Under Putin and Xi, the post-communist authoritarian regimes in Russia and China had both initiated anti-corruption programs that exhibited some parallels but were also profoundly different. Through a contextualized comparison, and drawing on Russian and Chinese sources, this article puts forth an institutionalist argument that these campaigns were being driven by divergent strategic objectives shaped by different formal and informal institutional settings. Whereas Putin’s more limited anti-corruption program was essentially a defensive move, embedded in factionalism, primarily aimed at protecting his political power under “competitive” authoritarianism, Xi’s broader and deeper campaign could be seen as an offensive initiative, targeting factionalism with a long-term goal to strengthen the CCP party-state, in addition to the obvious short-term objective of his own power consolidation.

This study examines crime and corruption among Russian law enforcement agencies after 2009 Police Reforms (henceforth referred to as Reforms). These Reforms sought to curb corruption at all levels of the Russian civil service and among uniformed law enforcement personnel. Many law enforcement officers thought that the rebranding of the militsiya as “ politsiya ” would have a transformational effect within the organization as well as how others perceived it. Ultimately, the rebranding effort failed; the only concrete changes were the organization's name and its personnel's uniforms. In fact, the Reforms seem to have contributed to even more corruption and abuse of power, as well as an expansion of the Ministry of Interior's ties to corrupt networks.

From a normative standpoint the media are usually seen as one of the pillars of a national integrity system, entrusted with the tasks of exposing and preventing acts of corruption and educating the public of the harm caused by corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues to be one of the most significant challenges that Europe faces, undermining citizens' trust in democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of political leadership. Evidence suggests that in fragile EU democracies such as Bulgaria, despite more than eight years of full membership and numerous preventive measures, corruption is rife and the press is hardly capable of exposing abuses of power or authority. On the contrary - drawing on in-depth interviews with 35 Bulgarian journalists - this paper argues that since communism collapsed in the late 1980s the media in post-communist societies such as Bulgaria has gradually become an instrument to promote and defend private vested interests, and is plagued by corruption. Senior journalists and editors cast serious doubt over the ability of the post-communist free press and journalism to act as a watchdog for society.

This paper analyses the relationships between income inequality and corruption in Europe and looks specifically at post-communist European countries. The scientific community agrees that there is important relationship between income inequality and corruption and many authors believe that low income inequality is connected to low corruption. According to empirical papers, this is true not only on the European scale, but also on a global scale. In this paper, I test this claim by conducting a multilevel analysis on 39 European countries in the period of 1995–2014. This model ascertains that there are immense differences between post-communist countries and the rest of European countries. The effects of income inequality on the level of corruption are discussed.

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anticorruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anticorruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.

Do Eastern European courts effectively constrain politicians and uphold the rule of law? Criminal prosecution of grand (high-level) corruption can further the central principle of equal responsibility under the law by demonstrating that even powerful political actors have to submit to the laws of the land. This article introduces the Eastern European Corruption Prosecution Database , which contains entries for all cabinet ministers (927 in total) who served in a government that held office in one of seven post-Communist Eastern European countries since the late 1990s. The systematic data collection reveals that Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia consistently indict more ministers than Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Poland; Slovakia has barely indicted anyone. We aim to start a research agenda by formulating hypotheses about which countries will see more corruption prosecutions and which ministers’ characteristics would make them more likely to face the court. We use the database to begin testing these hypotheses and find some evidence for several associations. We find no strong evidence that EU conditionality or membership raises the profile of the grand corruption issue or leads to more indictments. Party politics seems to affect the frequency of corruption indictments more than the structure and behavior of legal institutions. Indictment rates are lower when a former Communist party controls the government and individual ministers from junior coalition partners are more vulnerable to indictment than other ministers. The existence of a specialized anti-corruption prosecution or a more independent judiciary do not seem to lead to the indictment of more ministers on corruption charges. Finally, we discuss avenues of future research that our database opens, both for the analysis of country-level and individual-level variation.

Issues of university autonomy, self-governance, and centralization and decentralization are still at the forefront of higher education in Ukraine. This study of university governance suggests that the state is a major foe of university autonomy, though certainly not the only one. The system of centralized university governance is experiencing changes in its content, function, mechanisms, and approaches, while maintaining its unity and highly centralized structure. Thus, it is difficult to adapt and respond to free market forces and challenges brought to the fore by the Euromaidan political turmoil and the war that followed. Such phenomena as corruption in education and internal pressures, marketization of educational services and financial integrity, changing organizational and managerial structures of universities present challenges to university governance and force it to change. They may also facilitate strengthening of university autonomy. However, as long as the disease of corruption exists, all attempts to reform higher education are unlikely to be successful.

