Over the years, civil society empowerment has become an integral part of the European Union’s (EU) external and internal governance as a way to advance democracy and enhance citizen participation. While there has been increasing scholarly attention to the instruments and impact of the EU’s civil society support, so far there has been little research on the question what kind of civil society the EU actually promotes. This article intends to fill this gap by examining the substance of the EU’s civil society support in post- Soviet Central Asia, a region where various forms of civil society organizations (CSOs) exist. The findings reveal a differentiation between civil society types promoted in EU strategic documents and those that are supported in practice. While at the strategic planning level the EU seeks to strengthen civil society broadly construed, at the program implementation level the (neo-) liberal CSOs are the main beneficiaries. At the same time, the EU customizes its civil society assistance depending on the realities on the ground and at times finds itself empowering state-led civil society, while communal groups rarely benefit from the EU assistance schemes. This has severe implications for the advancement of citizen participation, considering that the actual grass-root initiatives are largely excluded from the EU assistance.

Almost twenty five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and several Central Asian republics appear to be converging on what may be termed a ‘hierarchic party system’, characterised by controlled and unequal competition between parties. Addressing the juncture between international politics and party politics, this article explores this convergence and considers Russian authoritarian norm diffusion as a possible explanation. This article argues that although Russia continues to build significant party-based linkage in Central Asia, similarities between party systems are the result of complex, multidirectional norm diffusion, as regimes look to liberalise or close their respective political systems.

With the planned US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 looming ever closer, and Central Asia’s own future increasingly in doubt, major powers are all competing to enhance their influence in Central Asia. 2014 may mark a regional tipping point, but none can accurately predict how the regional balance might shift after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 2009–2010, the signs of growing Russian dependence on China in terms of economy and energy were palpable, as were the signs of China successfully subordinating Russia to its Central Asian economic agenda. In 2011–2012, it was difficult to see Russia simply acquiescing in its subordination to China without reacting to that situation negatively. Since 2011, to avoid this dependence on China, Russia has vigorously pushed for its regional integration schemes. 2011 marked the launch of the US “New Silk Road” initiative. Great power regional integration schemes, however, undermine both regional and national development.

As the kick-off to his presidential campaign, newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin published an article calling for a Eurasian Union among the states of the former Soviet Union. Using this as a jumping off point, this article evaluates the several overlapping organizations promoted by Moscow to bring the ex-Soviet republics closer together. It looks specifically at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, and finally the hopes for a Eurasian Union. The article analyzes the multipronged approach, combining military cooperation through the CSTO and the hoped-for Customs Union and broader Eurasian Union. Using energy politics as a case study to explore the extent and limitations of Russia’s influence over the policies of the other states, the article illustrates how resources and domestic politics create either strengths or vulnerabilities for them. Finally, the author argues that despite Moscow’s wishes, each of the states is more or less able to defend its sovereignty and independence, thus limiting Russia’s sway over the territory of the “former Soviet space.”

The demise of the USSR led to the collapse of its centrally organised retail system. With this collapse the supply of consumer goods dried up, especially in the remote parts of the former USSR. At the same time the advent of capitalism offered a new institutional framework for independent retail activities. In the Kyrgyz Republic, where the economic liberalisation followed strictly the Washington Consensus, a large number of small shops emerged in both urban and rural areas. This study analyses the reasons for this boom in retail start-ups as well as the constraints the mainly inexperienced merchants encounter. As will be shown, any success in retail activities depends greatly on the performance of other economic sectors. The main goal of starting a retail business is to minimize risks within the overall livelihood strategies of households in rural Kyrgyzstan.

Under the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan has achieved independence and stability by exploiting its natural resources through a strategy of “staple globalism” and by balancing the great powers against each other. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new regime first distanced itself from Russia and tried regional alliances, then accepted help from NATO, and most recently turned cautiously to Russia (and China). Throughout, Uzbekistan has managed to receive considerable assistance from international agencies and military aid from several outside powers, albeit relatively little private foreign investment, owing to its poor business climate. The country has also handled potential conflicts with neighbors without significant violence.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had profound economic and social effects on many of the newly independent transition economies. Nowhere was this more so than in the fisheries sector — with one of the biggest production shortfalls occurring in Kyrgyzstan, following the collapse of lake capture and pond-culture production. In 2005, aggregate landings were just 48 tonnes — barely 3 per cent of the catch level recorded in 1989. This article has two objectives. First it analyses the extent to which the dissolution of the Soviet Union can explain the collapse of the fisheries sector in Kyrgyzstan. Second, in the light of these findings, it considers what practical steps, if any, might be taken to revitalize the sector.

