In this article, I explore the interconnection between Putin’s politics of re-Stalinization, historical memory, and a specific version of the post-Soviet neo-medievalism. I show that re-Stalinization is a mass movement that is grounded in the unprocessed memory of Soviet crimes and atrocities. The popular myth of the “Great Patriotic War” and the myth of Stalinism as the Golden Age exploited by Putin’s memory politics became a gold mine for Putin’s kleptocracy. I argue that re-Stalinization and the Kremlin-sponsored ideology of Eurasianism represents two interrelated trends of a complex ideological process. Eurasianism combines Soviet denial of individuality with the idea of a state-dependent patriarchal society and Russian historical messianism. It glorifies the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. The ‘medievalist’ discourse of Eurasian ideologists, which advocates a return to the medieval society of orders, on the one hand, and the Gothic monsters populating post- Soviet film and fiction, on the other, creates a political language that expresses new attitudes to people in post-Soviet Russia. They depict a new social contract that reconsiders the modern concept of citizenship, and creates a social basis for the criminalization and militarization of Russian society.

Evidence drawn from the intersection of historical memory and politics in Russia underline not only on-going framing battles over the Soviet past. The evidence suggests that the Kremlin is unwilling to develop and impose on society historical narratives which promote chauvinism, hypernationalism, and re-Stalinization. Although such an agenda has some support among incumbent elites and in society, it remains subordinate in terms of political influence as of early 2016. Instead, the regime is now extending support to groups in society and the political establishment which favor a critical assessment of the Soviet era, including Stalinism. This emerging criticism of the Soviet past serves a number of important goals of the leadership, including re-engagement with the West. To this end, the Kremlin recently approved new history textbooks critical of the Soviet past as well as a significant program that memorializes the victims of Soviet repressions. Yet the regime is unlikely to usher in thorough de-Stalinization which would threaten its power. Instead, the Kremlin is attempting to assemble a grand narrative that approves, as well as criticizes – in different measures – each of the regimes that existed in the 20th century (tsarist, communist, and post-communist). This incipient narrative constitutes a form of bricolage , which involves the retrieval and reassembly of diverse, often conflicting, elements to solve a problem. Here the problem is the long-standing, divisive issue of how to evaluate the history of 20th century Russia and its different regimes. The Kremlin now seeks to knit together the diverse identities of these regimes through the unifying historical thread of the Russian state. This act of bricolage also seeks to reconcile the contradictions within each regime: elements of the new narrative can be expected to condemn the inhumanity of Stalin and Stalinism while other facets will extol industrialization and the Great Patriotic War as the achievements of Russian-led Soviet society. From this perspective, neither re-Stalinization nor de-Stalinization is likely to occur in Putin’s Russia. Nevertheless, if recent initiatives remain in place, critical assessments of Soviet foreign and domestic policies will become increasingly commonplace.

This article discusses different aspects of the political evolution of Russian President and former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the impact of his evolution upon the type of regime that has evolved from soft authoritarianism to a ‘militocracy‘ and ‘consolidated authoritarian regime.’ The article discusses eight contributions to this special issue by placing them within the broader context of how the West misread two areas pertaining to Russia. The first is how the West by wrongly believing that Russia, being a member of G8, the NATO-Russia Council and other Western structures, continued to be interested in becoming a Western political and economic system. The second is the tradition, stretching back to Sovietology, of ignoring and downplaying the issue of how the nationalities question and different nationalisms interact with democratic revolutions, transitions and, specifically, with Russian politics. The introductory article next discusses the eight contributions within the context of: Russian messianism, the Russkii Mir (Russian World), how and when nationalists and fascists became mainstream in Russian politics, Putin’s great power nationalism, Ukrainophobia and Russian chauvinism, historical myths and re-Stalinization of Putin’s political system. The final section compares Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014 respectively and the growing xenophobia in Russian foreign policy.

The growing and increasingly politically active Russian Muslims of diverse ethnic backgrounds provide various political models for their relationship with Russians. Some still accept Eurasianism but assume that it is Muslims not Orthodox Russians who should be the “older brothers” in the alliance or, in any case, that the very notion of older and younger brother should be put to an end. The others want complete separation from Russia or at least the minimization of their relationship with it. Finally, others believe in the Islamization of Russia. The models provide a glance at the possible scenarios for Russia’s future.

Eurasianism as a concept emerged among Russian émigrés in the 1920s, with the premise that Russia is a unique ethnic blend, primarily of Slavic and Turkic peoples. Its geopolitical implications for Russia include gravitation toward mostly Turkic Central Asia. Alexander Dugin, one of its best-known proponents, believes that the demise of the Soviet Union was simply a tragic incident. The people of the former USSR should again be united in a grand Eurasian empire, with Russia a benign and generous patron, providing its “younger brothers” clients economic largesse and defense, mostly against the predatory USA. The “orange revolutions” and the rise of Russian nationalism, for whose proponents a restored imperial presence is rather marginal, indicate that Eurasianism—along with the dream of the resurrection of the USSR—is becoming less viable.

Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement. Its representatives state that Russia is a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and ethnic groups. Eurasianists also emphasize the corporate nature of the Russian state which makes it quite different from the West. Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s as an anti-Bolshevik movement. Yet, through its evolution, Eurasianism has become closer and closer to the Soviet brand of Marxism. In its blending of Marxism with nationalism, Eurasianism was one of the precursors to the present-day ideology of post-Soviet Russia.