This paper attempts to explain the process of institutional transition of post-communist countries applying conceptual framework proposed by D.C. North, J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. The first part of the article is devoted to outline the theory of North, Weingast, and Wallis. The second part the theory is used to analyze transformation processes in post-communist countries. An important conclusion of this paper is that cultural, religious and historical factors have crucial impact on formation of new coalitions of elites in the transitions countries. In the countries where Western values were present the transfer of the market and democratic formal institutions was easier. Also, the process of transformation was strongly influenced by external factors, especially the prospect of integration with the European Union, which encouraged elites to take action that benefited the opening of both political and economic markets. These observations suggest that, in general, the success of transformation in transition countries did not depend on the intentional actions of ruling elites.

This article sketches the roots and social underpinnings of both Economic Man (EM) and Soviet Man (SM) and looks at the interaction between the two archetypes during the transformation of former socialist nations since 1990. It depicts the creation of SM as the bearer of socialist “planned economy” ideology while also showing how EM was able to survive, albeit often underground, in the Soviet Union and its satellites. It also looks at the unique nature of the Soviet EM and to what extent SM has been dismantled. This paper concludes by examining how well the Western, market-oriented economic ideology was implemented and why the process occurred differently in various former socialist countries. It illustrates the varying malleability of the human mentality and provides some insights into the possible outcomes of future efforts at sociopolitical transformation.

The article presents an analysis of “informal institutionalization” in post-Communist Russia in theoretical and comparative perspective. It is devoted to critical analysis of existing explanations of the dominance of subversive institutions – that is, those rules, norms, and practices that at first sight partly resemble institutions of modern democracy, good governance and rule of law, but in fact inhibit them. While “pessimists” focus on cultural and historical embeddedness of subversive institutions in Russia, “optimists” draw their attention to patterns of post-Communist state-building, and “realists” point out the major role of special interests groups in turning growing pains of informal governance in Russia into its chronic deceases.

The progress toward institutional changes should be evaluated through the prism of their influence on a country’s development abilities. In Poland, during the twenty years of comprehensive systemic shift, gross domestic product (GDP) has increased more than in any other post-communist country. While judging the transformation progress, not only the improvement of competitiveness and growth in terms of quantity must be taken into account, but also social and cultural aspects. There have been five distinct periods in Poland, from the viewpoint of economic growth. Had there been a better policy coordination of systemic change and socio-economic development, GDP over the periods considered could have increased by a half more. This opportunity has been missed due to the intermittent implementation of wrong economic policies based on wrong economic theories. Poland’s transformation can be seen as a success, but only to the extent of two-thirds of its potential.

This paper endeavors to show the importance of history for any study in the social and political sciences. Following theorist and Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, it attempts to show how the past and the present are connected through the continuity of a society’s institutions even when those formal institutions undergo a radical change, that is, revolution. To that end I will be comparing two agricultural societies — Russia and China — beginning with their Imperial periods — to show how their attitudes towards their peasantry have endured through the upheaval of both revolutions and the potential impact on development. The impact of the Russian revolution on China will also be examined.

In this paper the current problems of socio-economic development, such as population loss, public health, and others, in independent Ukraine are presented and analyzed. Their main causes are identified as follows: extensive type of economic development, absence of the clear, sustainable goals and appropriate programs, high level of corruption, general socio-cultural (moral) crisis, passive civil position of society, lack of democracy, and inadequacy of institutions, for example, the higher education system. The contemporary problems of social capital development and inefficiency of science and higher education institutions in Ukraine are examined.

The aim of this paper is to emphasize the role of institutions to attract FDI in 11 former communist European Countries: eight new members of the European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and three candidates to a future enlargement (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). In a first step we proceed to an analytical framework to understand the link between transition, institutions and FDI. In a second step we test an empirical model based on pooled data. The results of our empirical test confirm our expectation that FDI is sensitive to specific and local institutional arrangements.

The article’s topic is the attitudes of the Russians toward their social institutions. As it will be shown, Russia is a country, much more than any other, that mistrusts its social institutions, political institutions in particular. There is no one institution that can garner more than 40 to 50 percent of the nation’s trust. Indeed, in terms of their lack of confidence in social institutions, the Russians are behind not only the most advanced countries in the world, but even countries known for their unstable political systems, such as Colombia or Nigeria.

Elite formation in state socialism is a key issue in both comparative mobility research and political sociology. Several perspectives have been proposed to explain the relative role of political loyalty and education in political mobility: a dual career path model, a party-sponsored mobility hypothesis, and a technocracy thesis. I propose an alternative approach, emphasizing the role of functional differentiation and its effect on elite recruitment in China. Using a data set on top Chinese leaders ( n = 1588), I find that effects of political loyalty and technical training on elite recruitment are patterned by institutional arrangements. Data analysis supports my explanation of elite selection in China.

Theory suggests that the political effects of referendums should vary according to the institutional provisions that allow for direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Relying on extant theoretical models the paper proposes initial tests of some implications for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The constitutions of these countries distinguish themselves by a wide variety of institutional provisions for referendums. Taking advantage of this increased variance, the paper demonstrates effects of different institutional provisions on policy outcomes, which, so far, have only been demonstrated at the sub-national level, for example, in the United States and Switzerland.

It is widely assumed that the post-socialist transformation started in Poland. This is true, but only in part. Although it was indeed in Poland that various processes contributing to this dramatic change gained the greatest momentum in the 1980s, things were not at a standstill in other countries of central and eastern Europe, either. Another widespread assumption is that the post-socialist transformation was set in motion in 1989, when—first in Poland and then, through a chain reaction engulfing the entire region—‘real socialism collapsed’ or, as others would prefer to put it, ‘communism was defeated’. There is no doubt that later in many respects Poland has handled the challenges of the great transformation better than other countries. Hence, after already over 15 years of ongoing post-socialist transformation toward democratic polity, market economy and civil society, there must be certain lessons the other countries, especially the so-called emerging markets, can learn from the Polish experience. Hence it is worth having a closer look at what works and why and what does not work and whyŒ

This article examines how the choice of Ukraine’s constitutional system affects both the relationship among key constitutional actors and the prospects of institutional change. It analyzes the character of the relationship between the president and parliament in the context of their competition over control of the cabinet. It then examines how and why the institutional interests and preferences of key political and public policy actors who inhabit the presidency, the legislature and the cabinet affect the prospects of maintaining or changing the constitutional status in Ukraine. It concludes that the institutional stability in Ukraine is still in a state of flux.

Now nearly everyone accepts the fact that institutions matter. However, institutions matter in more than one way. While sound institutions may help to reduce uncertainty and create order in human interactions, flawed institutions may produce results that go contrary to their designers' wishes, no matter what these wishes are. Defects in institutional arrangements may provide “wrong” opportunities, place “wrong” constraints, create “wrong” incentives, reward “wrong” behaviors and above all, structure human interactions in “wrong” ways. This article investigates what makes institutions defective and why defective institutions may cause ineffectiveness. It first identifies the fundamental underpinnings of effective institutions and probes their importance in generating efficiency. It then tries to explain why, in the absence of some of these key elements, defective institutions cannot deliver what effective institutions can. The case of fiscal relations in China is used to highlight the key propositions of the article.