Sport mega events are the most prominent manifestations of the multidimensional and global interrelation between sport and politics. The purpose of the paper is to present the contrasting cases of two Polish SMEs: UEFA European Championships in football (Euro, 2012) and the bid for Winter Olympic Games Cracow 2022. This article pays special attention to the role of Polish political elite in promoting both events and to the grassroots movement that effectively ended the bidding for the latter event. It also discusses how the allegedly successful Euro 2012 tournament was presented in the public discourse in order to avoid conflicts and debates about the very idea of hosting the games. This proved unsuccessful in the latter case. This case deserves scrutiny as it is an unusual example of effective bottom up mobilization of civil society against the whole political elite.

The purpose of the present paper is to determine the changes of the sector and industry structure of FDI and to confront the observed patterns with the hypotheses or predictions derived from the IDP model. At the heart of the IDP model lies the concept of net outward investment (NOI). The NOI position (NOIP), broken down by the main sectors and component industries of the Polish economy, is analyzed for the period of 1996–2016. We develop a conceptual framework of the sectoral shifts in the composition of NOIP along its different stages. Subsequently, our panel regression analysis indicates that the relative share of a sector in inward and outward FDI stocks is positively related to its level of technological intensity and its level of service intensity.

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics.We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia’s relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO’s mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization’s continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland’s striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland’s effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors’ conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.

Of the 11 post-socialist states that have already become European Union members only five have joined the common currency Eurozone. The other six, including Poland, the region’s largest economy, have, pursuant to accession treaties, the right and obligation to adopt euro as their currency. They fail to exercise their right and meet their obligation, which has both causes and consequences. These are economic and political in nature and that is why there is no certainty about how the situation will evolve in future. However, from both of those perspectives, and especially for economic reasons, Eastern European EU members should join the Eurozone, as the resulting benefits, not only for Poland, significantly outweigh the conversion costs. Thus, new countries, especially Poland, adopting euro would have a positive impact on the European integration process, which is experiencing a serious structural, institutional and political crisis.

The 2004–07 EU enlargement towards the post-communist region showed that the long waiting for EU membership could impact on levels of public support for the EU. This article examines citizens’ trust towards national and international institutions after joining the EU in Poland, in comparative perspective. In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones. Politicians and political parties are the most distrusted actors, undermining the social and political fabric in the region. An overview of political participation and levels of trust with focus on national data sets and the European Social Survey shows that levels of trust are quite low and a share of the population is concerned with sovereignty vis-à-vis EU integration. This analysis addresses how the relationship between citizens and institutions have changed and how this may affect not just the EU’s policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but how it can also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.

The paper explores the recent political participation in Poland focusing on the KOD movement. Given that very limited data is available on the impact of citizen participation in political process in Poland, the paper attempts a preliminary assessment of the participation “between elections”. The paper tries to take a snapshot of the KOD movement and to examine it in the context of civil society concept. The paper argues that the KOD movement is located between civil and political society on the one hand. On the other hand, it draws strongly on the symbolism of the civil resistance during the last two decades of communism. The dichotomy of post-communism and the former anti-communist opposition (including former Solidarity and KOR activists) was relevant for the political participation in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s and, as I argue now, has been replaced by new identity conflict between the symbolic politics of nationhood and the liberal Europeanized vision of politics.

The present study investigates how Poles perceive the post-communist political system of contemporary Poland. A nationwide random sample of 400 adults was selected, using a probability quota sampling strategy, and interviewed face-to-face in respondents’ homes. The chief outcome variables were: full acceptance, conditional acceptance, and rejection of the Polish version of democracy. The majority of respondents generally approved, fully or at least conditionally, the new democratic system in Poland. Multiple regression analyses showed that differential attitudes toward Polish democracy depend on respondents’ age, their understanding of the concept of democracy, evaluations of democracy in general, and levels of political anomie.

This study uses firm data to examine the locational trends of foreign direct investment projects undertaken by Polish companies. The findings of the study are consistent with the evolutionary models of internationalization. Companies in the early stages of internationalization are motivated by markets and resource seeking, whereas efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking are significant motivators in the advanced stages of internationalization. However, our results with respect to Polish cross-border acquisitions by service companies and greenfield foreign direct investments by industrial or manufacturing companies did not confirm the evolutionary model findings. We found evidence that, in both cases, investments are motivated by the need for efficiency or strategic assets.

Poland maintained its open-list PR system but introduced gender quotas in the 2011 parliamentary elections in order to increase the number of women deputies. Yet this change had only a limited impact on women’s representation. The 2011 election confirms that ‘favorable’ electoral laws provide opportunities for women, but they cannot guarantee that women will be elected. In particular, the use of quotas alone is not sufficient to ensure high levels of women’s representation. The most important factors in explaining the Polish result were 1) the absence of a ‘zipper’, a list ordering that alternates men and women candidates, thus ensuring high list-places for women 2) the parties’ favoring of men in their list placement 3) the relative size of the political parties and 4) voters’ support for list leaders and incumbent deputies. Despite a disappointing outcome, quotas may be seen as beneficial in increasing women’s presence and the potential for further evolution of the electoral system.

The article looks first into the nature of the relations between Germany and the CEE countries a decade since the accession of the CEE countries to the EU. The relations are characterized as normalised and intensive with diverse levels of closeness and cooperation reflecting of the conceptual and ideological compatibility/differences. Next, the article focuses on the German attitude to the euro zone crisis. Germany has become a hegemon in the rescue effort aimed at stabilisation and economic invigoration of the euro zone. However, German hegemony has developed by default, not by design: her leading position is linked with considerable political and financial costs. Germany moved central stage and took the position of a reluctant hegemon. However, German role is contested internationally (it has not the support of the French government in key areas) as well as internally (particularly by the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bundesbank). The article argues that the new situation makes the German–CEE relations increasingly relevant for both sides. The German leadership of the EU increasing split along the north–south divide requires backing by the Northern group countries to which the CEE in general belongs. Given a number of reasons the CEE countries implement three distinctive strategies of co-operation with Germany in European politics. Also military co-operation, which remained rather limited so far, may receive new impulses, given the financial austerity.

