Slovenia, until recently a “success story” of the transition from communism to democracy and the rule of law, is experiencing its biggest constitutional and political crisis since its independence in 1991. The Slovenian constitutional model is currently facing a simultaneous economic and political crisis. The article argues that there are two principle reasons for this apparent decline of the Slovenian model. First, because of its relatively privileged position vis-a-vis other East Central European countries, Slovenia has been a reluctant reformer, doing very little to actually change its institutional setup from the communist past. Second, when Slovenia implemented reforms, it did it in a very particular way: as an uncritical model-taker of policy models from the West. This mimicry was done in a fairly top down, bureaucratic way, creating institutions without deep enough roots in society, and without necessary trial and error style usually needed for successful evaluation of proposed reforms.

It is difficult to find, at a glance, a clear connection between corruption and the reform processes in the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The key to untangling this issue is to look at the peculiarities of their transition strategies and economic crisis compared with those of Central and East European countries. This paper aims to unravel the complex ties between the transition process and corruption in the FSU states through theoretical and empirical analyses of the impact of multiple factors. These factors include the extent of decentralization of the government–enterprise relationship and the degree of state intervention in corporate management as well as the impact of economic distress that have been affecting the frequency and degree of corporate exploitation and state capture. In this manner, our study aims to complement earlier achievements in this field.