Under Putin and Xi, the post-communist authoritarian regimes in Russia and China had both initiated anti-corruption programs that exhibited some parallels but were also profoundly different. Through a contextualized comparison, and drawing on Russian and Chinese sources, this article puts forth an institutionalist argument that these campaigns were being driven by divergent strategic objectives shaped by different formal and informal institutional settings. Whereas Putin’s more limited anti-corruption program was essentially a defensive move, embedded in factionalism, primarily aimed at protecting his political power under “competitive” authoritarianism, Xi’s broader and deeper campaign could be seen as an offensive initiative, targeting factionalism with a long-term goal to strengthen the CCP party-state, in addition to the obvious short-term objective of his own power consolidation.

The bases of the political divisions in Macedonia are hard to explain solely through the traditional theoretical approach based on social structures and values. We include the perceptions of the communist past together with the social structures and values; and use survey data to run a multinomial logistic regression with undecided voters as the base category. Results show that perceptions of communism have the strongest influence on political divisions. Diverging perceptions of communism combine with attitudes toward religious values and shape a cultural left-right dimension. On the other hand, there is an absence of a left-right distinction in economic policies. The finding could be a useful explanation for political divisions in other post-communist countries, where there is an absence of distinction in economic policies.

The extant literature on clientelism has tended to focus on large parties. This article asks what happens to small parties that operate in an electoral system dominated by large clientelistic parties. Our case study is the Romanian National Liberal Party (PNL). During the last two decades, it has become the second-largest party in Romania. This is unusual because the liberals in post-communist countries are politically weak. The main base of liberal support is typically urban middle classes. By contrast, PNL's electoral base is in the economically underdeveloped rural world. Using electoral statistics, economic datasets, and qualitative analysis, we demonstrate that PNL's success was due to pork-barrel spending and the development of clientelistic networks in which local mayors play a key role. PNL was able to grow by following the example of the dominant parties and creating networks of loyal mayors. In turn, this opens perspectives for research about clientelism in small communities, as well as comparative studies based on small parties.

The transformation process from an authoritarian/totalitarian system entails many institutional changes, however, the individual citizen is often being overlooked in this chaotic, fast-paced process and his or her “transformation” into a democrat is taken for granted. The changing socio-political system and its exigencies may lead to nostalgia and social frustrations, which in turn cause democratic backsliding. In order to cultivate a democratic society and avoid future backsliding, the post-communist states quickly set out to reform their educational systems, both in form and substance. By reviewing the reform process of the Czech educational system and discussing the prevailing legacies left by the communist regime, the article will show that through the “destruction” of the former system and its de-monopolization, decentralization and de-ideologization, the state deliberately lost significant means and power to transform Czechs from “ homo sovieticus ” to “ homo democraticus ” and is now left with a dependence on the highly autonomous schools and their propensity to foster democratic generations that will uphold the democratic state in the future. This paradox is reminiscent of the so-called Böockenföorde dilemma, claiming that the liberal democratic state “lives by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself”.

Frustration/satisfaction under the post-Communist democracy and under the pre-1989 Communist authoritarianism were studied in the Czech Republic in 2008 using a nationwide sample of 1093 respondents and an original Societal Frustration inventory. The patterns of frustration were contrastingly opposite: The past was dominated by the memory of oppression, of curtailed self-actualization yet fulfilled basic needs. In contrast, current democracy allowed for free self-actualization but the intensity of the current frustrations has exceeded the past frustrating memories. Main current complaints included a) general insecurity, lack of fulfillment of basic needs; b) corruption, low political culture, decline of civility (rudeness, envy, and ethnic intolerance). The results and their discussion help to explain the psychology of Communism, post-Communism, transition, and democratic consolidation.

This paper suggests that the different and sometimes contradictory public narratives of perestroika constitute an essential part of understanding the expectations of people regarding perestroika and their evaluation in the post-perestroika years. These narratives also underline the notion that post-Soviet governments have been unable to consolidate new constructs of memory with respect to perestroika. Historical construction regarding the pre-perestroika years of the Soviet administration in most of the post-Soviet Central Asian (CA) countries is conducted along the ideological lines associated with the post–independence years in each of the republics.

