In 2019, what began in Hong Kong as a series of rallies against a proposal to permit extraditions to mainland China grew into a raft of anti-authoritarian protests and challenges to Beijing’s grip on the city. Given the gravest political crisis confronting Hong Kong in decades, this research investigates why the protests have lacked centralized leaders and why the solidarity among the peaceful and militant protesters has been immense. This article also examines the strengths and limitations of this leaderless movement with different case studies. The authors argue that serious threats to the commonly cherished values in Hong Kong, amid the absence of stable and legitimate leaders in its democracy movement, underpinned the formation of a multitude of decentralized decision-making platforms that orchestrated the protests in 2019. Those platforms involved both well-known movement leaders organizing conventional peaceful protests and anonymous activists crafting a diversity of tactics in ingenious ways, ranging from economic boycotts, human chains around the city, artistic protests via Lennon Walls, to the occupying of the international airport. The decentralized decision-making platforms, while having generated a boon to the movement with their beneficial tactical division of labor, also produced risks to the campaign. The risks include the lack of legitimate representatives for conflict-deescalating negotiations, rise in legitimacy-sapping violence, and susceptibility to underestimating the risks of various tactics stemming from a dearth of thorough political communication among anonymous participants who had different goals and degrees of risk tolerance. In short, Hong Kong’s anti-extradition movement in 2019 sheds light on the basis of leaderless movements, and on both the strengths and risks of such movements.

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anticorruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anticorruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.

We examine whether the existence of civil society in Georgia has promoted social and institutional trust in the population. As much of the literature suggests, Georgia is different from its neighbors in that civil society development is more advanced. Does participation in civil society lead to more social and institutional trust? Using survey data from the Caucasus Barometer and the World Values Survey, we find that attitudes regarding social and institutional trust are more developed in Georgia than in its neighbors, and that activity in voluntary organizations is positively associated with social and institutional trust in Georgia.

The authors compare civil society development in Russia and Ukraine in recent years in terms of civil society’s structure and relationships with the state and the broader society. They find major differences in 1) the treatment of civil society by state actors and 2) the level of trust placed in civil society by the population. They use these and other findings to assess civil society’s ability to play economic, political and social roles as defined by Michael Edwards in Civil Society (Edwards, 2009) and discover important differences emerging with regard to the political and social roles.

Through the Eastern Partnership the EU specifically attempts to strengthen democracy in Georgia. Lacking strong conditionality, the EU has to rely on a different approach to democracy assistance, such as a network governance mode. The implementation of EU policies has led to an expanding institutional network where NGO inclusion has been strengthened. However, this form of network governance operates within the realities of the domestic political and international context, influencing its effectiveness and impact. Despite the increased involvement of NGOs in EU policies the role and impact of civil society within Georgian politics and society has remained limited.

The main focus of this article is the role of organized civil society in facilitating citizen engagement in Central and East European new EU member states after the EU accession and the recent economic crises. Using international comparative methodologies and data this article analyses democratic processes in the new member states focussing on the changes in strengths and weaknesses of citizen engagement. It shows the ways in which the post-enlargement process, especially the economic crisis affected the ability of CEE citizens — both directly, and via civil society organisations and trade unions — to be active participants of the multilevel governance processes. It finds that one of the key remaining gaps of the democratization process remains the relative weakness of state—citizens relationship. The impact of the economic crisis on the CEE countries was significant, in particular in regard to financial viability of organised civil society. However, economic crisis also acted as an important mobilization factor, and in all countries under study, civic participation, enabled by civil society and trade unions increased. New initiatives — in particular those tackling corruption and party campaign finance, saw NGOs focussing their advocacy efforts towards the government as well as actively mobilizing and engaging citizens. Across the CEE region, we are seeing gradual social learning, internalization of new norms and emergence of new identities — active citizens engaged with (and if necessary in opposition to) the state — directly (public mobilization and protests) and via organized civil society.

Over the years, civil society empowerment has become an integral part of the European Union’s (EU) external and internal governance as a way to advance democracy and enhance citizen participation. While there has been increasing scholarly attention to the instruments and impact of the EU’s civil society support, so far there has been little research on the question what kind of civil society the EU actually promotes. This article intends to fill this gap by examining the substance of the EU’s civil society support in post- Soviet Central Asia, a region where various forms of civil society organizations (CSOs) exist. The findings reveal a differentiation between civil society types promoted in EU strategic documents and those that are supported in practice. While at the strategic planning level the EU seeks to strengthen civil society broadly construed, at the program implementation level the (neo-) liberal CSOs are the main beneficiaries. At the same time, the EU customizes its civil society assistance depending on the realities on the ground and at times finds itself empowering state-led civil society, while communal groups rarely benefit from the EU assistance schemes. This has severe implications for the advancement of citizen participation, considering that the actual grass-root initiatives are largely excluded from the EU assistance.

The paper explores the recent political participation in Poland focusing on the KOD movement. Given that very limited data is available on the impact of citizen participation in political process in Poland, the paper attempts a preliminary assessment of the participation “between elections”. The paper tries to take a snapshot of the KOD movement and to examine it in the context of civil society concept. The paper argues that the KOD movement is located between civil and political society on the one hand. On the other hand, it draws strongly on the symbolism of the civil resistance during the last two decades of communism. The dichotomy of post-communism and the former anti-communist opposition (including former Solidarity and KOR activists) was relevant for the political participation in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s and, as I argue now, has been replaced by new identity conflict between the symbolic politics of nationhood and the liberal Europeanized vision of politics.

