Chinese President Xi Jinping has advocated for scientific and technological self-reliance amid increasing global tensions over emerging technologies. So far though, reforms to China’s innovation ecosystem have fallen short of the goal of developing domestic versions of many of the technologies at the center of U.S.-China competition. The Ministry of Education’s new program called “organized scientific research” seeks to address this shortcoming. In so doing, the ministry aims to channel research resources toward strategically relevant sectors—especially in technologies susceptible to U.S. restrictions—while maintaining space for free scientific exploration.
Key Findings
“Organized scientific research” is a catch-all term to describe the Ministry of Education’s advocacy for more basic scientific research funding and greater alignment of universities’ scientific work with China’s national strategic priorities. This includes focusing resources on supply chain-relevant innovations such as advanced semiconductors.
The Ministry of Education (MOE) commands China’s largest ministerial budget, which covers a host of critical expenses for scientific research such as salaries for talent program recruits. MOE directly oversees 65 of China’s top universities engaged in scientific research.
To achieve technological self-sufficiency, MOE has developed specific initiatives. Some target the general conditions for innovation in China. Others look to make breakthroughs in “key and core technologies” deemed crucial for China’s industrial development.
In 2019, MOE launched a new program to organize research on “chokepoint technologies" key to supply chain security. Through “integrated research platforms” based at Chinese universities, researchers work in high-priority sectors including those now subject to U.S. export controls. Organized scientific research shapes this work by breaking down larger problems into smaller projects, using team-based approaches that pool expertise across different disciplines.
Since 2019, MOE has increased the number of its engineering research centers, a program dating back to the early 1990s to reverse-engineer imported technologies. The program now focuses on indigenous innovation to replace technologies such as advanced semiconductors materials susceptible to foreign restrictions.
Introduction
In a speech delivered at the third study session of the politburo in February 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted the importance of boosting domestically produced basic scientific research and reaching “high-level scientific and technological self-reliance” in order to prevail in an ongoing global competition over science and technology.1 Since then, the most publicly visible reforms to China’s innovation system have been to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), which has been largely stripped of its administrative functions while its offices were subsumed by a powerful new Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC).2
However, other ministries are also pitching in. The Ministry of Education (MOE) one year earlier published its vision for self-reliance in a document called “Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening” (see Figure 2). It states that institutions of higher education are important components of China’s “strategic scientific and technological strength.”
Several problems plague China’s innovation system, including—according to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—that it has done too little to address “national needs.” Those needs include developing domestic versions of technologies at the center of U.S.-China competition, ranging from high-end microchips to gas turbines in airplanes.
The Ministry of Education’s answer to these challenges is something called “organized scientific research” (有组织科研). This concept is meant to channel science toward “national and regional strategic needs” by addressing the “pressing problems faced by national security as well as economic and social development.”3 Despite this ambition, the MOE’s document explicitly highlights the importance of continued “free exploration” of science, alluding to a tension between state needs and the imperatives of the research community in China.
In the policymaking process of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), opinions lack the force of legal reforms. Instead, they outline the broad activities or strategies a government entity should undertake. These are often translated into more specific plans or regulations. While the MOE opinions did not trigger major bureaucratic changes like the MOST reforms of March 2023, this document is nevertheless critical for understanding the direction of Chinese innovation policy because it lays out self-reliance strategies for some of China’s most critical innovation actors—its universities. While the MOST reforms codified into law a focused policy planning role, the 2022 MOE opinions serve to shape the ministry’s role in implementing innovation.
The Importance of the Ministry of Education to Chinese Innovation
The Ministry of Education’s vast resources are central to realizing President Xi’s vision of technological self-reliance. China’s MOE commands the country’s largest ministerial budget.4 Its 2023 expenditures on higher education alone totaled 403 billion yuan ($211 billion), dwarfing the annual budgets of MOST and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).5 While that number covers non-technical subjects such as political science, the education budget covers a host of critical expenses for scientific research such as salaries for talent program recruits.6
The Ministry of Education directly oversees 76 universities, 65 of which are engaged in science and technology, including China’s most prestigious research universities such as Tsinghua University and Peking University.7,8 Over the past several years, the budgets of these top research universities have ballooned.9 For instance, Tsinghua University’s annual operating budget grew from 26.9 billion yuan ($14.1 billion USD) in 2018 to 41.1 billion yuan ($21.5 billion) in 2023, a 52 percent increase.10 These institutions also house the ministry’s key labs, research groups with special MOE funding, and two research and development (R&D) programs—the integrated research platform and the engineering research center—which focus on developing supply chain-relevant “chokepoint” technologies. Supply chain stability is central to China’s self-reliance drive, and these two programs are critical for understanding China’s science and technology policy.
Institutions of higher learning are the country’s most important players in basic research. Over the past five years, the higher education sector deployed about 50 percent of the country’s basic research funds. Public research institutions came in second, while corporations deployed the smallest fraction of basic science funding. However, as of 2020, private sector basic science funding is now the fastest growing sector in this field. A 2021 note from the National Bureau of Statistics credits recent reforms, including generous tax deductions, for this increase in corporate-funded basic research.11 Despite this, higher education remains the biggest and most important actor in basic science in China (see Figure 1).
