This article will analyze the connection between history, countervailing ideologies, that is, the legacy of the Cold War, and the perceived identification of human rights violations as they pertain to countries with major security interests in Northeast Asia. This article will further show that the enduring nuclear-weapons problem in North Korea has been inextricably linked to human rights issues there, specifically because Washington wants to change the behavior of officials in Pyongyang so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a state that at least remotely resembles a liberal democracy. Although supported by much of the international community, including the United States' South Korean and Japanese allies in Northeast Asia, Washington's North Korean policy has remained ineffective, as Pyongyang has continued to perform missile testing and still possesses nuclear weapons.

Partisanship has become the dominant ideological incentive to political polarization. Likewise, the analytical association between polarization and the party system in electoral democracies has focused, in most of the existing literature, on political polarization, leaving aside authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts where a fair multi-party election is absent or dysfunctional. By collecting and analyzing online posts about international terrorism from Sina Weibo in China, between January 2011 and December 2016, this study proves the existence of opinion polarization on terrorism in China's digital media sphere. By categorizing the findings into two camps, ‘global war on terror discourse’ and ‘antiimperialist narrative’, the study elucidates these polarized attitudes in terms of their acceptance, denial and decomposition of the global discourse of fears about terrorism. Drawing on our case study, the study then proposes an alternative explanation for the motivation/driver of mass polarization in digitally networked communication in China, identified as the effect of globalization and localization.

It is established that Party-army relation followed a “separated” pattern in the Soviet Union as opposed to an “infused” pattern in China. This article explores the historical origin of this difference in the revolutionary periods. By analyzing the biographies of communist military elites, it argues that this discrepancy took shape before the revolutionary takeover and resulted from the differentiated intensities of warfare across Russia and China. In China, the numerous civil wars and military defeats, radicalized the old military structure and boosted societal militarization; thus, eroding the mutual exclusion between the military and revolutionaries. The effect was lesser in Tsarist Russia than in prerevolutionary China, making the old military a conservative and professional corporate that the Bolsheviks could not completely subordinate to Party control.

Is China still building socialism or has it already built capitalism? Or maybe both? Or maybe none of those two systems? Or maybe with the market reforms that deviate from the traditional socialism, it has created something different from the classical types of political and socio-economic regimes known from the 20th century? Some authors have proclaimed that there has been capitalism in China for some time; others claim that socialism has developed there, of course one with Chinese characteristics. Shortages have been successfully eliminated, but the economic system is unbalanced, showing surpluses this time. So, is it socialism, as the official Chinese authorities claim, or capitalism, as asserted by numerous economists? Tertium non datur ? By no means, as there are yet other possibilities of system interpretations and the most fascinating of them is being offered by the present-day China, where a unique internal convergence is taking place. Features of socialism intermingle with essentials of capitalism and vice versa , creating a new, different quality. Tertium datur .

Recent research on the international diffusion of democracy has focused on demonstrating how diffusion can change regime outcomes. Although there is still debate within the field of democratization over how important democratic diffusion is relative to domestic factors, autocratic leaders believe that democratic diffusion can be a threat to their rule. It is clear that some countries, such as North Korea, prevent diffusion by severely restricting interactions with foreigners and forbidding access to external sources of information. The more intriguing question is how the states that have economic, diplomatic, and social linkages with democratic states prevent democratic diffusion. In other words, what methods do globally-engaged, autocratic governments use to limit exposure to and reduce receptivity to democratic diffusion? In addition to using coercion and economic patronage, autocratic states utilize two nonmaterial mechanisms to prevent democratic diffusion: 1) restricting exposure to democratic ideas and 2) developing alternative narratives about democracy to reduce local receptivity to democratic diffusion. Sophisticated autocratic leaders can limit receptivity to democratic diffusion if they convince citizens that those ideas are “foreign,” will cause “chaos,” or if they believe they already have their own form of democracy. I explore these methods of establishing firewalls to prevent diffusion by examining the cases of China and Kazakhstan, two countries where a high level of economic linkage coincides with a successful continuation of autocratic rule, despite the global spread of democratic norms. China has developed extensive methods to restrict access to foreign ideas about democracy while Kazakhstan has mainly focused on developing an alternative narrative about democracy. This article contributes to the literature on authoritarian persistence and democratic diffusion by investigating the internal methods autocratic leaders adopt to ensure that democratic diffusion does not threaten their rule.

