After the Sino-Soviet dispute had considerably weakened Moscow’s supremacy in world communism, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was keen on restoring control and unity. But he soon discovered that his meaning of unity did not exactly coincide with what others had in mind. West European communists were striving to accommodate social principles to domestic conditions so, as to be able to accede to government. They advocated for each party’s right to make their own decisions independently and also for an enlargement of world communism beyond its initial sectarianism. Their cause was vulnerable though as internationalism was still an important part of their political identity, apart from the fact that Moscow did subsidize most of them. In the second half of the 1960s though, a new voice joined those asking for reform in world communism: Nicolae Ceauşescu, a leader of the Romanian Communist Party. Interested to promote his country’s autonomy in the Soviet bloc, Ceauşescu had no reason to support Moscow’s efforts to regain control. Instead, Ceauşescu developed close relations with West European Communist parties and assumed some of their ideological tenets, trying to fend off Soviet domination. This way, although he never was a Eurocommunist, Ceauşescu did play an important part in the ideological debates that were later to produce Eurocommunism, defendingWest European arguments in front of Moscow.

This paper discusses the results of the survey conducted in co-operation with the European Research Center for Migration and Ethnic Relations, concerning identity in the Autonomous Republics of Russia and Ukraine. The survey queried 6522 residents of such republics as Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia), and Tatarstan in Russia, and Crimea in Ukraine. It examined the construction of social identities, common narratives regarding threats and deprivations, confidence in public institutions, the prevalence of views toward national minorities as ‘fifth columns’, ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and other conflict indicators. An early warning model, built on the basis of the results, measured the potential for conflict based on these factors, and found that it was most pronounced in Bashkortostan and Crimea, and to a lesser extent in Tatarstan. Conflict was less likely in Sakha, Karelia, and Komi, although there were still certain indicators that suggested potential problems, including moderate support for independence in these republics.