China’s Distribution of Basic Research Funding by Sector
Source: National Bureau of Statistics12
China’s Distribution of Basic Research Funding by Sector
Source: National Bureau of Statistics12
Organized Scientific Research in China’s Drive for Technological Self-Reliance
MOE opinions have institutionalized a new term—organized scientific research—that first circulated in specialized scholarly debates at least a year prior to the release of the opinions.13 This concept conveys a unique MOE contribution to the country’s self-sufficiency drive. It generated a broad debate within China’s higher education community including commentary by renowned scientists, respected innovation experts, and university presidents, each attempting to give meaning to the term.14 Universities also proceeded to organize workshops to discuss the term’s implications for their work.15 Recognizing the term’s importance, President Xi in his 2023 speech noted that “basic science was becoming more organized.”16
In proposing and analyzing “organized scientific research,” several Chinese experts reference a U.S. report entitled Science: The Endless Frontier. It was prepared in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, a former dean of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Engineering, upon request from President Franklin Roosevelt who asked for advice on how the United States should reconfigure its post-World War II scientific enterprise.17 The report’s central recommendation was that the U.S. federal government direct research funds toward U.S. universities. The White House then created an independent agency called the National Science Foundation (NSF) to disperse these funds. The outcome was remarkable—the U.S. government lifted the country’s still emerging research universities to the forefront of global science.
Box 1. An Official Take on the Meaning of “Organized Scientific Research”
An official explanation of organized scientific research was provided by Lei Chaozi, director of the MOE Department of Science, Technology, and Information Technology, in an article that appeared in a 2023 edition of China Higher Education, a journal overseen by the ministry.18 As is typical in CCP discourse, the essay clusters issues and goals into triplets and quadruplets.
Lei names three areas requiring “integration,” including the need to connect scientific and national strength, boosting double-class universities, and shifting toward multidisciplinary and problem-oriented work. Lei argues that China’s innovation system needs to undergo “four transformations.” Researchers should take greater initiative and stop fixating on credentialism, says Lei, and China’s science and technology (S&T) platforms—such as its labs and centers—have grown unchecked, misaligning resource distribution with policy needs. He also named “four aspects” that are important for China’s future S&T progress, including the need to solve original problems, develop “chokepoint technologies,” and support regional initiatives, such as in the region around the cities of Chengdu and Chongqing, and boosting domestic industry.
He concluded by outlining “three challenges” for China’s scientific enterprise. Lei laments the inadequate monitoring of work in key and core technologies, and that many research teams in China are not really working as teams but instead act like “straddlers and disbanded soldiers.” Finally, Lei argues that that research teams needed to become “combat ready,” and claims researchers are not bold enough and prefer to be big fish in a small pond rather than small fish in a big pond.
In referencing the Endless Frontier report, Chinese experts make two broad arguments. First, that China can claim global leadership in science and technology by investing in basic research in its universities. Second, that the Chinese research community should embrace the realignment of scientific work with national goals. Both are critical to the country prevailing in an ongoing international competition over technology, in particular with the United States.
In 2023, two science policy scholars at Renmin University wrote that over the past several years the U.S. science policy community went through a period of reflection, including on the legacy of Bush’s report. The result was the creation of the Directorate for Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships, a new NSF office that increases government funding for translating basic science into marketable technologies. In creating the directorate, the United States expanded the role of “organized scientific research,” the authors argue. China, they write, should proceed in a similar direction by focusing research in key areas, embracing the government’s role in coordinating science, emphasizing “application-oriented basic research,” and supporting China’s top research universities.19,20
The influence of organized scientific research will likely stay confined to Chinese universities. That is because the MOE oversees only university-based research, and not research based at state-owned enterprises or private companies. Furthermore, MOE has significantly less power than the newly established Central Science and Technology Commission in shaping national science and technology policy and will struggle to propagate its ideas beyond its purview without the endorsement of the commission.21,22
However, the debate over the importance of basic science is likely already settled. Xi Jinping dedicated an entire politburo speech to the matter in February 2023. Vannevar Bush’s work is now likely being deployed to advocate for MOE’s position in a marketplace of actors within the Chinese system, where different ministries are competing for central government funds.
Because of the ministry’s vast resources, the centrality of universities to innovation, the list of self-reliance activities—especially those focused on chokepoint technologies—and the rallying call around “organized scientific research,” the MOE deserves special attention from those interested in understanding China’s self-reliance drive.
Box 2. The Legacy of Vannevar Bush in Global Science Policy Discourse
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report Science: The Endless Frontier has had an enduring impact on science policy discourse worldwide. It is often referenced when science is experiencing political headwinds, as was the case when the report was first written. Bush led the charge to reorganize American science toward military applications during World War II. Once the war concluded, he then advocated for basic science funding to go toward universities.23
In 2020, NSF republished Bush’s seminal report on its 75th anniversary.24 At the time, the U.S. Congress would soon enter tense negotiations over U.S. innovation. One proposal, the Endless Frontier Act, was repackaged into the CHIPS and Science Act. “NSF’s mandate was designed from the first moment to serve the national interest,” France A. Córdova, the agency’s director, wrote in her commemoration letter.25 The Endless Frontier was used in both the United States and China to advocate for increased science funding.
Bush left a mark on European science debates as well. His work influenced the European Commission’s 2005 expert group report Frontier Research: The European Challenge.26 In the lead up to it, the Commission acknowledged Bush’s role in setting up a funding mechanism that would largely allow researchers to choose their own areas of work, which benefited industry further down the line. As a result, the European Union set up—for the first time—a basic science funding scheme.27
General and Sectoral Self-Reliance
To contribute to technological self-sufficiency, MOE opinions have identified nine overarching measures or goals and specific initiatives to accomplish them (see Figure 2).
