The 2004–07 EU enlargement towards the post-communist region showed that the long waiting for EU membership could impact on levels of public support for the EU. This article examines citizens’ trust towards national and international institutions after joining the EU in Poland, in comparative perspective. In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones. Politicians and political parties are the most distrusted actors, undermining the social and political fabric in the region. An overview of political participation and levels of trust with focus on national data sets and the European Social Survey shows that levels of trust are quite low and a share of the population is concerned with sovereignty vis-à-vis EU integration. This analysis addresses how the relationship between citizens and institutions have changed and how this may affect not just the EU’s policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but how it can also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.

Croatia’s complex and violent transition contributed to conditions under which ex-communists have exerted significant influence over multiple post-Communist parties. In the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by President Franjo Tudjman employed war to impose a semi-authoritarian system that further weakened the electoral prospects of the most logical Communist successor party—the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP-led coalition’s win in the 2000 elections ushered in conditions that enabled a deeper democratization in Croatia that brought it closer toward integration into the EU. HDZ’s loss in 2000 and EU leverage then helped compel HDZ to reform and to continue work toward meeting EU accession requirements.

This paper examines the effects of European integration on the Polish steel industry and finds that, contrary to expectations, the more successful firms are in fact being hurt by the process. As a result, productivity improvements are unlikely to be either as great or as efficiently distributed as proponents of integration suggest. This outcome is the product of a complicated and politically expedient bargaining process among steel-sector union confederations and central governments both in the EU and in Poland. The integration plan, which calls for government-controlled production quotas, enables politicians and union leaders on all sides to cover themselves politically with respect to their constituents. The main losers in the process are managers and employees of successful Polish firms.