The main focus of this article is the role of organized civil society in facilitating citizen engagement in Central and East European new EU member states after the EU accession and the recent economic crises. Using international comparative methodologies and data this article analyses democratic processes in the new member states focussing on the changes in strengths and weaknesses of citizen engagement. It shows the ways in which the post-enlargement process, especially the economic crisis affected the ability of CEE citizens — both directly, and via civil society organisations and trade unions — to be active participants of the multilevel governance processes. It finds that one of the key remaining gaps of the democratization process remains the relative weakness of state—citizens relationship. The impact of the economic crisis on the CEE countries was significant, in particular in regard to financial viability of organised civil society. However, economic crisis also acted as an important mobilization factor, and in all countries under study, civic participation, enabled by civil society and trade unions increased. New initiatives — in particular those tackling corruption and party campaign finance, saw NGOs focussing their advocacy efforts towards the government as well as actively mobilizing and engaging citizens. Across the CEE region, we are seeing gradual social learning, internalization of new norms and emergence of new identities — active citizens engaged with (and if necessary in opposition to) the state — directly (public mobilization and protests) and via organized civil society.

This paper traces the origins of the different monetary regimes adopted in Bulgaria and Romania in 1996–97 and examines their performance during the EU accession. The findings indicate that the constraints of the currency board in Bulgaria shifted economic activity towards the private sector, while the discretionary policies in Romania turned public finances into both a contributor and a response mechanism to economic imbalances. While the prospects of EU accession initially enhanced the performance of the monetary anchors, the implicit insurance of EU membership increased moral hazard and led to a rapid rise in private and public debt. The paper also explores the historical parallels between the monetary regimes of Bulgaria and Romania in 1996–97 and 1925–1940.

Using Poland as a case study, the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka has demonstrated most persuasively the significance of trust (and distrust) as a key to the analysis and understanding of socio-political and socio-cultural developments in Central Europe in the transition to democracy. Sztompka’s study ends upbeat with a brief glance at the situation in the late 1990s. Had the book been written a decade later, it would have revealed that the path ahead has remained rocky. Public trust in governments, politicians and public institutions generally has remained a scarce commodity. It is against this background that the restoration of an independent civil law notariat, as an integral part of the ‘return to Europe’ project, has occurred in Poland, and, mutatis mutandis , in other Central European countries. However, following a first decade of successful transformation from state employment to liberal profession, notaries in Central Europe now find that it is precisely because they have embraced the status of Western-style liberal professionals that they are coming under attack by both the European Commission and their own national governments. As a result, they have had to embark on a process of reconsideration of their position in order to ensure the profession’s survival. This paper traces and compares developments in Poland and Hungary. As can be expected there is a strong common denominator between them. But equally and more interestingly, there are distinctive national features which now, as ‘bloc history’ recedes, are coming increasingly to the fore.

This paper focuses on the current political and socio-economic situation in the two most recent EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania. Overall, the post-accession period in both countries has been comparable to that in the East-Central European members that had joined the Union on 1 May 2004. However, there have been some significant differences in the postaccession path of Bulgaria and Romania, which set them apart from the rest of the EU-10, as well as among themselves. For instance, the problem of corruption has been a particularly salient theme for the political elites of both countries and it led to the paralysis of the cabinet in Romania during the first year of its membership and to the rise of powerful populist alternatives in Bulgaria. What has probably been even more distinguishing in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania is their apparent inability to swiftly deal with the political and social challenges emerging after accession, as well as to adequately respond to the process of Europeanization. The main reason for this has been the unfinished political and socioeconomic transformation of both countries, accompanied by the consolidation of certain ‘reserve domains’, occupied by the former secret services and semi-mafia structures.

In the transition experience, the Czech and Slovak Republics have made some effort to achieve fiscal decentralization. From independence to EU accession, the devolution of power designed to strengthen the autonomy of local governments according to the principles of subsidiarity have also included a reform of public administration. The nature of reform efforts and their implications for fiscal decentralization are analyzed. The failure to achieve a robust autonomy for subnational governments is due to the ongoing adherence to the notion of “state administration” as opposed to self-government in both republics.

The Czech Republic’s Temelín nuclear power plant provoked the worst relations between it and Austria. This article identifies novel, unexpected roles that the EU played in that dispute: mediator, framework-setting; absenteeism; foil; and belated enforcer. The EU ultimately altered the nature of the dispute and can be seen to have inadvertently defended a non-member state’s interests against those of an existing member.