Across the post-communist region, new parties are gaining support from voters by promising to reject the status quo and orthodox policy. Some have come to govern on the basis of such promises and their “outsider” identity. But do these new parties actually make different post-crisis policy once they are in government? This paper compares policies adopted to address economic crisis in Bulgaria and Romania. Both governments pursue a standard set of austerity measures, but the Bulgarian government was able to take a more aggressive stance for a much longer time before losing support due to its outsider image.

Of the 11 post-socialist states that have already become European Union members only five have joined the common currency Eurozone. The other six, including Poland, the region’s largest economy, have, pursuant to accession treaties, the right and obligation to adopt euro as their currency. They fail to exercise their right and meet their obligation, which has both causes and consequences. These are economic and political in nature and that is why there is no certainty about how the situation will evolve in future. However, from both of those perspectives, and especially for economic reasons, Eastern European EU members should join the Eurozone, as the resulting benefits, not only for Poland, significantly outweigh the conversion costs. Thus, new countries, especially Poland, adopting euro would have a positive impact on the European integration process, which is experiencing a serious structural, institutional and political crisis.

The progress toward institutional changes should be evaluated through the prism of their influence on a country’s development abilities. In Poland, during the twenty years of comprehensive systemic shift, gross domestic product (GDP) has increased more than in any other post-communist country. While judging the transformation progress, not only the improvement of competitiveness and growth in terms of quantity must be taken into account, but also social and cultural aspects. There have been five distinct periods in Poland, from the viewpoint of economic growth. Had there been a better policy coordination of systemic change and socio-economic development, GDP over the periods considered could have increased by a half more. This opportunity has been missed due to the intermittent implementation of wrong economic policies based on wrong economic theories. Poland’s transformation can be seen as a success, but only to the extent of two-thirds of its potential.

It is widely assumed that the post-socialist transformation started in Poland. This is true, but only in part. Although it was indeed in Poland that various processes contributing to this dramatic change gained the greatest momentum in the 1980s, things were not at a standstill in other countries of central and eastern Europe, either. Another widespread assumption is that the post-socialist transformation was set in motion in 1989, when—first in Poland and then, through a chain reaction engulfing the entire region—‘real socialism collapsed’ or, as others would prefer to put it, ‘communism was defeated’. There is no doubt that later in many respects Poland has handled the challenges of the great transformation better than other countries. Hence, after already over 15 years of ongoing post-socialist transformation toward democratic polity, market economy and civil society, there must be certain lessons the other countries, especially the so-called emerging markets, can learn from the Polish experience. Hence it is worth having a closer look at what works and why and what does not work and whyŒ

This article seeks to determine whether a political business cycle existed during Yeltsin's tenure in the Second Russian Republic. While Yeltsin certainly had the power and desire to increase his electoral chances, the lack of state resources and doubts about their appeal to voters presents an inconclusive picture concerning the existence of a political business cycle during this period. Statistical analysis, however, demonstrates that the level of real wage arrears decreased during electoral periods. Other measures, such as federal budget spending or the average monthly pension, only show weak indications of electoral period manipulation. Finally, the usefulness of buying votes in the Russian case, however, is questioned, considering Yeltsin's failures in various Duma elections.