Measures and Initiatives of the “Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening”
Source: Ministry of Education34
Measures and Initiatives of the “Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening”
Source: Ministry of Education34
Some of these initiatives target the general conditions for innovation in China. One such example is China’s “double first-class construction” (双一流建设) plan launched in 2015 (see Figure 2, Goal 1, Initiative a) to shape China’s best universities into world-leading ones.28 Others, such as a high-level policy issued by China’s State Council, focus on improving the general “atmosphere” and work culture of the scientific enterprise (see Figure 2, Goal 9).29
MOE’s initiatives strive for academic excellence and resemble what UC San Diego professor Barry Naughton describes as policies that seek to improve “the overall innovation environment, rather than any specific sector.”30 Such programs aim at general—rather than sector-specific—self-reliance.
Meanwhile, other programs are aimed at making breakthroughs in what the Chinese government calls “key and core technologies,” a loosely defined group of products that PRC leadership believes it needs to develop and produce domestically. These technologies include chokepoint technologies deemed critical for China’s supply chain security. The programs involve specific technologies or industries and aim at sectoral self-reliance.
Addressing a conference of scientists in 2018, President Xi declared that “past experience has shown us over and over again that we cannot expect to acquire critical and core technologies through requests, purchase, or begging.”31 The message was clear; Chinese researchers must find ways to make critical technologies at home.
Already a month before the release of the MOE opinions, the ministry launched a detailed initiative called the “Thousand Schools, Ten Thousand Companies” to help develop critical technologies domestically. It sets out goals to create 30 integrated research platforms (IRPs)—a new program—and 100 additional engineering research centers (ERCs), a pre-existing program.32
A key aim of the initiative is to deepen integration of industry, academia, and research institutes (产学研) in order to develop “key and core technologies and common technologies” without which “industrial development is restricted.” If official statements are any indication, the program seems to be making headway. According to Lei Xiaoyun, director of the Intellectual Property Utilization Promotion Department of the State Intellectual Property Office, as of June 2023, 1,500 patent holders—among them 600 different universities—had been matched with 76,000 companies.33
Integrated Research Platforms for Chokepoint Technologies
In 2019, MOE launched the new IRP program to organize research on chokepoint technologies.35 The author was able to identify 30 new IRPs (集成攻关大平台), confirming that the goal laid out in “Thousand Schools, Ten Thousand Companies” has been reached. All are based at Chinese universities and work in high-priority sectors such as high-end chips currently subject to U.S. export controls.36
An illustrative example of an IRP focused on chokepoint technologies is the “Integrated Research Platform for New Generation Integrated Circuit Technology” (新一代集成电路技术集成攻关大平台) at Fudan University. Fudan University has a history working on microelectronics and this group now appears focused on developing advanced chip fabrication processes at three-to-five nanometer (nm) nodes.37 In fall 2023, Fudan University released two job postings. One role entails work on non-planar three-dimensional transistors—the so-called fin field-effect transistor (FinFET) and gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET)—advanced semiconductor systems which amplify or switch electrical signals and allow for lower power consumption and higher chip performance.38
The roles describe chip feature sizes that are well below the 14 nm threshold the U.S. Department of Commerce export controls targeted in October 2022. Work at Fudan University in this area, however, predates the implementation of these controls. The university has been recruiting research associates to work on 3–5 nm process chips for its integrated research platform since at least March 2021.39 This suggests that the Chinese government deployed research resources to degrading the U.S. chokehold well before restrictions were ever imposed.
Organized scientific research shapes the work of universities by breaking down larger problems into smaller projects, some of which require expertise across different disciplines. Such an effort is team-based and relies on recruiting relevant talent.40 A good illustration of this approach is Shandong University’s “Integrated Research Platform for New-Generation of Semiconductor Materials” (新一代半导体材料集成攻关大平台).41 This platform is divided into at least six teams, each focusing on a different material with applications in microchip technology. The platform also receives input from an academic committee and a board composed of industry leaders.42 One corporate partner claimed that working with Shandong University’s integrated research platform allowed the company to tap into the university’s technical talent—talent that was otherwise in short supply.
Integrated Research Platforms of the Ministry of Education
Source: The author, using various university, party, association, and government websites43
Integrated Research Platforms of the Ministry of Education
Source: The author, using various university, party, association, and government websites43
Increasing the Number of Engineering Research Centers
Starting in 2019, the MOE began to dramatically increase the number engineering research centers (ERCs), a program dating back to the early 1990s. Originally launched to reverse-engineer technologies imported from abroad, the program is being repurposed to focus on indigenous innovation of key technologies.44
While MOE-ERCs do not have explicit instructions to work on chokepoints, their work overlaps considerably with that mandate and many centers advertise their contributions to chokepoint technologies on their websites. MOE issued calls for applications to the engineering research center program in 2019 with a “basic requirement” that applicants work in the areas of “national security, artificial intelligence, advanced materials, digital technology, high-end chips and software, aircraft engines and gas turbines, and life science and technology” (see Appendix A).45 These areas overlap considerably with China’s list of chokepoint technologies.46 A call for applications to receive MOE-ERC status in 2021 continued the focus on chokepoints by requiring grantees work in similar technologies (see Appendix A).47 Over the course of two batches—in 2019 and again in 2021—MOE added about 120 new research centers, comfortably ahead of its goal of 100.