This article reveals Russian paradox: the combination of high level of corruption with strong and relatively effective government. In the focus of attention lies the examination of relations between the corruption and the processes of socio-political transformations of the end of the XX — beginning of the XXI centuries and the particularities of the corruption integration into the government of Russia. Basing upon the concept of the corruption as a political and administrative rent the author arrives to the conclusion about the formation of the corrupt model of governance in Russia. The article analyses factors which give relative efficiency to the Russian model of corrupt governance as well as the costs and contradictions of it. The author also reaches the conclusion that corruption-oriented model of governance is prospectless and makes a point that effective anti-corruption measures in Russia can be carried out only in case of current regime change and consequent realization of democratic, market and administrative reforms.

Washington DC is not only a center for democracy promotion programs by government-funded and private foundations and think tanks. Washington DC has also attracted hundreds of millions of dollars for lobbyists, political consultants and think tanks from authoritarian political forces and kleptocrats who have little in common with American and European values. Both Republicans and Democrats have been recipients of these illicit funds from state officials and oligarchs who are seeking to ingratiate themselves with American public opinion. Political consultants, lobbyists, lawyers and think tanks which receive funds from such sources are part of a bigger problem of reverse corruption and cynicism and the export of authoritarian practices from Ukraine and post-Soviet states to the West. This was clearly seen in the hiring of Paul Manafort, Viktor Yanukovych’s long-time political consultant by US presidential candidate Donald Trump. Trump’s promise to ‘drain the (Washington) swamp’ rings hollow after it was revealed he accepted funds from a Ukrainian oligarch who had earlier donated funds to the Clinton’s (Reader 2016).

The 2004–07 EU enlargement towards the post-communist region showed that the long waiting for EU membership could impact on levels of public support for the EU. This article examines citizens’ trust towards national and international institutions after joining the EU in Poland, in comparative perspective. In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones. Politicians and political parties are the most distrusted actors, undermining the social and political fabric in the region. An overview of political participation and levels of trust with focus on national data sets and the European Social Survey shows that levels of trust are quite low and a share of the population is concerned with sovereignty vis-à-vis EU integration. This analysis addresses how the relationship between citizens and institutions have changed and how this may affect not just the EU’s policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but how it can also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.

Corruption is perceived in all societies as a social pathology that causes great material and moral damage and is a threat to the society’s continual development. Especially in countries with a freshly consolidated democracy, as Slovenia, the phenomena of corruption must be treated with all due attention. This article emphasises that corruption in Slovenia is publicly perceived as one of the most important and even increasing problems in society. We are also analysing one of the crucial side effects of the corruption, resulting itself in ever deeper public distrust to most significant political and administrative institutions.

One of the most lingering questions about Russian politics that dominates public discourse and media coverage is the future of political regime after the 2012 presidential elections. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the extent of differences between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, how long their “tandemocracy” will last and what can bring about regime change as scarce critics of the Kremlin, from ultra-liberals to communists, have been haphazardly co-opted into the power system, leaving no political ambitions that they would not, in principle, be ready to abandon in return for proper compensation. In sharp contrast to the views of many regional experts and commentators, the presentday Russian Federation is the world’s most anti-Soviet state. It is based upon a very different set of values: private ownership, dire individualism, the cult of money, a clan-based political system, and pervasive corruption at all levels of government. The North Caucasus ethnocratic elites, however, do not have access to abundant resources for sale, and are forced to look around for alternative sustenance, as rigid centralism and unification limit their rent-seeking capabilities. Alexander Khloponin, the incumbent presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, seems to continue the policy of buying the loyalty of regional archaic clan-based elites that aggravates rather than improves the situation. The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight grip over the region, neither Putin nor Medvedev has real power to bring change to the North Caucasus? In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the paper examines the triadic relationship among central political elite, who benefited from the massive privatisation of lucrative segments of Soviet industry in the early 1990s, regional clan-based ethnocracy, and non-systemic religious opposition. Drawing on the works of Russian scholars and experts in Russian politics, the paper explores the hypothesis that on-going instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by a well-known set of theories of ethnic violence, because it is carefully negotiated by regional and central political elite, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and whose clan-based rent-seeking agendas have gradually driven Russian statehood into a complete dead-end. Instead of facing the real challenges that are addressed in this paper, it is only able to make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The paper concludes that the deep freeze in the Russian political system has exhausted its debatable potential for change through the existing tandem model of government with its obscure division of roles between two leaders. What we actually see is an imitation of political reform and the resulting degradation of the entire system of governance. Over the past century, Russian polity has never been as weak as today, because the only legitimate source of power in Russia is corruption.