The past 20 years have seen profound shifts in Polish foreign and security policy. Like other states in Central Europe Poland became part of the Euro-Atlantic sphere upon gaining first NATO and then EU membership. Despite such broad similarities, Poland’s trajectory since 1989 has been marked by some specific and defining features. Poland has become the most significant player in Central Europe and tends to be viewed in the region as a leader, twinned with this, due to its size and relative strength, Poland is taken seriously at the EU table. At the same time, there has been a palpable shift in Polish Atlanticism and a more skeptical view of the US has emerged. This article explores the sources of these reconfigurations and considers their potential implications.

Using Polish panel data from 1998, 2003, and 2008, I examine people’s knowledge of the governing parties of the Sejm in 2003. I focus on ability, opportunity, and motivation to explain political knowledge. I also examine the effects of knowledge on changes in political attitudes and behaviors from 2003 to 2008. Major sources of political knowledge are prior political interest and the change in interest from 1998 to 2003, political experience, and cognitive ability. There also exists a substantial gender gap in knowledge. Finally, political knowledge leads to changes in political interest, alienation, democratic attitudes, and voting behavior.

Despite connections and common traits between geopolitics and International Business based on geography and location, literature on this matter is scarce. This study aims to contribute to this literature gap, by assessing the importance of Poland’s geopolitical factors in FDI location decisions. By applying a hybrid methodology which combines qualitative and quantitative analyses we conclude that there is a connection between Poland’s geopolitical factors (stable, variable and interactional) and the volume, origin and distribution of the FDI received.

Information about the support given by the public opinion to political actors has become a constant element of the public debate in Poland after the fall of Communism. Very soon polls became an argument in debates, a premise, or a way to justify decisions. At the same time they were criticized both by politicians and journalists convinced that polls can significantly influence the election results. But the fact was not noticed in Poland that all debates about the influence of polls on election outcomes should be preceded by a discussion of the way they are presented in the media. The present article joins this debate by subjecting to analysis the polls published in the Polish press during parliamentary campaigns in the dimensions of the role they played during the recent several years, the quality of methodological information, and of the way the polls were used in the media. As opposed to European and American analyses, no improvement in the conformity to standards of minimal disclosure in newspapers’ reporting of public opinion polls was noticed, although—like in other countries—a dramatic increase in the number of polls reported was observed.

The former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe have attempted to reconcile their Communist past in different ways. It is in Poland, however, where the issue of dealing with its Communist past through attempts at lustration has been especially fraught. It will be argued here that Poland’s lustration problems are caused primarily by a failure to understand the specific nature of totalitarian dictatorship that existed in Poland under Communist rule.

Historical legacies play an important role in the rise of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. This article conducts an in-depth study of the trajectory of a particular radical right party, the League of Polish Families, in a particular Central and East European country, Poland. The central objective of the article is to highlight that, although there are important similarities between the League of Polish Families and other radical right parties in both Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, the League of Polish Families differs in some respects, such as the composition of electorate and ideology from these parties. The article shows that the observed differences have their roots in the Polish historical legacy, that on some accounts deviates from the historical legacies present in other Central and East European countries.

Using Poland as a case study, the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka has demonstrated most persuasively the significance of trust (and distrust) as a key to the analysis and understanding of socio-political and socio-cultural developments in Central Europe in the transition to democracy. Sztompka’s study ends upbeat with a brief glance at the situation in the late 1990s. Had the book been written a decade later, it would have revealed that the path ahead has remained rocky. Public trust in governments, politicians and public institutions generally has remained a scarce commodity. It is against this background that the restoration of an independent civil law notariat, as an integral part of the ‘return to Europe’ project, has occurred in Poland, and, mutatis mutandis , in other Central European countries. However, following a first decade of successful transformation from state employment to liberal profession, notaries in Central Europe now find that it is precisely because they have embraced the status of Western-style liberal professionals that they are coming under attack by both the European Commission and their own national governments. As a result, they have had to embark on a process of reconsideration of their position in order to ensure the profession’s survival. This paper traces and compares developments in Poland and Hungary. As can be expected there is a strong common denominator between them. But equally and more interestingly, there are distinctive national features which now, as ‘bloc history’ recedes, are coming increasingly to the fore.

The progress toward institutional changes should be evaluated through the prism of their influence on a country’s development abilities. In Poland, during the twenty years of comprehensive systemic shift, gross domestic product (GDP) has increased more than in any other post-communist country. While judging the transformation progress, not only the improvement of competitiveness and growth in terms of quantity must be taken into account, but also social and cultural aspects. There have been five distinct periods in Poland, from the viewpoint of economic growth. Had there been a better policy coordination of systemic change and socio-economic development, GDP over the periods considered could have increased by a half more. This opportunity has been missed due to the intermittent implementation of wrong economic policies based on wrong economic theories. Poland’s transformation can be seen as a success, but only to the extent of two-thirds of its potential.

This article explores the background of social engineering in the Bieszczady in the 1950s and 1960s, when a revolutionary political leadership ventured to impose a new socialist order in an area ravaged by war and ethnic cleansing. The article addresses two questions: first, what were the conditions that resulted in the failure of socialist engineering in the Bieszczady, and second, what were the consequences of this failure for relationships at the local level? One thesis put forward is that the relative weakness of the Polish state vis-à-vis the local setting left plenty of room for local residents to develop a dynamic social order of their own.