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Keywords: Orange Revolution
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Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2014) 47 (1): 81–91.
Published: 24 January 2014
...Povilas Žielys; Rūta Rudinskaitė The 2004 Orange Revolution failed to skyrocket Ukraine into the ranks of consolidated democracies. Some previous research claimed that, in the similar case of post-Rose Revolution Georgia, its vague democratic perspectives can be explained by, among others, a...
Abstract
The 2004 Orange Revolution failed to skyrocket Ukraine into the ranks of consolidated democracies. Some previous research claimed that, in the similar case of post-Rose Revolution Georgia, its vague democratic perspectives can be explained by, among others, a negative impact of politically biased US democracy assistance programs. This article examines five groups of US programs (electoral aid, political party development, legislative strengthening, NGO development and media strengthening) implemented in Ukraine in 2005–2010, and concludes that US diplomatic support for the pro-Western “Orange” leadership did not translate into political bias of US-funded democracy assistance programs.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2012) 45 (3-4): 429–438.
Published: 01 September 2012
... policies to deal with Russia’s un-acceptance of Ukraine and its hard-nosed geopolitical goals. © 2012 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 2012 The Regents of the University of California Trust in state institutions Orange revolution...
Abstract
This main focus of the article is an analysis of Ukraine two decades after it became an independent state through ten factors that have remained constant features of Ukrainian life. The first factor is low public trust in state institutions and the wide gulf between elites and state on the one hand and the public on the other. A second factor is the striving by political forces to monopolize political and economic power for the sake of power and self-enrichment – not for the conducting of reforms. The third factor is threats to democracy under eastern Ukrainian Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych. The fourth factor is the low quality and ideological amorphousness of political parties. The fifth factor is the absence of political will and re-occurrence of missed opportunities; a prominent example of which is the Viktor Yushchenko presidency. The sixth factor is the domination of elite greed and rapaciousness over pursuit of the national interest and national security. The most egregious example of this corruption is in the energy sector which western Ukrainians have dominated (It’s a Gas: Funny business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, 2006). A seventh constant factor is the prevalence of virtual over actual policies and the non-fulfillment of domestic obligations which leads to low public trust in state institutions. The eighth factor is an imitation of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures because virtual policies lead to inconsistent and multi-vector foreign policies. Virtual policies make it difficult for European and American governments to engage with the Ukrainian authorities because they rarely fulfill their obligations. The ninth factor is eastern Ukrainian naivety about Russia, regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian, that pursues hard-nosed geopolitical goals, a naivety that applies to Kuchma in 1994 as much as to Yanukovych in 2010. The tenth factor, the Russia factor, is Russia’s inability to accept Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Both eastern and western Ukrainian have been unable to fashion responsive policies to deal with Russia’s un-acceptance of Ukraine and its hard-nosed geopolitical goals.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2012) 45 (1-2): 65–76.
Published: 30 March 2012
...Jane L. Curry; Doris Göedl The Serbian Revolution of 2000, Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003, and Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 are examined from the perspective of both the causes of popular engagement and the elite interaction. The authors argue that the model of Electoral Revolutions based...
Abstract
The Serbian Revolution of 2000, Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003, and Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 are examined from the perspective of both the causes of popular engagement and the elite interaction. The authors argue that the model of Electoral Revolutions based on democracy promotion from outside and election fraud as a trigger for action does not fully explain either what brought people to the streets or why there was not a clear move to democratization in these cases. Instead, they show that corruption, failed administration, and state weakness were the triggers, that the opposition politicians were from the old administration, that people were repeating what they had done before in demonstrating, and that the mass movements did not result in the growth of civil society, increased popular engagement, or (on their own) significant democratization.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2011) 44 (3): 221–232.
Published: 23 August 2011
..., 2003 Georgian Rose and 2004 Orange democratic revolutions. The Kuchmagate crisis, impending succession crisis, 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution – all of which took up most of Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office – were the first significant domestic threats to Ukraine’s new, post...
