According to welfare chauvinism, access to the welfare state should be reserved for the native population, whereas immigrants are seen as a drain on resources. The curious aspect of welfare chauvinism in Europe is that it is more prevalent in the East. Why is this the case? This article uses the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) in order to locate the most robust individual-level determinants of welfare chauvinism for countries of both Eastern and Western Europe. The results suggest that there is no support for the socioeconomic explanation of welfare chauvinism. There is support for the cultural capital explanation of welfare chauvinism, but only for Western Europe. Finally, there is support for the theory that higher levels of trust lessen the likelihood that a person adopts welfare chauvinism. This finding holds for both Eastern and Western Europe.

This study examines the trust in political institutions in Azerbaijan using the data from the survey Caucasus Barometer (CB) conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in 2012–2013. Two hypotheses – cultural and institutional – were tested. The study partially confirms the previous findings that national culture, as well as individual socialization (macro and micro-cultural theories) are the main determinants of trust in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, government performance and individual evaluation (macro-and micro institutional theories) did not affect much on the trust level in the country.

The 2004–07 EU enlargement towards the post-communist region showed that the long waiting for EU membership could impact on levels of public support for the EU. This article examines citizens’ trust towards national and international institutions after joining the EU in Poland, in comparative perspective. In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones. Politicians and political parties are the most distrusted actors, undermining the social and political fabric in the region. An overview of political participation and levels of trust with focus on national data sets and the European Social Survey shows that levels of trust are quite low and a share of the population is concerned with sovereignty vis-à-vis EU integration. This analysis addresses how the relationship between citizens and institutions have changed and how this may affect not just the EU’s policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but how it can also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.

In January 2012, in several cities of Romania, people turned out to streets to protest. The protests were linked to the wave of movements such as the Indignados or Occupy Wall Street. The students were especially visible among protesters. In this paper, we show that the profile of protests in Romania witnessed a significant shift from workers strikes for higher wages and better jobs, during communism and in the 1990ies, to social movements in which young urban educated citizens mobilize with the help of social networks for issues that are linked to the quality of democracy and life. Furthermore, the shift in protesting is associated, at the individual level, with distrust of the political system, which stimulates engaging in demonstrations. Interestingly, online activism accelerates the feeling of shared distrust of institutions, motivating youth to engage in protest participation, although the effects might be moderate and the causal arrow somewhat uncertain. The hypotheses are tested with data from a general survey on participation in 2012 and a student survey from October 2012. We find that gender, distrust in institutions and family income influence protest behavior. Time spent online has a negative effect on protest engagement and online activism is related to protest behavior.

Corruption is perceived in all societies as a social pathology that causes great material and moral damage and is a threat to the society’s continual development. Especially in countries with a freshly consolidated democracy, as Slovenia, the phenomena of corruption must be treated with all due attention. This article emphasises that corruption in Slovenia is publicly perceived as one of the most important and even increasing problems in society. We are also analysing one of the crucial side effects of the corruption, resulting itself in ever deeper public distrust to most significant political and administrative institutions.

Using Poland as a case study, the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka has demonstrated most persuasively the significance of trust (and distrust) as a key to the analysis and understanding of socio-political and socio-cultural developments in Central Europe in the transition to democracy. Sztompka’s study ends upbeat with a brief glance at the situation in the late 1990s. Had the book been written a decade later, it would have revealed that the path ahead has remained rocky. Public trust in governments, politicians and public institutions generally has remained a scarce commodity. It is against this background that the restoration of an independent civil law notariat, as an integral part of the ‘return to Europe’ project, has occurred in Poland, and, mutatis mutandis , in other Central European countries. However, following a first decade of successful transformation from state employment to liberal profession, notaries in Central Europe now find that it is precisely because they have embraced the status of Western-style liberal professionals that they are coming under attack by both the European Commission and their own national governments. As a result, they have had to embark on a process of reconsideration of their position in order to ensure the profession’s survival. This paper traces and compares developments in Poland and Hungary. As can be expected there is a strong common denominator between them. But equally and more interestingly, there are distinctive national features which now, as ‘bloc history’ recedes, are coming increasingly to the fore.

This paper discusses the results of the survey conducted in co-operation with the European Research Center for Migration and Ethnic Relations, concerning identity in the Autonomous Republics of Russia and Ukraine. The survey queried 6522 residents of such republics as Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia), and Tatarstan in Russia, and Crimea in Ukraine. It examined the construction of social identities, common narratives regarding threats and deprivations, confidence in public institutions, the prevalence of views toward national minorities as ‘fifth columns’, ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and other conflict indicators. An early warning model, built on the basis of the results, measured the potential for conflict based on these factors, and found that it was most pronounced in Bashkortostan and Crimea, and to a lesser extent in Tatarstan. Conflict was less likely in Sakha, Karelia, and Komi, although there were still certain indicators that suggested potential problems, including moderate support for independence in these republics.

The article’s topic is the attitudes of the Russians toward their social institutions. As it will be shown, Russia is a country, much more than any other, that mistrusts its social institutions, political institutions in particular. There is no one institution that can garner more than 40 to 50 percent of the nation’s trust. Indeed, in terms of their lack of confidence in social institutions, the Russians are behind not only the most advanced countries in the world, but even countries known for their unstable political systems, such as Colombia or Nigeria.

This paper looks at trust and confidence in people and institutions in eight of the countries that have undergone transformation since the breakup of the Soviet Union. While the questions are not identical to those asked in previous research in post-Soviet societies, our findings are comparable—greatest trust in relatives and friends, less in people in general and least in politicians and institutions of social control. Levels of trust are not high, and there are interesting differences between the countries, giving support to the view that trust and confidence are eroded by sudden and dramatic negatively perceived change.

The citizens of postcommunist states have relatively low levels of trust in their basic political institutions. This paper argues that to consolidate the advances towards civil society and democracy particular attention must be paid to strengthening trust. Trust requires not just the institutional framework appropriate to democracy and the rule of law — already substantially in place — but also an appreciation of politics and civil society as spheres of continuing diversity, competition and conflict. The deficit of trust can be addressed by a leadership exemplary in its service to the public interest, and by an acceptance of the new, adversarial politics.