This article explores the sources of legitimacy of private property in the means of production in Ukraine. The conceptualization of legitimacy of private property was made by analyzing theoretical approaches to the study of the foundations of private property relations in Western countries. The application of these approaches tests economic utilitarian, psychological, and sociocultural explanations of legitimacy of large and small private enterprises and private land in the process of activation of post-communist transition of Ukrainian society. The basic hypothesis was that the process of legitimation of private property in the means of production proceeds by uniting utilitarian and psychological adaptation with sociocultural agreement of ideological attitudes. This hypothesis was verified with the help of created legitimacy indices by comparison of linear regressions and data of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine for 2013 and 2017. The results indicate that the hypothesis has been held true only concerning legitimacy of small private enterprises. They have acquired a moderate extent of legitimacy owing to the fact that besides the factors of adaptation, social recognition has increased at the expense of people who support the multiparty system and the liberal and mixed methods of regulation of the economy. In contrast, the existence of large private enterprises and private land has not acquired the corresponding sociocultural foundation.

The suspense-filled attempted partial privatization of the Narva Power Plants in the neo-liberal darling Estonia involved a rich cast, from trade unions and local scientists, via Estonian courts and ombudsmen to international consulting firms, major global banks and the US government. More important, a detailed single case study on the democratic decision-making process in this privatization case makes it possible to go beyond common generalizations regarding the consequences of neo-liberalism for democratic processes. It shows that purported proponents of economic neo-liberalism such as the US government sometimes use their arguments to advance the narrow business interests of politically well-connected firms. Established private firms can behave in a more rent-seeking manner than publicly owned, ex-communist companies. Liberal economic principles of open competition and a level playing-field are at times used by actors in the democratic process to question top-down, opaque economic decisions.

This article examines how Russian privatization helped create the Putin political system. During the ‘who lost Russia’ debate in the 1990s, American economic advisors were rebuked for allowing a ‘capture of the state’ by the oligarchs. A larger time frame reveals that the consequences of Russian privatization were quite different from the forecasted ones. Because the new class of owners were regarded as illegitimate, lacked clear property rights, and ran conglomerates immersed in a command economy these owners, that is, oligarchs, were easily subdued by the state. As a consequence, there is little chance for a coalition of elites to mobilize against Putin.

What factors determine the timing of elite defection in conditions of post-Soviet personalistic presidentialism? How do relations with a powerful patron state affect this process? This article analyzes these questions on the basis of a case study of Transnistria, a de facto state with strong links to Russia. It argues that privatization processes involving actors from the patron state provide a unique opening for elite defection by heightening tensions between the rent-seeking interests of the personalistic president and those of new owners; direct or indirect signals from the patron state may also affect elite’s perceptions of incumbent durability and their corresponding decisions.

Violations of rights, a weak Duma, political parties dominated by bureaucrats, and corrupt privatization are ordinarily taken as signs or even causes of the failure of democracy in Russia or at best as normal traits of electoral politics in a middle-income state. Yet all of these are natural consequences of introducing democracy in a country with the Russian electorate’s distinctive recent experience of a loss of a third of the state’s territory and half its population. In such a democracy only a centrist, not a liberal, strategy can block a return to authoritarianism, and such a strategy in Russia will subordinate rights to the task of privatization that a Duma weakened by ideological, demographic and geographic impediments to party development cannot conduct. Consequently what are taken as signs or causes of democratic failure in Russia are instead necessary effects of introducing democracy in Russia’s special circumstances.

While foreign land ownership has become a post-Cold War security concern for East-Central Europe, it has been neglected in security studies focused on more traditional topics. This article offers a comparative analysis of: (1) the post-1989 development of policy towards land sales to non-citizens, (2) why foreign land ownership has been the most controversial in Hungary and especially Poland, and (3) why foreign ownership can be a useful tool for nationalists. Mining the land issue ultimately strikes a deeper tension between foreign-driven pressures to liberalize land markets within a pan-European free market and the still-strong belief that states should control land sales for the good of the nation.