Embodying a state vision of how civil society ought to function and be designed by the authorities, Public Chambers in Russia have been criticized as means of state control. This state dominance is the starting point in this article, which asks what room to manoeuvre a regional Public Chamber has. Drawing upon fieldwork this article examines how members and local observers of the Public Chamber give meaning to this activity. The analysis assesses the role of state dominance, discussion of routines and responses to local demands, and concludes that these incremental developments form civil society in Russia.

The main question on which this article focuses is this: What conditions determine whether a group carrying out protests in Russia is more likely to be successful in attracting support by recruiting people to participate in its activities and gaining sympathy from many members of the population? There is strong agreement among experts on Russian society and politics that protests in defense of abstract, general rights do not appeal to most citizens. This article focuses on groups using protest tactics that have been more successful in gaining support, such as the Defenders of the Khimki Forest. The evidence that is presented in this article suggests that Russians are more likely to take part in protests by an organized group if it seeks remedies for concrete problems that directly affect them and their families. The appeal to felt needs that are grounded in everyday experiences also seems to be an important factor that helps a group to evoke a favorable response toward its actions among broad circles of the general public. For those doing scholarly research, to interpret the development of civil society in Russia mainly in terms of the struggles of human rights groups and political opposition movements would lead the researchers to neglect the activities of most social organizations in Russia.

The article assesses civil society in Putin’s Russia through the lens of the small social movement working against gender violence. Based on questionnaires distributed to movement organizations in 2008–2009, we find significant retrenchment among the NGO segment of the movement, adding evidence to the claim of Russia’s turn toward authoritarianism. However, this innovative, midlevel analysis–not the typical society-wide surveys nor the small number participant observation–also shows that the women’s crisis center movement has made some in-roads in transforming the state, revealing that some democratic opportunities remain at the local level.

The article challenges the hypothesis that there is cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions and practices. While valid at a general level, the relationship is not confirmed once it is scrutinized thoroughly and heterogeneous categories are disaggregated. For the European post-Communist cases, the pattern of the relationship between the regime type and the propensity to associate closely resembles the one in Latin mature democracies and non-authoritarian countries, provided that voluntary associations are chosen as measurements of vitality of social capital and robustness of civil society. A possible consequence of this provocative finding would be re-evaluating the well-established concepts in social sciences.

This paper examines how different social, economic, historical and physical conditions coincide in the formation of space and processes of decline in the period of transformation in Poland. The focus lies on a specific residential area in the centre of the Polish city of Gdansk and the question why no improvements have been done in this particular area to stop its successive decline. It is among other things argued that clear urban policy together with improved urban planning and clear legislation on ownership are needed in order to improve conditions in this and other deprived areas of the city.

In 2003–2005, democratic revolutions overthrew the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, disillusioned citizens witness today their new leaders creating a Bonapartist regime, entering into open conflict with former revolutionary allies or being forced to accept cohabitation with leaders of the previous regime. This article argues that despite internationally acclaimed civic mobilisation, civil society's weakness seriously affected the three revolutionary processes. These were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes' political elite. Finally, the supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.

This paper compares the system of social maintenance and insurance in the Soviet Union, which was in force in the three Baltic countries before their independence, with the currently existing social security systems. The aim of the paper is to highlight the forces that have influenced social policy transformation from its former highly universal, however authoritarian form, to the less universal, social insurance-based systems of present day Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. It will be demonstrated that the welfare–economy nexus is not the only important factor in the development of social programs. Rather, social policy should be studied as if embedded in the political, historical and cultural aspects of a given society. The people’s attitude towards distributive justice will be highlighted as being one of the most important factors for either social policy shortcomings or expansion. This paper takes steps to combine quantitative and qualitative data.

The citizens of postcommunist states have relatively low levels of trust in their basic political institutions. This paper argues that to consolidate the advances towards civil society and democracy particular attention must be paid to strengthening trust. Trust requires not just the institutional framework appropriate to democracy and the rule of law — already substantially in place — but also an appreciation of politics and civil society as spheres of continuing diversity, competition and conflict. The deficit of trust can be addressed by a leadership exemplary in its service to the public interest, and by an acceptance of the new, adversarial politics.

This article explores the changes in organisation around labour and women’s issues in China. It is argued that whilst the two fields of organisation share common features, they have also evolved in distinct ways, reflecting the relative salience of gender and labour issues and the approach of non-governmental women’s and labour groups towards the Party-state. This focus on women’s and labour groups provides more general insights into the emergence of civil societies, public spheres and corporatism in China. In particular, the contradictory implications of the divergent evolutionary paths of labour and women’s groups underline the need to think in terms of increasingly complex and fluid processes of interest intermediation.

What alternatives are available to China in the next one or two decades? ‘More of the same’ is not a likely scenario, because one-party rule is not optimal for coping with the challenges of modernization and global interdependence. A second model, Singapore's authoritarian capitalism, appeals to many CCP leaders. But Singapore's scale and way of life are so different that its example cannot be very relevant to China. Nor does the Soviet imperial model fit, because China does not suffer from imperial overreach as did the USSR. The post-Soviet Russian model—a move from rigid hierarchy to free enterprise anarchy—could await China. Both countries have lacked institutions of civil society that could stabilize the country if central authority collapses. Another alterative would be a return to regionalism, spurred by economic and ethnic differences within China. Some PRC leaders hope to find a Chinese way that transcends other models, but this is not realistic. The most useful model for China and the world would be a gradual transition from authoritarianism to multi-party democracy, as has taken place in Taiwan. In one or two decades, China could edge in that direction. If so, animosities between the mainland and Taiwan would also diminish, removing a thorn from U.S.–Chinese relations. Opportunities for mutual gain may then overshadow present tensions.