Abstract
Conspiracy theories in Ukraine draw on inherited Soviet political culture and political technology imported from Russia where such ideas had gained ascendancy under President Vladimir Putin. Eastern Ukrainian and Russian elites believed that the US was behind the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer, 2003 Georgian Rose and 2004 Orange democratic revolutions. The Kuchmagate crisis, impending succession crisis, 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution – all of which took up most of Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office – were the first significant domestic threats to Ukraine’s new, post-communist ruling elites and in response Ukraine’s elites revived Soviet style theories of conspiracies and ideological tirades against the US and Ukrainian nationalism. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko became the focal point against which the conspiracies and tirades were launched because his support base lay in ‘nationalist’ Western Ukraine and he has a Ukrainian-American spouse. The revival of Soviet style conspiracy theories has become important since Viktor Yanukovyc’s election as Ukrainian president in 2010 because this political culture permeates his administration, government and Party of Regions determining their worldview and influencing their domestic and foreign policies.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2010) 43 (4): 383–395.
Published: 28 October 2010
... opposition maintained a strategy of non-violence over the longest protest period of 17 days but was prepared to use force if it had been attacked. The regime attempted to suppress the Orange Revolution using security forces. Covert and overt Russian external support was extensive and in the case of Ukraine...
Abstract
The Ukrainian opposition faced one of the greatest degrees of state-backed violence in the second wave of democratization of post-communist states with only Serbia experiencing similar cases of assassinations and repression of the youth Otpor NGO. In the 2004 Ukrainian elections the opposition maintained a strategy of non-violence over the longest protest period of 17 days but was prepared to use force if it had been attacked. The regime attempted to suppress the Orange Revolution using security forces. Covert and overt Russian external support was extensive and in the case of Ukraine and Georgia the European Union (EU) did not intervene with a membership offer that had the effect of emboldening the opposition in Central-Eastern Europe. This article surveys five state-backed violent strategies used in Ukraine’s 2004 elections: inciting regional and inter-ethnic conflict, assassinations, violence against the opposition, counter-revolution and use of the security forces. The article does not cover external Russian-backed violence in the 2004 elections unique to Ukraine that the author has covered elsewhere.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2010) 43 (3): 285–296.
Published: 16 August 2010
...Taras Kuzio This article is the first to study the positive correlation between nationalism and democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest, 17...
Abstract
This article is the first to study the positive correlation between nationalism and democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest, 17 days. But, the Orange Revolution was also the most regionally divided of democratic revolutions with western and central Ukrainians dominating the protestors and eastern Ukrainians opposing the protests. The civic nationalism that underpinned the Orange Revolution is rooted in Ukraine’s path dependence that has made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist empire.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2009) 42 (2): 199–216.
Published: 13 May 2009
... California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 2009 The Regents of the University of California ‘Colour revolutions’ Orange revolution Transition studies Collective agency Discourse theory Ideology Political subjectivity The political developments of the early 2000s...
Abstract
The article aims to identify a theoretical framework which would be able to provide explanation for the cases of political mobilization during the ‘Colour revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. It reviews the existing literature on the topic, which is predominantly oriented by the ‘transition paradigm’. The major shortcomings of this literature are identified: the privileging of either structure or agency when accounting for social change, a strong emphasis on the role of elites and insufficient attention to collective agency. Accordingly, I argue that the methodology of poststructuralist discourse theory may importantly supplement the ‘transitological’ framework owing to its ability to conceptualize the dynamic interdependence between structure and agency, as well as the formation of collective political identities.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2006) 39 (4): 447–473.
Published: 31 October 2006
...@msu.edu © 2019 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 2019 The Regents of the University of California Authoritarianism Corruption International law Transition of power Putin Yeltsin Orange Revolution Russia Georgia Ukraine...
Abstract
The attitudes of leaders toward their personal future are very important to domestic and international politics. These views are particularly vital in the case of leaders of nondemocratic regimes who could face legal prosecution for their corrupt acts or violations of human rights in their own country and abroad. In spite of these fears, however, the leaders in many authoritarian societies trespass laws, both domestic and international, in order to preserve their power and enrich their families. They expose themselves to the danger of the prosecution after they leave office or lose control of the regime. In this context, the author pays special attention to Vladimir Putin’s political future and to the developments in Russia, which favor and disfavor his continued stay in power after 2008.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2006) 39 (3): 331–350.