This article traces developments in the Czech political elite’s thinking about structural changes that the region and the country have experienced during the last several years. It is argued that two parallel, external structural constraints have significantly shaped decisions of the Czech political elite as the country has, once again, proven to be an ostensibly “reactive state”. These structural constraints have been the ongoing U.S. recalibration of its grand strategy as well as the financial crisis with a systemic challenge to the European political project in which fiscal and monetary issues have largely replaced previous criticism of the Constitutional Treaty and then the Reform Treaty. It is argued that these developments have posed a notable problem for two predominant ideological convictions present in the Czech political thinking – Atlantism and Europeanism, as neither of them has offered readily answers to deal with such a challenge. As will be shown, this mutually reinforcing dual challenge has further exacerbated previously existing Czech government’s lack of political vision, and resorted to a political mentality which has contained elements of denial, rationalization, and political resignation.

The article examines how the structure of party systems, that is, effective number of political actors, electoral volatility, and shares of dominant party votes and seats, affect the initiation and direction of electoral reform in post-communist democracies. Based on a dataset of electoral rule changes in post-communist democracies from 1992 to 2008, we analyze the frequency and direction of reforms over time. The findings reveal that the frequency of reforms declines with successive electoral cycles but not to the degree suggested by theories of institutional inertia. Countries with high levels of voter volatility are more likely to engage in reforms; however, the findings in this article demonstrate that politicians react to volatility by inconsistently choosing between permissive and restrictive responses.

The article presents an analysis of “informal institutionalization” in post-Communist Russia in theoretical and comparative perspective. It is devoted to critical analysis of existing explanations of the dominance of subversive institutions – that is, those rules, norms, and practices that at first sight partly resemble institutions of modern democracy, good governance and rule of law, but in fact inhibit them. While “pessimists” focus on cultural and historical embeddedness of subversive institutions in Russia, “optimists” draw their attention to patterns of post-Communist state-building, and “realists” point out the major role of special interests groups in turning growing pains of informal governance in Russia into its chronic deceases.

The article focuses on rise of nationalism and xenophobia in Slovenia. It starts by considering the issue of unrecognized minorities in Slovenia (former Yugoslavia nations) that have no minority rights, despite being large groups, as many international organizations for the protection of minorities have pointed out. A particular issue in this relation for Slovenia is the ‘Erased’ – the individuals who did not acquire Slovenian citizenship when Slovenia seceded from federal Yugoslavia – and despite the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision, the Slovenian state has still not recognized their rights, which were violated in the post-independence period. The article also examines two other minorities in Slovenia, the Jews and the Roma. The article finds Slovenia to be a closed, non-globalised society which, in spite of its constitutional declaration to protect the rights of minorities and other national communities, is seeking to retain a politically and culturally homogeneous nation state.

The article assesses civil society in Putin’s Russia through the lens of the small social movement working against gender violence. Based on questionnaires distributed to movement organizations in 2008–2009, we find significant retrenchment among the NGO segment of the movement, adding evidence to the claim of Russia’s turn toward authoritarianism. However, this innovative, midlevel analysis–not the typical society-wide surveys nor the small number participant observation–also shows that the women’s crisis center movement has made some in-roads in transforming the state, revealing that some democratic opportunities remain at the local level.

The former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe have attempted to reconcile their Communist past in different ways. It is in Poland, however, where the issue of dealing with its Communist past through attempts at lustration has been especially fraught. It will be argued here that Poland’s lustration problems are caused primarily by a failure to understand the specific nature of totalitarian dictatorship that existed in Poland under Communist rule.

Romania is an archetypical case of protracted post-communism. Its regime transition was problematic and its founding election flawed, allowing successor communists to secure their hold on power. A period of quasi-authoritarianism and failed reform followed until critical elections in 1996 brought the liberal opposition to power for the first time. Since that time its political system has stabilized into a pattern in which electoral competition occurs but political accountability is limited and corruption is widespread. The current regime should therefore be considered as consolidated, bearing the marks of the transition period, but unlikely to undergo any further near term dramatic change.

