The functioning of public administration should be consistent with the general interest, common to all citizens, and independent from the particularized interests of changing political forces. A condition for the proper functioning of administration is the selection of appropriate personnel to perform the duties defined by the state. According to the premises of this paper, the recruitment of personnel based upon objective criteria is of fundamental importance for the effective realization of the administration’s mission. This article analyzes the weaknesses of personnel policy in fiscal administration in Poland after 1989 against the background of the broader process of creating a Polish civil service. The study aims at determining the extent to which the actual relations between politics and administration reflect legal regulations. The article focuses on personnel policy with regard to senior positions in fiscal administration, whose occupants have leverage over decision-making processes and human resources policy in various agencies. It turns out that after every parliamentary election there is major turnover in the personnel occupying senior positions in the fiscal administration offices, that is, the persons associated with the previous governing team are replaced with individuals enjoying the confidence of those who have just come to power. In light of these findings one can infer that, contrary to the constitutional principles guiding the functioning of the government administration in Poland, its politicians have deliberately designed legal regulations in such a manner as to enable them to assume control over fiscal administration.

This paper aims to determine where the Hungarian civil service system might be situated on an imaginary merit system – spoils system scale. In doing so, the Hungarian system is analyzed from two angles. Firstly, regulation is scrutinized as it is manifested in the Civil Service Act. Secondly, practice is examined relying on available statistical and survey data. The author argues that, contrary to the conclusions of most of scholarly publications, the Hungarian Law is a pseudo-merit system law, not in fact preventing the prevalence of a spoils system. Practice generally reveals, however, features of a modestly politicized system with signs of increasing professionalization. The last two sections investigate the potential explanations for these somewhat surprising findings and whether the findings for the Hungarian civil service may be generalized to some or most of the Central and East European countries.