This paper attempts to create an overview of the Ukraine twenty years after independence by presenting prevailing conceptual narrative models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. Based on the analysis of 58 interviews of Ukrainian political and intellectual elites and foreign experts, the study revealed several categories of conceptual narrative models employed by respondents: (1) a state without a national idea and a common identity; (2) a country in an unfinished transition and degradation; (3) a divided society; and (4) Ukraine as a colony or “wild capitalism”. The analysis of these categories helps to assess conflict potential in Ukraine and discuss some ideas for conflict prevention and resolution.

This main focus of the article is an analysis of Ukraine two decades after it became an independent state through ten factors that have remained constant features of Ukrainian life. The first factor is low public trust in state institutions and the wide gulf between elites and state on the one hand and the public on the other. A second factor is the striving by political forces to monopolize political and economic power for the sake of power and self-enrichment – not for the conducting of reforms. The third factor is threats to democracy under eastern Ukrainian Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych. The fourth factor is the low quality and ideological amorphousness of political parties. The fifth factor is the absence of political will and re-occurrence of missed opportunities; a prominent example of which is the Viktor Yushchenko presidency. The sixth factor is the domination of elite greed and rapaciousness over pursuit of the national interest and national security. The most egregious example of this corruption is in the energy sector which western Ukrainians have dominated (It’s a Gas: Funny business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, 2006). A seventh constant factor is the prevalence of virtual over actual policies and the non-fulfillment of domestic obligations which leads to low public trust in state institutions. The eighth factor is an imitation of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures because virtual policies lead to inconsistent and multi-vector foreign policies. Virtual policies make it difficult for European and American governments to engage with the Ukrainian authorities because they rarely fulfill their obligations. The ninth factor is eastern Ukrainian naivety about Russia, regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian, that pursues hard-nosed geopolitical goals, a naivety that applies to Kuchma in 1994 as much as to Yanukovych in 2010. The tenth factor, the Russia factor, is Russia’s inability to accept Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Both eastern and western Ukrainian have been unable to fashion responsive policies to deal with Russia’s un-acceptance of Ukraine and its hard-nosed geopolitical goals.

The author challenges the dogma that complete openness of the country to the external world has only a positive impact on its current state of affairs and its future. He uses post-Soviet Russia to show that in several respects openness, in particularly systematic emigrations of active people from the country, creates a lot of the problems which, however, can be partially solved if society has true democratic institutions.

Anti-corruption efforts in Europe’s post-communist states have been less successful than anticipated. Criticism has been raised against the role of the international community in promoting anti-corruption programmes. Besides, such programmes have been deemed vague and “all-inclusive”. They have largely failed to address local factors “informing” corrupt behaviour in post-communist states, such as (a) negative perceptions of law, and (b) informal practice.‘ I’d be grateful if you could retain the original sentence as it is more precise.

This article examines the relationship between social justice norms and the perceived legitimacy of the social stratification system in the Czech Republic. Despite the fact that meritocratic values have remained the dominant part of ideology in the Czech Republic throughout the transformation process, those values have played only a very minor role in fostering evaluations of system legitimacy, such as perceptions of system closure and widespread inequality. This article argues that perceived corruption is the key factor that negatively mediates the relationship between norms of distributive justice and beliefs about social legitimacy, and ultimately plays a major role in reducing the legitimacy of the social stratification system. The main analysis uses a structural equation model based on Czech data from the ISSP Role of Government Survey in 2006. The evidence lends support to the path dependency view of the social transformation process, according to which rampant corruption, which was a core legacy of the market transformation process, continues to shape system legitimacy even in the face of relative economic prosperity of the mid 2000s.

Drawing on evidence from Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, this article analyses the use of a tool of political coercion known in the post-communist world as adminresurs , or administrative resource. Administrative resource is characterized by the pre-election capture of bureaucratic hierarchies by an incumbent regime in order to secure electoral success at the margins. In contrast to other forms of political corruption, administrative resource fundamentally rewrites existing social contracts. It redefines access to settled entitlements—public infrastructure, social services, and labor compensation—as rewards for political support. It is thus explicitly negative for publics, who stand to lose access to existing entitlements if they do not support incumbents. The geography of its success in post-communist states suggests that this tool of authoritarian capacity building could be deployed anywhere two conditions are present: where there are economically vulnerable populations, and where economic and political spheres of life overlap.

This article examines the incomplete and sometimes contradictory evidence on the crime, organised crime and corruption situations in post-communist states, and then seeks to explain the apparent increase in all three in early post-communism. Among the factors considered are the impact of weak states and economies, neo-liberalism, globalisation, Schengen and Fortress Europe, the Communist legacy (the ‘ghost from the past’), and collusion. The article then examines the dynamics of criminality and malfeasance in the region, and provides evidence to suggest that the crime and corruption situation has stabilised or even improved in most post-communist countries in recent times. The factors considered for explaining this apparent improvement are the role of external agents (notably the EU), the move from transition to consolidation, and the role of political will.