Scholars have characterized the relationship between a state center and regions, especially in federal states, as an ongoing bargaining game. The central objective in this study is to demonstrate the importance of political, economic, geographic and cultural determinants, or structural resources, in center-region relations in the Russian Federation during the 1990s. Structural resources have provided regional leaders with structural power in the federal bargaining game. According to my findings, politically superior, wealthy, culturally distinct, geopolitically and geoeconomically important and peripherally located regions were favored in the bilateral treaty process between 1994 and 1998 and were given chance to conclude treaties at an early stage.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of Putin’s radical overhaul of the Russian federal system and its impact on federalism and democratisation. Whilst not all of Putin’s reforms have been implemented fully, the reorganisation of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, combined with his creation of seven federal districts, make a mockery of federalism. There are real worries that Putin’s quest for a ‘dictatorship of law’ will be bought at the cost of civil liberties and the consolidation of democracy. At present it would appear that Putin is willing to sacrifice democracy in order to win unity. However, his attack on the sovereignty claims of the ethnic republics are surely just as likely to stir up nationist sentiments as to quell them.

The scholarly literature on democratic transitions has largely ignored developments at the local level and the relationship between federalism and democracy. In this work I examine the development of federalism in Russia and I assess the impact of Russia’s highly asymmetrical form of federalism on democratisation. The study shows that federalism far from promoting democracy has allowed authoritarianism to flourish in many of Russia’s eighty nine regions and republics. Federalism and democratization in Russia exist in contradiction rather than harmony. In a vicious circle, authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by authoritarianism in the region and vice versa. “Elective dictatorships” and “delegative democracies” are now well entrenched in many republics, and mini-presidential systems are firmly established in a majority of the regions.

In this essay we identify economic and political factors that led both the federal centre and the regions in Russia first to open the process of federal bargaining and then to pursue it in the form of signing bilateral treaties, unique for each region. Many Russian politicians and most scholars of Russian politics view asymmetric bilateral bargaining as a dangerous institutional choice contributing to federal instability and potentially threatening the disintegration of Russia. We offer an alternative view. While the treaty-signing practices are actively maintained by Russian political elites, we argue that the genesis of asymmetric bilateral bargaining in Russia had a strong ‘path dependence’ component. In particular, it was precipitated by the developments of the last period in evolution of the Soviet federalism.

The central research goals of this article are to classify and explain the positions of the 89 state “governors” of Russia with regard to the most desirable federal division of power. The state governors are classified along a 5-item autonomy index based on events data and content analysis of their speeches, declarations, petitions, threats and actions from 1991–1995 as reported in two regional sources. Theoretical propositions derived from four schools of thought (essentialism, instrumentalism, relative deprivation and resource mobilization) are tested to discover which, if any, provide useful insights into the preferences and behavior of regional elites in Russia. In the end, a combined model that synthesizes elements of the above is shown to be most useful in explaining variation in elite positions.