Eurasianism as a concept emerged among Russian émigrés in the 1920s, with the premise that Russia is a unique ethnic blend, primarily of Slavic and Turkic peoples. Its geopolitical implications for Russia include gravitation toward mostly Turkic Central Asia. Alexander Dugin, one of its best-known proponents, believes that the demise of the Soviet Union was simply a tragic incident. The people of the former USSR should again be united in a grand Eurasian empire, with Russia a benign and generous patron, providing its “younger brothers” clients economic largesse and defense, mostly against the predatory USA. The “orange revolutions” and the rise of Russian nationalism, for whose proponents a restored imperial presence is rather marginal, indicate that Eurasianism—along with the dream of the resurrection of the USSR—is becoming less viable.

This article concludes this special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies by summarizing the various contributions and noting their commonalties as well as dissimilarities. The primary themes are the various problems in need of solution in Central Asia and the surrounding “neighborhood” (e.g., Afghanistan), including identity-driven conflicts and various ways of handling them. The article reaches out from the academic researchers who have contributed the articles, to policymakers, especially in the U.S., who may be concerned with identifying and solving the problems of Central Asia and its neighborhood, noting the “unintended consequences” that may befall them for what they do or do not do in the region.

Environmental challenges, resulting from either a scarcity of natural resources or environmental degradation, may contribute to security risks in Central Asia. An encouraging sign is the recent attention of the governments of Central Asia, civil society groups and international organizations to these environmental security issues. Their efforts indicate that by working together to prevent conflicts caused by environmental problems, cooperation among the countries of Central Asia may expand. Both short and long-term obstacles must be overcome if these groups are to ensure that environmental stresses do not lead to security concerns.

Will revolution, either of the democratic or the Islamic fundamentalist variety, spread throughout Central Asia? Such a question cannot be answered definitively. I will address this question by examining what is going on in Central Asia in light of different theories of revolution, including the ones focusing on relative deprivation, regime type, state breakdown, external factors, democratic revolution theory, and the role of the military. This study will show that several theoretical approaches suggest that the ingredients for revolution in Central Asia are either there now or will be in the not too distant future.

What impact have Eurasia’s 2003–2005 “colored revolutions” had on the state of democracy and autocracy in the region? The logic of patronal presidentialism, a set of institutions common to post-Soviet countries, suggests that the revolutions are at root succession struggles more than democratic breakthroughs generated by civic activists and foreign democratizing activity. This helps explain why Georgia is experiencing a new retreat from ideal-type democracy while only Ukraine, whose revolution weakened the patronal presidency, has sustained high political contestation after its revolution. This means that autocratic leaders clamping down on non-governmental organizations, free media, and their foreign supporters may have learned the wrong lessons, perhaps making their countries more susceptible to violent revolution than they were before.

Following the demise of Soviet-type regimes most countries of postcommunist Inner Asia either experienced initial political openings followed by reversion to authoritarianism or moved directly from one type of harsh authoritarianism to another. Mongolia is exceptional. The extent of political opening there during the 1990s far exceeded anything seen in any neighboring country and the gains of the early post-Soviet period were maintained instead of reversed. This paper investigates the causes of Mongolia’s relative success and argues that the absence of several factors that are often regarded as propitious for democratization has actually facilitated Mongolia’s democratization. The experience of postcommunist Inner Asia casts doubt on some arguments current in thinking on regime change.

In the twentieth century the identity of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people has been closely intertwined with the identity of Russia and the Russian people. Since Kazakhstan began to move toward sovereignty in the late 1980s, official republic documents relevant to language have reflected attempts to redefine republic and ethnic identity. This study traces the evolution of images of identity through examination of the title of language laws, legally declared status for Kazakh, Russian, and other languages, linguistic requirements for employment, and differential treatment of Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. The continuing debate on language demonstrates that even though Kazakhstan is now an independent country, fundamental questions remain about its identity.