In large and heterogenous countries, cross-regional inequality often fuels political conflict over redistributive demands. Standard economic theory holds that initial inequality in incomes across subnational regions of a country should eventually give way to convergence. However, economic liberalization in Russia and China has not produced cross-regional convergence. The paper demonstrates that interregional inequality remains high in both countries and grounds explanation for this finding in their communist institutional legacies. Their common institutional history complements country-specific explanations for the observed trends in cross-regional inequality.

Why has the Chinese communist state remained so durable in an age of democratization? Contrary to existing theories, this article argues that the strong state coercive capacity has survived the authoritarian rule in China. We demonstrate that the Chinese Communist Party has taken deliberate actions to enhance the cohesion of its coercive organizations—the police, in particular—by distributing “spoils of public office” to police chiefs. In addition, the state has extended the scope of its coercion by increasing police funding in localities where the state sector loses control of the population. We use and rely on mixed methods to test this theory.

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer, and Central Asia’s own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009–2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011–2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US “New Silk Road” initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development.

Unlike China’s other top leaders, PremierWen Jiabao has presented his political views after the 17th CCP Congress. Wen’s assertive attitude for further political reform has attracted attention from international as well as domestic media. This article utilizes both institutionalism and network analysis to explain this uncommon political phenomenon, while it illuminates the drawback of the attribute perspective which has been used popularly to infer the attitudes of China’s political elites. This study argues that Wen’s attitude with personality has been produced by some institutional and network factors. They include: the decline of a powerful rival, different functions of the party and state in China’s policy-making and implementation, division of policy work among Politburo Standing Committee leaders.

Under the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan has achieved independence and stability by exploiting its natural resources through a strategy of “staple globalism” and by balancing the great powers against each other. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new regime first distanced itself from Russia and tried regional alliances, then accepted help from NATO, and most recently turned cautiously to Russia (and China). Throughout, Uzbekistan has managed to receive considerable assistance from international agencies and military aid from several outside powers, albeit relatively little private foreign investment, owing to its poor business climate. The country has also handled potential conflicts with neighbors without significant violence.

This paper endeavors to show the importance of history for any study in the social and political sciences. Following theorist and Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, it attempts to show how the past and the present are connected through the continuity of a society’s institutions even when those formal institutions undergo a radical change, that is, revolution. To that end I will be comparing two agricultural societies — Russia and China — beginning with their Imperial periods — to show how their attitudes towards their peasantry have endured through the upheaval of both revolutions and the potential impact on development. The impact of the Russian revolution on China will also be examined.

Despite the government’s active legislation to protect workers, labor rights still remain widely ignored and poorly enforced in China. Structural constrains, such as the state’s development strategy biased on efficiency over equity, tight labor markets, and the lack of an effective safety net, cannot fully explain why Chinese workers have had so little impact on the environment in which they work and the violations of their rights often occur. Using Marshall’s theory of citizenship rights, this article explores the structure of China’s labor rights for an explanation. It argues that while Chinese labor legislation stipulates workers’ individual rights regarding contracts, wages, working conditions, pensions, and so on, it fails to provide them with collective rights, namely the rights to organize, to strike, and to bargain collectively in a meaningful sense. The lack of collective rights is one of the major factors that render workers’ individual rights vulnerable, hollow, unenforceable, or often disregarded. Labor legislation that enables workers to act collectively is crucial for safeguarding their individual rights.

Elite formation in state socialism is a key issue in both comparative mobility research and political sociology. Several perspectives have been proposed to explain the relative role of political loyalty and education in political mobility: a dual career path model, a party-sponsored mobility hypothesis, and a technocracy thesis. I propose an alternative approach, emphasizing the role of functional differentiation and its effect on elite recruitment in China. Using a data set on top Chinese leaders ( n = 1588), I find that effects of political loyalty and technical training on elite recruitment are patterned by institutional arrangements. Data analysis supports my explanation of elite selection in China.

