The attitudes of leaders toward their personal future are very important to domestic and international politics. These views are particularly vital in the case of leaders of nondemocratic regimes who could face legal prosecution for their corrupt acts or violations of human rights in their own country and abroad. In spite of these fears, however, the leaders in many authoritarian societies trespass laws, both domestic and international, in order to preserve their power and enrich their families. They expose themselves to the danger of the prosecution after they leave office or lose control of the regime. In this context, the author pays special attention to Vladimir Putin’s political future and to the developments in Russia, which favor and disfavor his continued stay in power after 2008.

This article seeks to determine whether a political business cycle existed during Yeltsin's tenure in the Second Russian Republic. While Yeltsin certainly had the power and desire to increase his electoral chances, the lack of state resources and doubts about their appeal to voters presents an inconclusive picture concerning the existence of a political business cycle during this period. Statistical analysis, however, demonstrates that the level of real wage arrears decreased during electoral periods. Other measures, such as federal budget spending or the average monthly pension, only show weak indications of electoral period manipulation. Finally, the usefulness of buying votes in the Russian case, however, is questioned, considering Yeltsin's failures in various Duma elections.