This study analyzes controversies and public attitudes concerning the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. The research question is: Which factors affect attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera in contemporary Ukraine? This article employs comparative and regression analyses of surveys commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2009 and 2013 to determine the effects of regional and other factors on attitudes toward these organizations and the OUN-B leader. The study shows that regional factors and perceptions of these organizations’ involvement in mass murder were the strongest predictors of the views concerning the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera. Their public support is strongest in Galicia and weakest in the East and the South, in particular, in Donbas and Crimea, two major conflict areas since the “Euromaidan.”

This paper examines the Cold War rhetoric in US–Russia relations by looking at the 2008 Russia–Georgia war as a major breaking point. We investigate the links between media, public opinion and foreign policy. In our content analysis of the coverage in two major US newspapers, we find that the framing of the conflict was anti-Russia, especially in the initial stages of the conflict. In addition, our survey results demonstrate that an increase in the media exposure of US respondents increased the likelihood of blaming Russia exclusively in the conflict. This case study helps us understand how media can be powerful in constructing a certain narrative of an international conflict, which can then affect public perceptions of other countries. We believe that the negative framing of Russia in the US media has had important implications for the already-tenuous relations between the US and Russia by reviving and perpetuating the Cold War mentality for the public as well as for foreign policymakers.

In this study we aim to compare the public perceptions towards informal patient payments in six Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine). Overall, around 35–60% of the general public in each country has ever made informal payments, though informal cash payments are perceived negatively, mostly as corruption. In-kind gifts are often seen as a token of gratitude. However, significant differences among countries are observed. Despite the public support for the eradication of informal payments, there are population groups who favor their existence and this should be taken into account in policy-making.

Information about the support given by the public opinion to political actors has become a constant element of the public debate in Poland after the fall of Communism. Very soon polls became an argument in debates, a premise, or a way to justify decisions. At the same time they were criticized both by politicians and journalists convinced that polls can significantly influence the election results. But the fact was not noticed in Poland that all debates about the influence of polls on election outcomes should be preceded by a discussion of the way they are presented in the media. The present article joins this debate by subjecting to analysis the polls published in the Polish press during parliamentary campaigns in the dimensions of the role they played during the recent several years, the quality of methodological information, and of the way the polls were used in the media. As opposed to European and American analyses, no improvement in the conformity to standards of minimal disclosure in newspapers’ reporting of public opinion polls was noticed, although—like in other countries—a dramatic increase in the number of polls reported was observed.

The contrast between Slovakia’s primary Communist successor party—the Party of the Democratic Left—and its own successor— Smer —offers considerable insight into the interaction between party ideology, organization and electoral success in post-Communist Europe. The Party of the Democratic Left and Smer offered relatively similar programmatic positions, but Smer managed to replace—and far outpace—its predecessor by offering a more charismatic public face, a smaller and more tightly centralized organization and an ideological flexibility that permitted it to take advantage of a shifting electoral environment.

As market reform has spread throughout the globe, both scholars and policy makers have become increasingly interested in measuring public opinion towards economic changes. However, recent research from American politics suggests that special care must be paid to how surveys treat non-respondents to these types of questions. We extend this line of inquiry to a well-known case of large-scale economic reform, Russia in the mid-1990s. Our major finding is that Russians who fail to answer survey questions tend to be consistently less “liberal” than their counterparts who are able to answer such questions. This finding has implications both for our understanding of Russian public opinion in the 1990s, as well as for measuring attitudes towards economic reform more generally.

Examination of the speeches, writings and editorials by the Putin Administration in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showed a consistent storyline that equated Russia’s war against Chechen terrorists with the subsequent US attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The storyline made a strong case for a Russian alliance with the US and the West against those who were attacking the ‘civilized world’. Two alternative storylines also emerged. The centrist-liberal storyline was skeptical of the benefits accruing to Russia from its support of the Bush Administration’s policy, while the national patriotic-Communist storyline concentrated on the ‘imperialist’ drive of the United States to control the resources of Eurasia. The resonance of the dominant Putin storyline and its skeptical and suspicious alternatives among the Russian public is tested by analysis of the responses to a representative national survey of 1800 adults conducted in April 2002. Significant socio-demographic differences appear in responses to eight questions. The Putin storyline is accepted by the rich supporters of the Edinstvo party, males, ‘Westernizers’, residents of Siberia, singles and young adults, while the oppositional storylines are supported by Communist party supporters, the elderly, Muslims, women, the poor, and residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The article critically surveys the impact of domestic public opinion on foreign policy in Ukraine by integrating it within theories of public opinion. Studies of public opinion in Ukraine have not given due weight to the unique characteristics of the Ukrainian ‘public’, which differs greatly from the Western public. Ukrainian society is passive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ relative to that of the state. The article argues that public opinion is of minimal importance in the area of foreign policy.

The article discusses, through conceptual elaboration and empirical investigation, the interplay between the perception of smallness and the concept of national identity in the case of Slovenia’s integration into the European Union. Unlike the prevailing literature on Slovenia, the authors do not take Slovenia’s smallness for granted. They argue that, in the particular case of Slovenian identity-building, smallness as an independent variable does not feature frequently at all. The research is based on methodological pluralism, with a special emphasis on political discourse, the mass media and public opinion in Slovenia

Based on our reassessment of existing studies on political interest and apathy in various societies, we argue the urgent need for a more systematic and focused examination of mass political interest—as psychological involvement in politics—in China. Utilizing data collected from a public opinion survey conducted in Beijing, China in late 1995, we intend to shed some light on the level and sources of political interest in contemporary China. Contrary to the prevalent argument that most Chinese are politically apathetic, we have found that there was a rather high level of political interest within our sample. We have also found that both conventional variables (i.e. age, gender, education, income, political efficacy, and dissatisfaction with government performance) and variables unique to the Chinese setting (i.e. being a farmer, becoming a private entrepreneur, joining the Chinese Communist Party and holding leading position in the party/government) have significant effects on the levels of political interest.

Among the arguments for rapid economic reform in transitions to the market in Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have argued that rapid reformers could better take advantage of the period of ‘extraordinary politics’ at the beginning of the transition. Regime transitions provide a unique opportunity for politicians to implement economic reform since the public is more likely to grant the government room to reform. If the public is more likely to give politicians this window of opportunity, politicians should implement far-reaching reforms during that period. I test two propositions in this paper: (1) politicians in office during a period of liberalization will get high positive ratings at the polls which will gradually deplete over time; and (2) at the beginning of the transition, views of the current economic situation will not predict views of politics. I find that approval of the Polish government was unusually high in the first one and one-half to two years of the Polish transition. In the same period, assessments of the current economic situation only weakly affected assessments of politics. After the period of extraordinary politics comes to an end, the relationship between political and economic assessments is much stronger. Thus, in a country with a harsh economic reform program and six contentious national elections within eight years, there is strong evidence that politicians benefited from a period of extraordinary politics at the beginning of the regime.