Many of them have already started work. That brings the total number of centers well beyond the government-recorded number of 488.48
The MOE responded to China’s sudden need for high-end chip technology. Compared to the batch of ERCs established in 2018—prior to heightened U.S.-China tech competition—at least five of the ERCs created in the 2019 batch work on high-end chip-related technologies (see Figure 4). Again, China was already deploying resources toward alleviating the U.S. semiconductor chokehold before the first export controls in October 2022 (see Appendix A).
MOE Engineering Research Centers: Batches 2013, 2019, and 2021–22
Source: Ministry of Education
MOE Engineering Research Centers: Batches 2013, 2019, and 2021–22
Source: Ministry of Education
One chip-focused center is the MOE-ERC for Technologies for the Preparation of High-Purity Chemicals for Use in the Manufacture of Integrated Circuits (集成电路高纯化学品制备技术教育部工程研究中心) approved in the 2021–22 batch. The center co-organized the first-ever “Conference on the Development of the High-Purity Chemicals Industry,” which explored how China can develop homegrown expertise to develop downstream materials for chipmaking.49 These chemicals are critical inputs that other countries may exploit. In April of 2023, news broke that the German government was contemplating export restrictions to China of such chemicals.50
Policy Implications
China’s policy of organized scientific research seeks to channel science as a source of national power. Much like in the United States, China’s policymakers have embarked on a period of reflection on the role of science in developing national power. Both Chinese and American science policy experts draw on the seminal work Science: The Endless Frontier to inform their debates.
To enhance China’s innovation ecosystem, the Chinese Ministry of Education has begun advocating for basic research. The ministry institutionalized organized scientific research into its policymaking process. This term is being used by the wider Chinese higher education community to highlight the importance of basic scientific research and advocate for greater alignment with national and strategic priorities.
The government is strengthening incentives for institutions of higher learning to assist its efforts to boost innovation. In what the PRC government refers to as a “whole-of-nation” effort, every ministry or agency in China is called upon to contribute to technological self-reliance. The Ministry of Education’s special role is to facilitate the participation of universities and other institutions of higher learning in this nationwide program.
The government’s efforts aim to drive both general and sectoral self-reliance. The MOE’s 2022 opinions compile a host of preexisting and newly initiated programs that aim to improve the general conditions for innovation and focus resources on specific technology sectors.
China’s innovation drive is launching new platforms and leveraging existing programs. MOE is channeling R&D resources into chokepoint technologies by launching new programs such as the integrated research platform—started in 2019—and enlarging legacy programs such as engineering research centers, which were created in the 1990s.
The PRC is using these programs to break down barriers between disciplines by bringing together different basic science and engineering talent teams. It is also promoting collaboration between universities and companies. In doing so, Beijing hopes to facilitate commercialization and overcome technical challenges. According to government-reported statistics, MOE has been able to improve university-led technology transfer.
Conclusion
China’s Ministry of Education plays a critical role in the country’s technological self-reliance drive. Two programs—the integrated research platform and the engineering research center—aim at focusing institutional capacity, talent, and other resources on a narrow set of technologies important for Chinese supply chain security. In order to facilitate this shift, the Chinese Ministry of Education launched a program called organized scientific research that sets out to realign higher education resources and activities toward self-reliance.
China’s program of organized scientific research promises to reshape the country’s innovation system. If successful, the impact of these programs will be that a larger proportion of university-based research in China will be dedicated to strategically relevant—in particular supply chain-relevant—innovations such as in the advanced semiconductor space.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ben Murphy, Hanna Dohmen, Marcus Conlé, Andrea Braun Střelcová, Sylvia Schwaag Serger, Tim Flink, and Aya Adachi for their valuable comments and feedback. Their input helped refine key arguments and enhanced the report through several sourcing suggestions. The author would also like to express his gratitude to Almuth Wietholtz-Eisert and Ahmet-Hamdi Çavuşoğlu who shared their perspectives from the worlds of science.
A special thank you goes to Tai Ming Cheung and Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau who offered crucial guidance at an early stage of the writing process and also to Lindsay Shingler and Paddy Ryan for excellent editorial direction and for nudging the project along.
Any mistakes are solely the fault of the author.
The author would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for providing support in the form of the 2021–22 German Chancellor Fellowship.
The views expressed in this paper are of those of the author and do not represent the views of any current or former employer.
