It is established that Party-army relation followed a “separated” pattern in the Soviet Union as opposed to an “infused” pattern in China. This article explores the historical origin of this difference in the revolutionary periods. By analyzing the biographies of communist military elites, it argues that this discrepancy took shape before the revolutionary takeover and resulted from the differentiated intensities of warfare across Russia and China. In China, the numerous civil wars and military defeats, radicalized the old military structure and boosted societal militarization; thus, eroding the mutual exclusion between the military and revolutionaries. The effect was lesser in Tsarist Russia than in prerevolutionary China, making the old military a conservative and professional corporate that the Bolsheviks could not completely subordinate to Party control.

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine’s regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi , of elites’ political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites’ renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures — two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine’s hybrid regime unchanged.

This paper endeavors to show the importance of history for any study in the social and political sciences. Following theorist and Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, it attempts to show how the past and the present are connected through the continuity of a society’s institutions even when those formal institutions undergo a radical change, that is, revolution. To that end I will be comparing two agricultural societies — Russia and China — beginning with their Imperial periods — to show how their attitudes towards their peasantry have endured through the upheaval of both revolutions and the potential impact on development. The impact of the Russian revolution on China will also be examined.

In 2003–2005, democratic revolutions overthrew the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, disillusioned citizens witness today their new leaders creating a Bonapartist regime, entering into open conflict with former revolutionary allies or being forced to accept cohabitation with leaders of the previous regime. This article argues that despite internationally acclaimed civic mobilisation, civil society's weakness seriously affected the three revolutionary processes. These were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes' political elite. Finally, the supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.

Will revolution, either of the democratic or the Islamic fundamentalist variety, spread throughout Central Asia? Such a question cannot be answered definitively. I will address this question by examining what is going on in Central Asia in light of different theories of revolution, including the ones focusing on relative deprivation, regime type, state breakdown, external factors, democratic revolution theory, and the role of the military. This study will show that several theoretical approaches suggest that the ingredients for revolution in Central Asia are either there now or will be in the not too distant future.

Since 1999, the post-Communist states have seen a series of attempts to overthrow semiauthoritarian governments, with the successful attempts known as the “colored revolutions.” However, not all such attempts have succeeded. This paper seeks to explain the variation in outcomes. Most accounts have focused on the development of grass-roots activist movements. The central argument here is that elites, and in particular security services, play a much more significant role in these revolutions than has generally been appreciated. This hypothesis is elaborated through a threshold model of protest, in which the central question is whether protests achieve a “tipping point” that makes them continue to grow larger until success is inevitable. The actions of elites, it is argued, play a decisive role in whether mass protests reach a tipping point. The argument is examined through a paired comparison of two failed attempts to overthrow governments through street protests (Serbia 1996e1997 and Ukraine 2001) with two successful cases (Serbia 1999 and Ukraine 2004). By studying cases with variation on the dependent variable, this paper seeks to improve the empirical and methodological basis of research on post-communist revolutions.