Though vilified as instances of “parliamentary putsch,” no-confidence censure motions remain significant constitutional tools through which the opposition can challenge the government in Romania, and publicly underscore its policy ineffectiveness in certain areas of activity. An overview of censure motions debated in the Romanian parliament from 1989 to 2012 reveals that center-left cabinets faced fewer challenges than their centerright counterparts, anti-communist forces were less skilled in articulating criticisms against cabinets, not all adopted motions led to cabinet removal, and motions became increasingly complex over time. Two motions adopted in 2009 and 2012, tabled by the center-left opposition against center-right cabinets, turned these parliamentary tools into powerful censure instruments.

Theory of parliamentary regimes presumes that parliament can express vote of no confidence in government. On the other hand executive power (government or head of state) is endowed with right to dissolve the parliament. However, these “doomsday devices” are not in balance in many parliamentary regimes, including the Czech Republic. On the basis of a comparative analysis of dissolution provisions in the constitutions of European states the article argues that the government in the Czech Republic should be given the right to dissolve the lower chamber at least in case that the latter expresses vote of no confidence in the former.