In a period in which ‘‘strong’’ and even ‘‘presidential’’ prime ministers have arguably become more the rule than the exception in the major states of Western Europe, most prime ministers in the new democracies of East Central Europe appear to have been relatively weak figures. This article investigates the reasons for that relative weakness in the ten East Central European countries, which together have had 87 prime ministers in the 16 years since the fall of Communism. It evaluates several possible explanations: party system weakness, the institutional structure, elite recruitment patterns, and policy constraints. It then seeks to explain several notable exceptions to the prime ministerial weakness rule.

Nine years after the domino-like collapse of East Central Europe's Communist regimes, the near-unanimity of the conclusion, in retrospect, that the collapse was inevitable stands in stark contrast to the failure of nearly all observers and participants to anticipate it (or at least to say so publicly) at the time. In looking back at the year preceding the collapse, the nagging question that still presents itself is why practically no one saw the “unavoidable” coming. Phrased more positively, it may prove instructive to ask what evidence was available to external observers, to eastern elites, and to ordinary citizens that should have alerted us or them to the impending catalysm.

Ostensibly democratic elites drawn largely from the non-communist intelligentsia have taken over the most prominent positions in the “new” political systems of East Central Europe. To what extent do they resemble either their interwar or communist predecessors? The answer is complex, but even prior to the return of post-communists to a share of power in Poland, certain similarities were apparent. The present elites come largely from what one former dissident has called the “lower nobility” of the communist era; most lived fairly comfortably under the old order and many contributed significantly to its support system. Like their predecessors, they are perceived as being remote from public concerns, and many have yet to learn the accommodative and bargaining skills associated with politics in longer-established democracies.