged or the stakes are high. Reconciling the desire to promote digital adoption and boost economic growth and the need to maintain control over cultural norms and moral values has proven to be inordinately constraining.

Beyond the inadequacies of existing regulatory frameworks for online activities and the moral panics social media occasionally induce, the squabbles surrounding the TikTok Girls’ postings and the legal actions against the two influencers highlight broader disjunctures. Evolving forms of self-expression and the advent of a social media–based creator economy are at odds with entrenched gender norms and have accentuated social panics surrounding youth activities online. The same digital tools and forms of engagement that enable young women to express themselves creatively and achieve financial independence also incite social condemnation and, in some instances, severe legal repercussions. This tension illustrates the contradictory pulls the digital turn engenders in relatively conservative societies. While global digital platforms are perceived as providing social engagement and financial opportunities, they also point to significant social, economic, and political conflictual pulls.

As the anchor piece for the current review symposium, this article provides an illustrative analysis of the complexities of the Middle East’s digital turn. It offers valuable insights into how the region might navigate the digital double bind in order to more effectively capitalize on the opportunities digitality affords. The article underscores the necessity of adopting a nuanced approach to digital policies and strategies, highlighting both the potentials and the constraints inherent in the region’s digital trajectory.

These formulations lead to the crucial question of how to break out of the double bind. This inquiry is hardly rhetorical. Conceptually, it harks back to debates on how social change occurs and the related question of the closed and open system (Lefebvre 1971; Jameson 1981, 91; Castoriadis 1987). Simply asserting that the region is perpetually caught between change and stasis recalls a tradition of essentialist claims about Middle Eastern exceptionalism (Salamey 2009) and proclamations about the Arab predicament (Ajami 1992). The complexities of the Middle East’s digital turn challenge these assumptions. While accounts often highlight an exponential pace of digital transformation, the region is paradoxically depicted as resistant to change. The coexistence of these opposing dynamics creates a situation where both change and stasis mark the Middle East’s digital turn.

While the entanglements presented here may seem daunting, they are not inevitable. The pervasiveness of digital technologies is such that they have become integral to the lived reality and intersect with various spheres of vital activity. Incremental changes are bound to happen when the double bind arises from asynchrony between different temporalities and imaginaries. When change stalls, it often reinforces the dynamics that ultimately constrain the possibility of long-lasting, radical transformation—hence the semblance of stasis. However, the Middle East is not necessarily trapped in this double bind. The discordances we identify are not immutable, nor do they follow a predictable path or lead to a predetermined ending. The interactions between the constitutive elements of the digital double bind generate openings in a system; these openings, by definition, forestall closure and preclude perpetual stasis. Though limited, these openings can foster meaningful change when leveraged effectively.

Capitalizing on such openings calls for localized approaches to innovation and the need to tailor digital strategies to the specificities of the Middle East. This involves not only technological adoption but also sociocultural and political embeddedness. For example, instead of attempting to replicate the Silicon Valley in the Middle East, a more productive approach would be to configure venues for innovation that align with the region’s economic, political, sociocultural, and infrastructural contexts and requirements. Similarly, the push for smart cities must be balanced with concerns about privacy, surveillance, digital rights, and the region’s diverse urban fabric, demographic prospects, and social histories. When it comes to AI and machine learning, the enthusiasm for and potential of these new technologies must be tempered with attention to historical legacies, ethical considerations, and the entrenched structures of bias and inequality. In all these endeavors, the engagement of states, markets, and publics as key stakeholders is paramount.

Heeding the nature of these internal contradictions and inherent tensions is imperative if the region is to navigate the challenges of the digital turn and harness the full potential of its digital investments. In this regard, the role of policy is crucial for navigating the complexities engendered by the digital double bind. Effective policies must support the development of local talent and skills, promote innovation ecosystems, and ensure that digital advancements contribute to social equity and justice. To these ends, policymakers need to be attuned to the multifaceted nature of the digital and how it intersects with broader socioeconomic and political dynamics.

Considered from a longue durée perspective, the digital double bind is undoubtedly an evolving process rather than a static condition. The history of technological change in the Middle East shows that periods of stasis and stagnation are interspersed with moments of change and innovation. The digital turn is no exception. While the Middle East is entrenched in a digital double bind, the underlying dynamics suggest that change, albeit incremental and uneven, is indeed possible.

It is our hope that the open-access availability of The Digital Double Bind opens up the opportunity for additional insights from academics and researchers as well as policymakers, industry analysts, and other stakeholders. In turn, this broader discourse will enable a more comprehensive understanding of the digital transformations shaping the Middle East, offering insights to inform balanced and inclusive digital development throughout the region.

The authors have competing interests to declare.

Mohamed Zayani is an award-winning author and professor of critical theory at Georgetown University. His works include The Digital Double Bind: Change and Stasis in the Middle East (with Joe F. Khalil; Oxford University Press, 2024); A Fledgling Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2022); Digital Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2018); Bullets and Bulletins (with Suzi Mirgani; Oxford University Press, 2016); Networked Publics and Digital Contention (Oxford University Press, 2015); The Culture of Al Jazeera (with Sofiane Sahraoui; McFarland, 2007); and The Al Jazeera Phenomenon (Pluto Press, 2005).

Joe F. Khalil is professor of global media at Northwestern University and currently a visiting professor at George Washington University. He has worked extensively on media industries, production studies, and alternative media. He is the author and coauthor of The Digital Double Bind: Change and Stasis in the Middle East (with Mohamed Zayani; Oxford University Press, 2024); Arab Television Industries (Palgrave, 2009); and Arab Satellite Entertainment Television and Public Diplomacy (Smith Richardson, 2009). He is also the coeditor of The Handbook of Media and Culture in the Middle East (Wiley-Blackwell, 2023) and Culture, Time and Publics in the Arab World (I.B. Tauris, 2018). Before joining academia, he had a long professional experience in the media and communication sector as television executive producer, consultant, and media market analyst.