Technology buckets for the three most recent batches of MOE–ERCs
| 2010/2013 Batch | 2019 Batch | 2021/2022 Batch |
|---|---|---|
| Medical and health information networks | National security | Integrated circuits |
| Electronic medical records and intelligent expert system | Artificial intelligence | Artificial intelligence (basic and cutting-edge technologies such as key algorithms) |
| Mobile digital medical system | Advanced materials | Blockchain |
| Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease treatment technology and equipment | Digital technology | High-end scientific instruments |
| Eye disease diagnosis and treatment technology equipment | High-end chips and software | Medical devices |
| Oral therapy technology and materials | Aircraft engines and gas turbines | Major engineering software |
| Biomedical digital imaging | Life sciences | Rare earth-based new materials |
| Energy saving and resource utilization of elastomer materials | Carbon neutrality (carbon zero and carbon negative emission technologies) | |
| Exploration and evaluation of metal mineral resources | Drug and vaccine development | |
| Petroleum biotechnology and bio-oil recovery | ||
| Energy-saving and efficiency-increasing intelligent technology and equipment | ||
| Creative and design digital media |
| 2010/2013 Batch | 2019 Batch | 2021/2022 Batch |
|---|---|---|
| Medical and health information networks | National security | Integrated circuits |
| Electronic medical records and intelligent expert system | Artificial intelligence | Artificial intelligence (basic and cutting-edge technologies such as key algorithms) |
| Mobile digital medical system | Advanced materials | Blockchain |
| Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease treatment technology and equipment | Digital technology | High-end scientific instruments |
| Eye disease diagnosis and treatment technology equipment | High-end chips and software | Medical devices |
| Oral therapy technology and materials | Aircraft engines and gas turbines | Major engineering software |
| Biomedical digital imaging | Life sciences | Rare earth-based new materials |
| Energy saving and resource utilization of elastomer materials | Carbon neutrality (carbon zero and carbon negative emission technologies) | |
| Exploration and evaluation of metal mineral resources | Drug and vaccine development | |
| Petroleum biotechnology and bio-oil recovery | ||
| Energy-saving and efficiency-increasing intelligent technology and equipment | ||
| Creative and design digital media |
Source: MOE51
Notes
“Xi Jinping calls for strengthening basic research to solidify self-reliance in science and technology,” MOE, February 22, 2023, http://en.moe.gov.cn/news/media_highlights/202302/t20230224_1047553.html; In Chinese: “习近平 : 加强基础研究 实现高水平科技自立自强,” China Government Website, July 31, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202307/content_6895642.htm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231123114940/https:/www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202307/content_6895642.htm).
The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council, “Translation: Reform Plan for Party and State Institutions,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), March 16, 2023 (trans. April 18, 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/reform-plan-for-party-and-state-institutions/.
“教育部印发 《关于加强高校有组织科研 推动高水平自立自强的若干意见》 (The Ministry of Education issued “Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening”),” MOE, August 29, 2022, http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/gzdt_gzdt/s5987/202208/t20220829_656091.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231123150722/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/gzdt_gzdt/s5987/202208/t20220829_656091.html).
At least among those budgets made public. The Ministry of National Defense’s budget may be larger still, but it is not public. See Ryan Fedasiuk, Emily Weinstein, Ben Murphy, and Alan Omar Loera Martinez, “Chinese State Council Budget Tracker,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), https://statecouncil.cset.tech/, accessed February 4, 2024.
“教育部 2023 年部门预算, (Department of Education 2023 Departmental Budget),” MOE, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A05/s7499/202303/W020230328543247647092.pdf, accessed February 4, 2024 (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240219180350/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A05/s7499/202303/W020230328543247647092.pdf). While higher education expenses (budget code 2050205) by MOE far exceed that of MOST or CAS, MOE’s S&T expenditures (budget code 206) are about 10 times smaller than that of MOST and 20 times smaller than CAS. However, S&T expenditures alone do not capture the full scope of research-related expenses.
Fedasiuk, Weinstein, Murphy, and Loera Martinez, “Chinese State Council Budget Tracker,” CSET, https://statecouncil.cset.tech/, accessed February 4, 2024.
“高等教育学校(机构)数 (Number of Higher Education Institutions),” MOE, http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_sjzl/moe_560/2022/quanguo/202401/t20240110_1099531.html, accessed February 4, 2024 (Archive: http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_sjzl/moe_560/2022/quanguo/202401/t20240110_1099531.html).
“2022年高等学校科技统计资料汇编 (Compilation of science and technology statistics in colleges and universities in 2022),” MOE, 2023, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/A16_tjdc/202307/W020230703504481842474.pdf, accessed February 4, 2024.
Ryan Fedasiuk, Alan Omar Loera Martinez, and Anna Puglisi, A Competitive Era for China’s Universities, CSET data brief, March 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/a-competitive-era-for-chinas-universities/.
“清华大学2023年度部门预算 (Tsinghua University 2023 Department Budget),” Tsinghua University, April 2023, https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/__local/4/6D/2B/402AE299C2BAC1C7FA4AC942C83_6598C762_644C6.pdf; “清华大学2022年度部门预算 (Tsinghua University 2022 Department Budget),” Tsinghua University, April 2022, https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/__local/4/F4/9A/3E64F0017D611E4121DE49315B8_7F0D6877_17AF15.pdf; 清华大学2018年度部门预算 (Tsinghua University 2018 Department Budget),” Tsinghua University, April 2018, https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/__local/0/00/C1/9E980D46617EC25751411575C58_F3776480_46422.pdf.
“统计局解读 《2021年全国科技经费投入统计公报 》 (The Bureau of Statistics interprets the “Statistical Bulletin on National Science and Technology Funding Investment in 2021”),” China Government Website, August 31, 2022, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-08/31/content_5707549.htm, accessed February 19, 2024.