How is socio-economic status linked to political support? The analysis of a Romanian national probability sample suggests that there are two distinct and opposite routes. On the one hand, status is positively associated to political support, via well-being and, on the other hand, it is negatively associated to political support, probably via expectations and values. Whereas the negative route implies that upper status Romanians are more critical of current politics without questioning democratic principles, the positive route reveals that Romanians’ discontent erodes not only trust in political actors but also more diffuse levels of political support, and leads to positive attitudes toward communism.

In this article we order the 28 post-communist countries in a theoretically informed typology of political regime forms. Our theoretical expectation is that a hierarchy exists in the extent to which the post-communist countries fulfill democratic criteria concerning electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. More particularly, we expect that the countries are doing better with respect to electoral rights than civil liberties and that they fare worst regarding the rule of law. The analyses confirm three — ever stricter — versions of this hypothesis, in the end establishing the presence of an almost perfect hierarchy across the attributes in the form of a Guttman scale. Furthermore, a systematic cross-spatial distribution is identified, which lends support to the notion that the present political differences must be traced back to structural constraints and are, therefore, likely to subsist.

This article examines the incomplete and sometimes contradictory evidence on the crime, organised crime and corruption situations in post-communist states, and then seeks to explain the apparent increase in all three in early post-communism. Among the factors considered are the impact of weak states and economies, neo-liberalism, globalisation, Schengen and Fortress Europe, the Communist legacy (the ‘ghost from the past’), and collusion. The article then examines the dynamics of criminality and malfeasance in the region, and provides evidence to suggest that the crime and corruption situation has stabilised or even improved in most post-communist countries in recent times. The factors considered for explaining this apparent improvement are the role of external agents (notably the EU), the move from transition to consolidation, and the role of political will.

The article challenges the hypothesis that there is cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions and practices. While valid at a general level, the relationship is not confirmed once it is scrutinized thoroughly and heterogeneous categories are disaggregated. For the European post-Communist cases, the pattern of the relationship between the regime type and the propensity to associate closely resembles the one in Latin mature democracies and non-authoritarian countries, provided that voluntary associations are chosen as measurements of vitality of social capital and robustness of civil society. A possible consequence of this provocative finding would be re-evaluating the well-established concepts in social sciences.

The author argues that political opportunism, an attitude common among communist party members before 1989, turned into both the blessing and the curse for post-communist parties in Poland. Once hopeful of secure careers in the authoritarian structures of the old regime, after the regime breakdown communists found themselves in a situation where the only chance for such a career could be associated with the party reinventing itself as a player in the field of pluralist democracy. Opportunistic attitudes of communist apparatchiks and nomenklatura members were instrumental in transforming them, individually and collectively, into effective actors in market economy and competitive politics. Yet the same attitudes doomed the post-communists once the opportunities associated with access to political power opened up widely. The same people who in the 1990s were so apt in turning the rules of democratic game into their collective advantage, in the 2000s acted with a sense of impunity and lack of any consideration for political accountability that in democracies arrives at the end of any election cycle. Plagued by corruption scandals, they lost their popular base: the economically disadvantaged groups to nationalistic populists, the urbane libertarians to liberal democrats.

This article investigates the extent of continuity and discontinuity of the original political, economic, and foreign policy value orientations of Russian and Polish post-Communist elites. I conclude that during the post-Communist period the Russian elite shifted the priorities from pro-democratic to authoritarian positions, engaged in a debate over the most desirable foreign policy course, and ultimately chose a pragmatically independent direction, but remained loyal to original beliefs in the free market. In Poland, with its cyclical rotation of governments, original pro-democratic and pro-Western elite value orientations survive to this day, while the issue of preferred economic model is contested and highly sensitive to electoral cycles.

This article explores the political, economic, and social forces underlying the east/west cleavage in the 1994 Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. We demonstrate that economic factors—notably, variations in regional economic strength and changes in employment in the period preceding the elections—are stronger predictors of country-wide voting behavior and candidate support than ethnic and linguistic factors. The exceptions are the extreme eastern and western oblasts, where the analysis suggests the existence of significant differences in political culture.