Published: 01 August 2006
... research on post-communist revolutions. E-mail address: p-danieri@ku.edu © 2006 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 2006 The Regents of the University of California Ukraine Serbia Revolution Protest Orange Revolution...
Abstract
Since 1999, the post-Communist states have seen a series of attempts to overthrow semiauthoritarian governments, with the successful attempts known as the “colored revolutions.” However, not all such attempts have succeeded. This paper seeks to explain the variation in outcomes. Most accounts have focused on the development of grass-roots activist movements. The central argument here is that elites, and in particular security services, play a much more significant role in these revolutions than has generally been appreciated. This hypothesis is elaborated through a threshold model of protest, in which the central question is whether protests achieve a “tipping point” that makes them continue to grow larger until success is inevitable. The actions of elites, it is argued, play a decisive role in whether mass protests reach a tipping point. The argument is examined through a paired comparison of two failed attempts to overthrow governments through street protests (Serbia 1996e1997 and Ukraine 2001) with two successful cases (Serbia 1999 and Ukraine 2004). By studying cases with variation on the dependent variable, this paper seeks to improve the empirical and methodological basis of research on post-communist revolutions.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2005) 38 (2): 167–190.
Published: 01 June 2005
... and led to the victory of the opposition through Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. * Tel.: +1 202 994 7914; fax: +1 202 994 5436. E-mail address: tkuzio@gwu.edu © 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 2005 The Regents of the...
Abstract
The article surveys and discusses different definitions of regime type in Ukraine and whether they provide a sound understanding of the regime emerging in Ukraine and other CIS states since the late 1990s. Ukraine and the CIS witnessed democratic regression and therefore could not be assumed that they were on a ‘transition’ path to a consolidated democracy. The majority of CIS states have either already moved to fully authoritarian regimes, such as Russia. Or, like Ukraine, they remained as unstable competitive authoritarian regimes which exhibited a ‘hybrid’ fusion of the former Soviet system and the emerging reformed economy and polity. Ukraine’s oligarchs during Kuchma’s second term preferred a fully authoritarian regime but they were also divided among themselves and faced a formidable opposition. These factors blocked the creation of a fully authoritarian regime under Kuchma and led to the victory of the opposition through Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2005) 38 (2): 231–249.
Published: 01 June 2005
... machine politics, applied in this paper, helps explain how they do it. The paper then considers how and why the Kuchma machine collapsed in the ‘‘Orange Revolution’’ of 2004, and the comparative lessons of the Ukrainian experience. © 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by...
Abstract
This paper considers Ukrainian politics from 1994 to 2004 (the term of Leonid Kuchma’s presidency) from the standpoint of ‘‘machine politics.’’ Many authors have argued that Ukraine and other post-Soviet states have combined elections with partly authoritarian regimes. The concept of machine politics, applied in this paper, helps explain how they do it. The paper then considers how and why the Kuchma machine collapsed in the ‘‘Orange Revolution’’ of 2004, and the comparative lessons of the Ukrainian experience.
Journal Articles
Journal:
Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2005) 38 (2): 191–205.
Published: 01 June 2005
... reserved. 2005 The Regents of the University of California Democracy Authoritarianism Ukraine Kuchma Orange revolution Yushchenko Competitive authoritarianism Rapacious individualism and political competition in Ukraine, 1992e2004 Lucan A. Way Department of Political Science, Temple...
Abstract
This article examines one reason for the failure of full-scale authoritarianism in Ukraine, 1992e2004. The monopolization of political control in Ukraine was partially thwarted by the disorganization of Ukraine’s ex- nomenklatura elite that dominated the country after the Cold War. Elite Ukrainian politics in the 1990s can best be understood as an example of ‘‘rapacious individualism.’’ This term was used by Martin Shefter to describe pre-machine New York city politics in the 19th century, dominated by a non-ideological and unstructured competition for power and rents. Rapacious individualism in Ukraine had a contradictory impact. It hindered full-scale democratization but also undermined efforts to consolidate authoritarianism. At one level, widespread corruption allowed the executive to concentrate political power because he controlled key patronage resources. At the same time, weak organization reduced the costs of open confrontation with the executive while corruption distributed resources to a broad range of future opposition leaders. The result was competitive authoritarian rule.