The author was able to find the complete sectoral breakdown (higher education, public research institutes, and enterprises) for 2018 and 2019. For 2020, the author could not find the breakdown for enterprises. However, the author simply subtracted reported basic science funds of higher education basic science funds and public research institutions from the total to get the amount of basic science funds linked to enterprise R&D. For 2021, the author could only find the amount of basic research funds deployed by higher education. For the following year, the author used the higher education percent contribution to overall basic research funding growth to calculate the absolute number of higher ed basic funding for 2022. The sources for each year are as follows:
2018: “一文二图三步解读 《2018年全国科技经费投入统计公报》 (One article, two pictures and three steps to interpret the “Statistical Bulletin on National Science and Technology Funding Investment in 2018”),分析测试百科网 (Analysis and Testing Encyclopedia Network), https://m.antpedia.com/news/2329689.html, accessed February 19, 2024 (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240219160101/https:/m.antpedia.com/news/2329689.html).
2019: “基础研究经费增长22.5% 财政科技支出破万亿 (Basic research funding increased by 22.5%, fiscal science and technology expenditure exceeded one trillion),” Home.China.com.cn, August 31, 2020, http://home.china.com.cn/txt/2020-08/31/content_41275864.htm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240219160417/http:/home.china.com.cn/txt/2020-08/31/content_41275864.htm); Alex Stone, China’s Model of Science: Rationale, Players, Issues, China Aerospace Studies Institute report, www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Infrastructure/2022-02-07%20Model%20of%20Science.pdf, accessed February 19, 2024.
2020: “国家统计局社科文司统计师张启龙解读 《2020年全国科技经费投入统计公报》 (Zhang Qilong, statistician of the Department of Social Sciences and Literature of the National Bureau of Statistics, interprets the “Statistical Bulletin of National Science and Technology Investment in 2020”),” National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, September 22, 2021, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/sjjd/202302/t20230202_1896538.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240219161415/https:/www.stats.gov.cn/sj/sjjd/202302/t20230202_1896538.html).
2021: “统计局解读 《2021年全国科技经费投入统计公报》 (The Bureau of Statistics interprets the “Statistical Bulletin on National Science and Technology Funding Investment in 2021”),” China Government Website, August 31, 2022, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-08/31/content_5707549.htm (archived: https://archive.ph/jJNwA).
2022: “国家统计局解读 《2022年全国科技经费投入统计公报》 (The National Bureau of Statistics interprets the “Statistical Bulletin on National Science and Technology Funding Investment in 2022”),” China Government Website, September 18, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202309/content_6904755.htm (archived: https://archive.ph/iwTfa).
Wan Jinbo, Zhang Feng, and Pan Jiaofeng “Carrying out “organized basic research”: task layout and strategic scientific and technological strength,” Proceedings of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 36, no. 12, 2021, 1404-1412, http://old2022.bulletin.cas.cn/publish_article/2021/12/20211202.htm, (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240218223526/http:/old2022.bulletin.cas.cn/publish_article/2021/12/20211202.htm).
Examples include:
1. Zhu Song-Chun, director of the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence & professor at Peking University. See “朱松纯 : 以有组织科研推进原创性、引领性创新 (Zhu Songchun: Promoting originality and leading innovation through organized scientific research),” ScienceNet.cn, February 18, 2023, https://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2023/2/494075.shtm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240202124345/https:/news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2023/2/494075.shtm).
2. A series of well-regarded Chinese innovation experts including Chen Jin, a Tsinghua University professor, organized a workshop on and produced analysis of “organized scientific research” and recommendations for realizing it. See “有组织科研如何提升服务国家战略能力 (How to improve the strategic ability to serve the country with organized scientific research),” Shaanxi Xueqian Normal University, March 6, 2023, https://archive.ph/Ad2p3.
3. Wang Jinsong, Sichuan University’s president offered commentary: “高校有组织科研如何“落地生花” (How can organized scientific research in colleges and universities “come to fruition”?),” ScienceNet.cn, April 28, 2023, https://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2023/4/499596.shtm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240204182836/https:/news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2023/4/499596.shtm).
“学校召开有组织科研工作推进会 (The school held an organized scientific research work promotion meeting),” University of Science and Technology Beijing, July 20, 2023, https://news.ustb.edu.cn/info/1087/58859.htm.
“Xi Jinping calls for strengthening basic research to solidify self-reliance in science and technology.”
Science: The Endless Frontier, A Report to the President by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Science Foundation report, July 1945, https://www.nsf.gov/about/history/EndlessFrontier_w.pdf.
Lei Chaozi, “雷朝滋 : 加强高校有组织科研以高水平科技创新服务中国式现代化建设 (Lei Chaozi: Strengthen organized scientific research in higher education to serve Chinese-style modernization with high-level scientific and technological innovation),” China Education Online, April 11, 2023, https://web.archive.org/web/20240202202735/https://news.eol.cn/xueshu/hui/202304/t20230411_2373153.shtml.
“周光礼、姚蕊 : 有组织科研 : 美国科教政策变革新趋势——基于 《无尽的前沿 : 未来75年的科学》 的分析 (Zhou Guangli, Yao Rui: Organized scientific research: a new trend in the reform of U.S. science and education policy - analysis based on “The Endless Frontier: Science in the Next 75 Years”),” Renmin University of China School of Education, April 26, 2023, http://soe.ruc.edu.cn/info/1132/3297.htm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240205234734/http:/soe.ruc.edu.cn/info/1132/3297.htm).
