What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine’s regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi , of elites’ political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites’ renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures — two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine’s hybrid regime unchanged.

This article examines coercive capacity and its impact on autocratic regime stability in the context of post-Soviet Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. In the post-Cold War era, different types of coercive acts require different types of state power. First, high intensity and risky measures – such as firing on large crowds or stealing elections – necessitate high degrees of cohesion or compliance within the state apparatus. Second, effective low intensity measures – including the surveillance and infiltration of opposition, and various forms of less visible police harassment – require extensive state scope or a well-trained state apparatus that penetrates large parts of society. Coercive state capacity, rooted in cohesion and scope, has often been more important than opposition strength in determining whether autocrats fall or remain in power. Thus, the regime in Armenia that was backed by a highly cohesive state with extensive scope was able to maintain power in the face of highly mobilized opposition challenges. By contrast, regimes in Georgia where the state lacked cohesion and scope fell in the face of even weakly mobilized opposition. Relatively high scope but only moderate cohesion in Belarus and Ukraine has made autocratic regimes in these countries generally more effective at low intensity coercion to prevent the emergence of opposition than at high intensity coercion necessary to face down serious opposition challenges.

During the Serbian Otpor movement to oust Milosevic (2000) and the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” (2004), the organizers developed explicit strategies to increase the costs of repression and to undermine the willingness of state security forces to engage in violent acts against them. By employing varying combinations of persuasion and deterrence tailored to the particular institutions they were addressing, the movements were able to successfully avoid a major crackdown.

A theoretical problem in defining “regime identity” of a political regime in conceptual and comparative terms is that there are no generally accepted theoretical criteria that could be used to demarcate the beginning and ending of a political regime and to assess the nature of a regime change in communist and post-communist countries. This article attempts to address the significance of this problem, revisit the utility of the totalitarian model, and develop a refined macro-model that can serve as the means to solve the problem and as reference points to define regime identity, assess and measure the regime change in theoretical and comparative terms. The refined model can serve both to observe, explain, and predict the regime change in general and to enrich our understanding of specific cases in particular. Based on the insights yielded by the new model, other researchers could modify this model by using techniques of formal modeling or by dropping some features while retaining others of the model.