The paper analyzes Russia’s perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern enlargement. Russia’s reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in explaining Russia’s evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed military threat — the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and theWest in general, as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia’s national security and that through the alliance’s expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural, economic, and political domination in Eurasia.

This article traces developments in the Czech political elite’s thinking about structural changes that the region and the country have experienced during the last several years. It is argued that two parallel, external structural constraints have significantly shaped decisions of the Czech political elite as the country has, once again, proven to be an ostensibly “reactive state”. These structural constraints have been the ongoing U.S. recalibration of its grand strategy as well as the financial crisis with a systemic challenge to the European political project in which fiscal and monetary issues have largely replaced previous criticism of the Constitutional Treaty and then the Reform Treaty. It is argued that these developments have posed a notable problem for two predominant ideological convictions present in the Czech political thinking – Atlantism and Europeanism, as neither of them has offered readily answers to deal with such a challenge. As will be shown, this mutually reinforcing dual challenge has further exacerbated previously existing Czech government’s lack of political vision, and resorted to a political mentality which has contained elements of denial, rationalization, and political resignation.

This article examines the changing security, economic and diplomatic components of the transatlantic link, with a particular focus on Washington’s approach and implications for Central and Eastern Europe. The United States continues to play an essential role as security underwriter in the region, but the military dimension of the transatlantic relationship is transforming and will result in greater burdens on Europeans. Economic links between the U.S. and Central Europe are developing more strongly than generally understood, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is likely to drive both political and economic ties. Unconventional gas developments are enhancing U.S. engagement in European energy markets. Finally, the U.S. remains keen to engage its European partners on a broad agenda of global and regional issues and retains its own interests in working particularly with Central and Eastern European countries to lend stability to ‘wider Europe’.

The broad purpose of this study is to exemplify changing forms of hierarchical rule manifested in post-Soviet Russia’s varying provision of regional security related to military conflicts. Russia’s regional role varies in form and in thickness. Although the endurance of Soviet legacy can be observed in four major areas (stabilising borders, economic interest, unification of fellow Slavs and fluctuating alliances), there is enough variance to suggest that over-deterministic theories about Russian regional foreign policy do not account for conjunctural factors that can contribute to change. Instead, we can view the Soviet and post-Soviet regional dynamic as one that is on a fluid anarchy–hierarchy spectrum.

Scholarly interest has recently shifted from issues of democratic transition to those of state formation and state viability. The paper reviews scholarly contributions to understanding state weakness and suggests criteria and indicators to capture stateness in the former Soviet region. It suggests a preliminary ranking of the post-Soviet states along dimensions of national order, economic efficiency and political viability. The paper hypothesizes a causal mechanism through which state development in the region may occur by incorporating both structural and policy-related factors. It concludes that most states in the region can only be characterized as weak, and their urge to become modern is therefore yet to materialize.

Environmental challenges, resulting from either a scarcity of natural resources or environmental degradation, may contribute to security risks in Central Asia. An encouraging sign is the recent attention of the governments of Central Asia, civil society groups and international organizations to these environmental security issues. Their efforts indicate that by working together to prevent conflicts caused by environmental problems, cooperation among the countries of Central Asia may expand. Both short and long-term obstacles must be overcome if these groups are to ensure that environmental stresses do not lead to security concerns.

The authors analyze the divisions within Russian liberalism—another influential IR theory—and the contradictory nature of this intellectual movement. In particular, they draw the attention to the debate between pro-Western and more nationally oriented liberals, which they view in terms of the familiar disagreement between supporters of cosmopolitan and communitarian thoughts. Whereas cosmopolitans insist on the emergence of a single humanity and emphasize the factors of unifying and homogenizing nature, communitarians underscore the role of national and cultural foundations in building democratic institutions in the world. The authors trace how various liberal currents perceive the nature of the post-Cold War order, Russia’s national interests, and its foreign policy orientations.

This article analyses realist school in the Russian international relations scholarshipand discusses the debates among Russian realists. It focuses on the characteristics of the newly emerging world order and the development of an adequate strategy for Russia to pursue in its international behavior. The authors argue that over the 1990s, realism has made considerable intellectual progress and has gained the status of a leading intellectual movement in Russia. It assisted Russian intellectual and political community in defining the country’s interests and priorities in the emerging international relations, and it provided a necessary analysis of the world order’s structure and polarity.

This essay assumes the significance of spatial imagination in shaping the political and cultural boundaries of the post-Soviet Eurasia and reviews the newly emerged geopolitical arguments in Russia. Rather than perceiving Eurasianist views in Russia as relatively homogeneous, I argue that such thinking is highly diverse and varies from West-friendly versions to those that are openly isolationist and expansionist. To support my argument, I select six recently published Russian volumes and group them into five distinct schools of Russia’s geopolitical thinking, each with their own intellectual assumptions, worldviews, and bases of support in the society. While writing on the same subject of the Eurasian geopolitics, each author proposes principally different solutions to the problems that emerged over the 10 years of Russia’s post-communist experience. The argument invites us to rethink the nature of Russia’s spatial thinking and activities in Eurasia and to seriously consider engaging Russia as an equal participant in a larger collective security-based arrangement in the region.