In 1945, Vannevar Bush also had a specific take on the “self-reliance” argument. He asserted that war-ravaged Europe was no longer able to provide a continued supply of basic science knowledge that could fuel the country’s future industries and economic might. Therefore, the United States needed to build its own scientific enterprise. While Chinese intellectuals and party officials use a very different argument for self-reliance, many similarly express the hope that China would become the next global center for science.
Charles Mok, “The Party Rules: China’s New Central Science and Technology Commission,” The Diplomat, August 23, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/the-party-rules-chinas-new-central-science-and-technology-commission/.
However, there is some uptake and mention of “organized scientific research” into policies rolled out by multiple ministries. See MOST, Beijing Municipal People’s Government, National Development and Reform Commission, MOE, and Ministry of Industry and Information, “科技部等印发 《深入贯彻落实习近平总书记重要批示精神 加快推动北京国际科技创新中心建设的工作方案》 的通知 (Notice of the Ministry of Science and Technology and others on issuing the “Work Plan for Deeply Implementing the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Instructions to Accelerate the Construction of Beijing International Science and Technology Innovation Center”),” May 17, 2023, https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2023/202305/t20230517_186077.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20240204193946/https:/www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2023/202305/t20230517_186077.html).
Michal Meyer, “The Rise and Fall of Vannevar Bush,” Distillations Magazine, July 21, 2018, https://www.sciencehistory.org/stories/magazine/the-rise-and-fall-of-vannevar-bush/.
Science: The Endless Frontier.
Ibid.
Frontier Research: The European Challenge, European Commission High-Level Expert Group Report, February 2005, https://erc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-09/high-level_expert_group_report_full_report_2005_en.pdf; “Communication from the Commission - Europe and basic research /* COM/2004/0009 final */,” EUR-Lex, 2004, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52004DC0009.
Tim Flink and Tobias Peters, “Excellence and Frontier Research as Travelling Concepts in Science Policymaking,” Minerva 56, 431-452, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-018-9351-7.
“探索世界一流大学建设的中国模式——“双一流”建设高校和建设学科名单解读 (Explore the Chinese model of building world-class universities—Interpretation of the list of “double first-class” construction universities and construction disciplines),” MOE, September 22, 2017, http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201709/t20170922_315007.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122112756/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201709/t20170922_315007.html).
“中共中央办公厅 国务院办公厅印发 《关于进一步弘扬科学家精神加强作风和学风建设的意见》 (The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the “Opinions on Further Promoting the Spirit of Scientists and Strengthening the Construction of Work Style and Study Style”),” China Government Website, June 11, 2019, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-06/11/content_5399239.htm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231120122131/https:/www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-06/11/content_5399239.htm).
Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Economía, 2021) https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-rise-of-chinas-industrial-policy-1978-to-2020/.
“习近平讲故事 : “关键核心技术是要不来、买不来、讨不来的”(Xi Jinping tells a story: “Key and core technologies cannot be obtained, bought, or begged.”),” People’s Daily Overseas Edition, June 6, 2019, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2019-06/06/content_1928983.htm (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122112233/http:/cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0606/c64094-31123936.html).
“教育部办公厅 工业和信息化部办公厅 国家知识产权局办公室关于组织开展“千校万企”协同创新伙伴行动的通知 (Notice from the General Office of the Ministry of Education and the General Office of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the State Intellectual Property Office on organizing the “Thousands of Schools and Thousands of Enterprises” Collaborative Innovation Partnership Action),” MOE, July 5, 2022, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/202207/t20220708_644510.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122140851/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/202207/t20220708_644510.html).
记者 王晓斌 (Wang Xiaobin),““千校万企”协同创新伙伴行动取得显著社会效益 (The “Thousands of Schools and Thousands of Enterprises” collaborative innovation partnership action has achieved significant social benefits),” People’s Daily Online, August 13, 2023, http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0813/c1004-40055483.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122140851/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/202207/t20220708_644510.html).
“教育部印发 《关于加强高校有组织科研 推动高水平自立自强的若干意见》 (The Ministry of Education issued “Several Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening”).”
Department of Teaching and Technology, “关于印发 《教育部科技司2019年工作要点》 的通知 (Notice on the issuance of the “Work Points of the Department of Science and Technology of the Ministry of Education in 2019”), MOE, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/tongzhi/201903/t20190301_371866.html, (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122115703/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/tongzhi/201903/t20190301_371866.html).
“教育部印发 《关于加强高校有组织科研 推动高水平自立自强的若干意见》 (The Ministry of Education issued “Several Opinions on Strengthening Organized Scientific Research in Higher Education to Promote High-Level Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening”);” “以“三个破解”加强高校有组织科研 (Strengthen organized scientific research in universities with “three cracks”),” Outlook Weekly, November 21, 2021, https://lw.news.cn/2022-11/21/c_1310678505.htm.
In 2015, it was included in the first batch of so-called “National Demonstration Microelectronics Institutions” (国家示范性微电子学院). See: DT Semiconductor Materials, 盘点28所示范性微电子成立时间线，哪一所是你心仪的大学？(Taking stock of the timeline of the establishment of 28 exemplary microelectronics universities, which one is your favorite?),” EET China, June 14, 2022, https://www.eet-china.com/mp/a138989.html (archived: https://archive.ph/9CwvM).
