Constitutional Courts stand at the interface between law and politics, as the newly formed Russian Constitutional Court exemplified during Russia’s time of troubles between 1991 and 1993. One Constitutional Court case from that period had particular significance. The Russian court considered the constitutionality of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Russian Communist Party (CP RSFSR). The seven month long hearing tested the court’s stamina and resolve. Described before it began as ‘Russia’s Nuremberg’, was the Communist Party case a turning point in Russia’s relationship with her past, or was it a staged showpiece with no real impact? This paper explores the Russian Constitutional Court’s longest case and its effects.

Why are judicial review mechanisms being incorporated into so many democratizing states? This study analyzes why politicians create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. It sheds light on the role constitutional courts play in the consolidation phase of a democratic transition, focusing on one of those countries with no tradition of independent judicial review or of democratic forms of governance—Russia. Past practices and historical precedent do not support the formation of an independent judiciary in Russia, and yet a potentially powerful constitutional court now exists. Moreover, during the course of the transition from the Soviet state to the Russian Republic, there were three attempts to create an independent judicial review mechanism only one of which could be termed a success. This analysis focuses on the self-interested calculations of politicians in forming each of these three institutions, demonstrating that political actors establish a constitutional court to enhance their democratic credibility.