The article analyzes authoritarian regimes within the post-Soviet territory in terms of informal practices (clannishness, clientelism and patronage) and their characteristics used by political leaders to form a power coalition. It has been argued that any of these informal practices determine a power coalition of a certain size, which is consequential for regime sustainability. Power coalitions formed on the basis of a clan-like nature is the least effective way to retain power and generally leads to regime destabilization. Clientelism, which allows for forming a power coalition on a wider basis, is a more effective strategy in terms of regime sustainability. Maximum regime sustainability is reached when patronage practices are used, which require more material resources and are only accessible to a limited number of wealthy states.

This paper examines 10 years of political transition in Cambodia. It is particularly relevant because Cambodia has just passed through a third stage of transition in the form of national grass roots elections to dilute elite power. The scope of the paper covers the three elections in the period 1991–2002 and is located in Dankwart Rustow’s transition theory. I conclude that while basic elements of the theory hold true, qualifications are required in relation to the length of the ‘acceptance’ phase for the elites, and the extent to which, even after 10 years, habitually normalised democratic processes are still unreliable at best, and violent at worst.