The interplay between the state and the super rich has been a subject of intense debate since the time of Aristotle, who introduced the notion of oligarchs and the oligarchic regime as the ruling of a few rich people. The ideologically loaded debates about the role of wealthy people in society can be found in each country in the contemporary world. In recent times, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi is both Italy’s prime minister and the richest person in the country (who has almost complete control over Italian TV) has aroused intense debates about the impact of big business on politics (Stille, 2003). It is not surprising that the case of the Italian prime minister draws attention in Russia, where he is often compared to both the Russian president as well as to the oligarchs (Remnik, 2003). A dramatic struggle between Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whose wealth was estimated before his arrest at eight-billion dollars, 1 unfolded in the summer and fall of 2003. This conflict will likely be recounted in any future textbook that discusses the relationship between political power and big money.

In January 1999, the Polish government implemented a new law reorganizing the health care in the country. This paper includes an outline of the changes, the main impact of which consisted of introduction of universal health insurance administered by Health Insurance Funds (‘‘Kasy Chorych’’). In June 2001 and 2002, a survey of insurance administrators and health care workers provided data concerning the reception of the new system, the perceived inadequacies, and the postulated changes. The intended objective of privatization of health provisions appears as remote as it was before the changes. The major obstacles are identified as political hurdles, physician resistance, and continued dependence on state allocations.

This article asks how new rules of political conduct are established in a country attempting political transformation and sweeping economic change. Based on a close analysis of the conflict over property policy and its effect on Russian executive–legislative relations in the 1990s, the study argues that regardless of formal distributions of power, the real allocation of policy-making authority is shaped in struggles over substantive policy issues. Those arenas, especially during the first years after the fall of an authoritarian regime, can function as “political classrooms” in which leaders either adopt or reject such practices as compromise and negotiation.

The political and ideological concerns aside, the fundamental economic argument in favor of postsocialist transition to a market system has been a supposition that it will improve allocative efficiency and thus the competitiveness of the industries and standard of living of households. It is believed that the shift of property rights from the state to private sector must quickly facilitate such an improvement. Yet in the majority of cases, even after the first decade of transition, the economies have not returned to the path of sustainable growth. The countries tackling the issues of recovery and growth relatively better are these which were able to focus not only on de-nationalization of the state assets, but mainly on the development of venture entrepreneurship. The grass-rooted development of especially small and medium enterprises has contributed significantly to overcoming the transitional depression and then to recovery and fast growth. Yet to accomplish such a sequence specific systemic and policy conditions must be met. To facilitate such a path of development proper institutional arrangements must be executed by the governments, legal framework must be established and the government policies ought to support the rise and competitive performance of the small and medium enterprises (SME). Liberalization is a prerequisite of growth of this sector in transition economies, but is not a sufficient condition. The crucial factors involve the institutional arrangements.

This article examines the relative importance of spontaneity and state initiative in economic transformation, using China’s shareholding system reform as case study. Two contrasting images of the Chinese state are identified: the strong state perspective sees the state as providing the basic impetus for change, whereas the weak state perspective emphasizes the role of spontaneous attempt. Based on fieldwork conducted in Foshan, where China’s first industrial shareholding enterprise emerged, we argue that although the Chinese state has been dysfunctional in some aspects, particularly at the local level, it has been strong enough to play a developmental role. The basic momentum of change has come mainly from the central government. Local authorities have helped implement the central policy, though with some distortions. Early spontaneous attempts have not played any significant role in defining the final reform program. It is the strong state perspective that holds.

The article deals with the relatively little researched problem of the restitution of property confiscated by the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, After the fall of communism, new democratic governments and parliaments were faced with the problem of compensating former owners. This problem has practical aspects related to investors' confidence, as well as moral, symbolic, and emotional ones. Quite often it becomes a pawn in the political game. Legislation adopted and proposed in the key countries of the region is examined and compared. The political, economic, and institutional context of re-privatization is analysed. From the point of view of the key objectives of property restitution, the different re-privatization formulas, practised throughout the region, are assessed.

The rapid privatization of the Czech economy has contributed to its first rank in the economic performance of the post-communist countries. The claim that 75 per cent of its GDP originates in the private sector may, however, be only formally true. Many of the voucher-privatized former state-owned enterprises and financial institutions are still influenced through core stakes in their share capital by the Fund of National Property and by their mutual interdependence. This article concludes that full privatization will likely be attained through a hybrid of German and American corporate governance systems.