“The new generation integrated circuit technology integration research platform recruits 1 full-time associate researcher,” Fudan University, October 18, 2023, https://hr.fudan.edu.cn/af/09/c15365a634633/page.htm, accessed November 21, 2023 (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231121192714/https://hr.fudan.edu.cn/af/09/c15365a634633/page.htm)
“Teaching assistant support,” Fudan University, https://hr.fudan.edu.cn/15365/list6.htm, (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231121194133/https:/hr.fudan.edu.cn/15365/list6.htm).
““有组织科研”对高校意味着什么 (What does “organized scientific research” mean to universities?),” 光明日报 (Guangming Daily), September 20, 2022, http://edu.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0920/c1006-32529968.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231121193130/http:/edu.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0920/c1006-32529968.html).
“新年第一天 : 集成攻关大平台科研攻关不停歇 (The first day of the new year: Scientific research on large integrated research platforms will not stop),” Shangdong University, January 1, 2024, https://dpt.sdu.edu.cn/info/1034/2775.htm (archive: https://archive.ph/1C0p8); “平台动态 (Platform Dynamics),” Shangdong Univesity, https://dpt.sdu.edu.cn/index/ptdt/6.htm, accesed February 21, 2024.
“《中国教育报》 报道 : 山东大学新一代半导体材料集成攻关大平台筑牢产业材料根基——“小晶体”带动“大产业”(“China Education News" reported: Shandong University’s new generation semiconductor material integration research platform builds a solid foundation for industrial materials - “small crystals” drive “big industry”),” Shangdong University, May 15, 2023, https://www.media.sdu.edu.cn/info/1031/32469.htm.
The author assigned technology categories to each integrated research platform and engineering research center by drawing on the center or platform’s name, descriptions of the research group’s activities on university or company websites, and in rare cases, by looking at the work, such as the publications, of the center or platform head.
Comparison of 2004 administrative measures:
“教育部关于印发 《教育部工程研究中心建设与管理暂行办法》 的通知 (Notice of the Ministry of Education on Issuing the “Interim Measures for the Construction and Management of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education”),” MOE, October 19, 2004, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3336/200410/t20041019_82269.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122183731/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3336/200410/t20041019_82269.html).
To updated 2019 administrative measures:
“教育部关于印发 《教育部工程研究中心建设与运行管理办法》 《教育部工程研究中心评估细则》 的通知 (Notice of the Ministry of Education on the issuance of the “Management Measures for the Construction and Operation of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education” and the “Evaluation Rules for the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education”),” MOE, October 16, 2019, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3336/201910/t20191030_406046.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122183906/http:/www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3336/201910/t20191030_406046.html).
“教育部关于印发 《教育部工程研究中心建设与运行管理办法》 《教育部工程研究中心评估细则》 的通知 (Notice from the Department of Science and Technology of the Ministry of Education on organizing the application for the construction project of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education),” MOE, May 31, 2019, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/tongzhi/201905/t20190531_383966.html (archived: https://archive.ph/bcggb).
Ben Murphy, Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies, CSET issue brief, May 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chokepoints/.
“关于组织申报教育部工程研究中心建设项目的通知 (Notice on organizing the application for the construction project of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education),” South-Central Minzu University, November 25, 2021, https://www.scuec.edu.cn/kfy/info/1183/7958.htm (archived: https://archive.ph/N5sKc).
“教育部 : 十年来高校专利转化增幅接近十倍 (The conversion of university patents has increased nearly tenfold in the past ten years),” Xinhua Net, September 27, 2022, http://education.news.cn/20220927/e4dbdc688f654fbd92c1656f6b743a01/c.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122184006/http:/education.news.cn/20220927/e4dbdc688f654fbd92c1656f6b743a01/c.html).
“关于召开第一届中国化工学会高纯化学品产业发展大会的通知(第一轮)(Notice on convening the first China Chemical Society High Purity Chemicals Industry Development Conference (first round)),” The Chemical Industry and Engineering Society of China, April 17, 2023, http://www.ciesc.cn/news/a2039.html (archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20231122124918/http:/www.ciesc.cn/news/a2039.html).
Michael Nienaber, Jenny Leonard, and Kamil Kowalcze, “Germany in Talks to Limit Export of Chip Chemicals to China,” Bloomberg News, April 27, 2023 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-27/germany-in-talks-to-limit-the-export-of-chip-chemicals-to-china.
Sources include:
For the 2013 batch: Technology categories announced in 2010 (“关于组织申报2010-2011年度教育部工程研究中心的通知 (Notice on organizing the application for the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education in 2010-2011),” MOE, December 24, 2010, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/tongzhi/201510/t20151023_215294.html); and centers picked in 2013 (教育部关于下达2013年度教育部 工程研究中心建设项目立项计划的通知 (Notice from the Ministry of Education on issuing the 2013 Ministry of Education Engineering Research Center Construction Project Plan),” MOE, October 30, 2013, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3338/201311/t20131104_159488.html.
For the 2019 batch: “教育部科技司关于组织申报教育部工程研究中心建设项目的通知 (Notice from the Department of Science and Technology of the Ministry of Education on organizing the application for the construction project of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education),” MOE, May 31, 2019, http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A16/tongzhi/201905/t20190531_383966.html.
For the 2021-22 batch: “关于组织申报教育部工程研究中心建设项目的通知 (Notice on organizing the application for the construction project of the Engineering Research Center of the Ministry of Education),” South-Central Minzu University, November 25, 2021, https://www.scuec.edu.cn/kfy/info/1183/7958.htm
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