Do Eastern European courts effectively constrain politicians and uphold the rule of law? Criminal prosecution of grand (high-level) corruption can further the central principle of equal responsibility under the law by demonstrating that even powerful political actors have to submit to the laws of the land. This article introduces the Eastern European Corruption Prosecution Database , which contains entries for all cabinet ministers (927 in total) who served in a government that held office in one of seven post-Communist Eastern European countries since the late 1990s. The systematic data collection reveals that Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia consistently indict more ministers than Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Poland; Slovakia has barely indicted anyone. We aim to start a research agenda by formulating hypotheses about which countries will see more corruption prosecutions and which ministers’ characteristics would make them more likely to face the court. We use the database to begin testing these hypotheses and find some evidence for several associations. We find no strong evidence that EU conditionality or membership raises the profile of the grand corruption issue or leads to more indictments. Party politics seems to affect the frequency of corruption indictments more than the structure and behavior of legal institutions. Indictment rates are lower when a former Communist party controls the government and individual ministers from junior coalition partners are more vulnerable to indictment than other ministers. The existence of a specialized anti-corruption prosecution or a more independent judiciary do not seem to lead to the indictment of more ministers on corruption charges. Finally, we discuss avenues of future research that our database opens, both for the analysis of country-level and individual-level variation.

EU rule of law assistance relies on supplying institutional ties as well as economic and technical support to candidate states, complemented by a demand to comply with certain political conditions. But, the establishment of the rule of law is a complex and often long-term process that includes both different facilitating and inhibiting conditions. Since 2006 Serbian government has adopted the National Judicial Reform Strategy aiming to establish a legal system based on legal security and respect for the rule of law. Nevertheless, its judiciary sector still reveals serious difficulties, especially in what concerns the independence and efficiency of judiciary. Looking at Serbian efforts to reform the rule of law and promote an independent judiciary, we analyse how the EU has been influencing these reforms and try to identify the weaknesses and strengths of EU rule of law assistance. Finally, we aim to contribute to know why judicial reforms, introduced by legislation, are not resulting in a truly judicial independence in Serbia, and what are the main obstacles to its effective implementation.

Populism is on the rise in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Persistent attacks on legal institutions of liberal democracy represent the most troubling aspect of the rising populism in CEE. The democracies in CEE are not about to collapse because of the rise of populism, yet the populist challenge to liberal democracy has to be taken seriously. While there has been significant progress in the development of ‘electoral democracy’ in the region, constitutional liberalism and the rule of law still remain weak. Only strong, independent, and professional legal institutions and respect for the rule of law can bring further consolidation of democracy in the region.

Constitutional Courts stand at the interface between law and politics, as the newly formed Russian Constitutional Court exemplified during Russia’s time of troubles between 1991 and 1993. One Constitutional Court case from that period had particular significance. The Russian court considered the constitutionality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Russian Communist Party (CP RSFSR). The seven month long hearing tested the court’s stamina and resolve. Described before it began as ‘Russia’s Nuremberg’, was the Communist Party case a turning point in Russia’s relationship with her past, or was it a staged showpiece with no real impact? This paper explores the Russian Constitutional Court’s longest case and its effects.

This paper studies a new phenomenon, the ‘top to bottom’ corruption networks of organized crime, law enforcement and Government officials in Russia. We examine the Soviet roots of corruption and its transformation during transitional period. By focusing on contemporary Russian corruption networks this paper explores the complex of state-run oligarchic structure with established rates, well organized inter-institutional groups incorporated by common ideas of extracting profits. The danger is in the existence of extensive and stable corruption networks, which not only profit by their illegal activities between Organized Crime groups and Law Enforcements, but invest in further corrupt developments to control the government. We argue that corruption in Russia, for a long time, has been imbedded in the system of social relations and, by the majority of citizens, was not considered to be a crime. Presenting arguments against existing simplified understanding of corruption, this study elucidates corruption networks as an expansion of Organized Crime in all spheres of post-totalitarian Russia. It also shows that a magic circle of corruption closely intertwines with the inefficiency of power and the inefficiency of rule of law.

Why are judicial review mechanisms being incorporated into so many democratizing states? This study analyzes why politicians create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. It sheds light on the role constitutional courts play in the consolidation phase of a democratic transition, focusing on one of those countries with no tradition of independent judicial review or of democratic forms of governance—Russia. Past practices and historical precedent do not support the formation of an independent judiciary in Russia, and yet a potentially powerful constitutional court now exists. Moreover, during the course of the transition from the Soviet state to the Russian Republic, there were three attempts to create an independent judicial review mechanism only one of which could be termed a success. This analysis focuses on the self-interested calculations of politicians in forming each of these three institutions, demonstrating that political actors establish a constitutional court to enhance their democratic credibility.

Empirical investigation of justice administration udertaken in post-Soviet Russia has been insignificant. Consequently, there is a dearth of knowledge about realities of justice administration ‘on the ground’, at the level of districts or towns. The author’s research project, an in depth empirical investigation of the activity of a single criminal court located in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, represents a step toward filling this gap. This paper concludes that the rule of law has made rather limited inroads in the day-to-day operations of criminal courts in the Russian deep provinces. The correspondence between earnestly declared legal principles and the mundane reality of judicial practice is loose and at some junctions non-existent.