China’s socialist employment system has undergone radical changes since the 1990s along with enterprise restructuring. Surplus workers have been laid off from state-owned enterprises in large numbers. China’s policy program for the management of layoffs in this process of enterprise restructuring has been evaluated as an example of ‘good practices in labor administration’. In this paper, we use original field data collected in Beijing, supplemented by additional information from recent Chinese studies, to assess this evaluation. We apply for this purpose the criteria often used by development agencies to evaluate governance systems, namely, accountability, transparency, consistency, participation, and information flow. Using these criteria as a yardstick, we argue that the Chinese experience in reforming their employment system through massive layoffs and re-employment is better characterized as a classic case of ‘muddling through’ rather than a shining example of ‘good governance’.

Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China—administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent.

While the Soviet Union imploded in the midst of its attempt to reform itself, more than a decade later China stands as a testament to the resilience of Communist rule. I suggest that one reason China has been able to stave off a regime collapse is that Chinese leaders have sought to learn from the collapse of the Soviet Union and are seeking to adjust their policies to buttress their political power. I present evidence in support of this position including statements of political leaders and party insiders, internal government documents, and Chinese scholarshipon the Soviet collapse.

What explains variation in investment climates across China's provinces and urban autonomous regions? Three main explanations are considered: variation in the character and size of economic interest groups, in central government policies, and in pre-communist provincial identities and traditions. There is statistical and anecdotal support for the interest group and provincial identity factors. On the other hand, there is little evidence that variation in central government policy has had much effect. Future work should refine statistical tests and case studies to better understand the joint influence of interest group pressures and provincial identities.

China's standing in the world—whether it is, or is seen to be, a great power—is a question of signal importance because of what great powers are capable of doing, what effects their actions and words have on others, and what is expected of them. By most conventional measures, China is at least on the verge of being a great power. Yet the country also occupies a pivotal global position in terms of its present and expected future impact on the environment. In the final analysis, because greatness is so much a function of a willingness to shoulder responsibility and demonstrate leadership, China's standing as a great power may well be determined by the country's response to the acute environmental stresses it faces. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

Large dams have been an important component of infrastructure development in capitalist and communist countries alike. In 1998, changing world attitudes on large dams led to a two year World Commission on Dams and new global standards may soon insist that future projects pay fair compensation so that resettlement becomes voluntary. Now, 10 years after introduction of economic reforms, China is mobilizing its resources to build the world's largest dam. This fulfils a longstanding ambition to impound the Yangtze River in Central China at the Three Gorges and use the hydropower, improved navigation and flood control to develop the economy. This paper examines the socio-economic impact of Three Gorges Dam on over 1.3 million people to be displaced while China is in transition to a market economy. We consider resettlement in terms of the decision-making structure, property rights and incentives to move, and how the project exacerbates problems created by market reforms, especially rising unemployment and deteriorating public health. We conclude the project is boosting economic expectations while adversely affecting large sections of the population, and this could provoke widespread social unrest and eventual changes in political institutions.

From 1982, when the Chinese government first signalled its intention to take back Hong Kong, to the actual transfer of sovereignty in 1997, the PRC engaged in a long-term campaign to “win friends and influence people” in the British colony. Hoping to prevent a large-scale flight of capital and manpower, and wishing to cultivate a core group of sympathetic local notables as future political leaders, Beijing issued frequent pledges of non-interference in Hong Kong's affairs and adopted classic “united front” tactics — flattering, cajoling, and otherwise wooing potential supporters while snubbing (and sometimes smearing) outspoken critics. Despite intensely negative local reaction to the 1989 “Tiananmen Massacre”, over the long haul Beijing largely succeeded in disarming public fears of a heavyhanded Chinese takeover. Consequently, the handover itself was an extremely calm, tranquil affair. And in the first 2 years of Hong Kong's new status as a “Special Administrative Region” of China, the PRC earned generally high marks for honoring its pledge to uphold the principle of “one country, two systems”.