The competitive grants schemes, a financing mechanism established for achieving social welfare as well as balanced and efficient territorial development, would have to be applied through a transparent and objective competition process. However, political influence of the ruling party and informal networks with central government decision-makers may influence access to competitive grants. This paper explores the extent to which the political affiliation and the personal informal connections/networks of the Municipalities and Communes leaders influence the allocation of competitive grants in Albania. The study is based on their perceptions and attitudes collected through the application of qualitative research instruments. We used a semi-structured survey that targeted local government leaders in Albania during the year 2013–14. Research shows that local government leaders are more likely to access grants from the central government if both belong to the same political party/coalition, follow personal informal connections/networks, and can use strong (political and/or bribing) lobbying with high-level decision makers.

The article analyzes authoritarian regimes within the post-Soviet territory in terms of informal practices (clannishness, clientelism and patronage) and their characteristics used by political leaders to form a power coalition. It has been argued that any of these informal practices determine a power coalition of a certain size, which is consequential for regime sustainability. Power coalitions formed on the basis of a clan-like nature is the least effective way to retain power and generally leads to regime destabilization. Clientelism, which allows for forming a power coalition on a wider basis, is a more effective strategy in terms of regime sustainability. Maximum regime sustainability is reached when patronage practices are used, which require more material resources and are only accessible to a limited number of wealthy states.

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine’s regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi , of elites’ political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites’ renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures — two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine’s hybrid regime unchanged.

Lavrentii Beria built up one of the most powerful patronage networks in Soviet history. Its success represents a unique case in Soviet history in which a regionally based secret police patron-client network, comprised primarily of representatives of ethnic minorities, took control first of the civilian leadership of one of the major regions of the Union, and then of the most powerful institution in the USSR, the national secret police, and subsequently became one of the main competing factions in the “crypto-politics” of the late-Stalin era. The fact that the Beria network emerged from the secret police gave it certain advantages in the political struggles of the period, but it also held weaknesses that played a role in Beria’s final undoing. The evolution and political struggles of Beria’s network also shed light on the inner workings of the competition among informal networks that made up the crypto-politics of the period. Using recent memoirs, new archival sources and interviews, this article will examine how Beria developed, managed and advanced his informal network, giving particular attention to the specific and unique outcomes that resulted from the rooting of this network in the secret police, at five critical junctures in Beria’s career.

This paper analyzes the effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability of local mayors in governing local development in Armenia. The research conducted in eight rural communities shows that in order to be effective, elected local mayors are compelled to resort to informal strategies to attract development resources to their communities. As formal opportunities for supporting rural livelihoods are limited, informal governance helps enhance people’s well-being and social cohesion. It also reinforces a system of “clientelistic accountability”, which ensures a significant level of responsiveness of local mayors to local needs, but also contributes to the disempowerment of citizens and leaves them vulnerable to corruption and mismanagement.

This paper will examine the phenomenon of betrayal in patronage networks in Soviet higher politics by considering one of the most high-profile and significant cases: the betrayal of Lavrenty Beria by two of his top lieutenants, Sergei Kruglov and Ivan Serov, during the post-Stalin succession contest in the spring of 1953.