Central Eastern Europe (further CEE) has been thoroughly reconstructed during nearly a quarter of century since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. The CEE countries turned to the West for economic and technological advancement, for political and administrative models as well as for protection. The authors coming from eight different countries look at the place and role of the former member states of the Warsaw Pact in the new European and international constellation. This concept of CEE includes most pro-western states of the former ‘Eastern block’: the four countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). There were many tumultuous political developments in and around the region within the last decade, and especially during the last five years when the financial crisis started to take its toll. While the Atlantic link of Central and Eastern Europe is still strong, many commentators have pointed out its wearing strategic meaning. The balance between the focus on the USA and the EU has shifted in favour of Europe. However, this shift has rather been an incomplete one due to the region’s own political and economic problems. The aim of this special issue is to analyse the new constellation by looking at the CEE countries themselves, at their ability to react and adapt, produce sound political strategies and act on as national actors: through bilateral ties, regional co-operation, NATO and the EU. Also, the main external actors - the USA, Russia and Germany - are looked at as they directly influence the way how the CEE countries shape their policies.

This article traces developments in the Czech political elite’s thinking about structural changes that the region and the country have experienced during the last several years. It is argued that two parallel, external structural constraints have significantly shaped decisions of the Czech political elite as the country has, once again, proven to be an ostensibly “reactive state”. These structural constraints have been the ongoing U.S. recalibration of its grand strategy as well as the financial crisis with a systemic challenge to the European political project in which fiscal and monetary issues have largely replaced previous criticism of the Constitutional Treaty and then the Reform Treaty. It is argued that these developments have posed a notable problem for two predominant ideological convictions present in the Czech political thinking – Atlantism and Europeanism, as neither of them has offered readily answers to deal with such a challenge. As will be shown, this mutually reinforcing dual challenge has further exacerbated previously existing Czech government’s lack of political vision, and resorted to a political mentality which has contained elements of denial, rationalization, and political resignation.

The presented article tries to make sense of Václav Havel, a man of many qualities and professions yet not a professional in the conventional sense of the word. The aim is to offer deeper insight into diverse cognitive elements which formed Havel’s political reasoning and attitudes. The idea is to provide an alternative interpretation and get beyond the customary explanations expressed through traditional IR language seeing Havel as a dissident idealist who was pushed by some realist impulses to clearly define real political and later also geopolitical stands. In doing so, the article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses conceptual frameworks (rather than a single framework) within which Have saw and understood the political world. The middle part examines Havel’s political agenda, namely the issues of the return to Europe, the German question, and relationships with Russia, the United States and toward multilateral institutions. The final part that utilizes primary data obtained through personal interviews with many Havel’s close collaborators presents two faces of Václav Havel: the dramatist and the ideologue.

The present article examines the tumultuous development in the issue of the Third Site (also known as the Third Pillar) of the US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) that was planned to be hosted by the Czech Republic and Poland. The article analyzes the entire ‘life cycle’ of the project, from its formal proposal in 2007 by the former U.S. President George W. Bush to its cancellation in 2009 by the current U.S. President Barak Obama. Without any doubts, the Third Site of BMD put Poland and the Czech Republic at the centre of international security politics and as such allows one to see how the two post-communist countries acted and reacted to related international positions, expectations and challenges. A detailed analysis of this issue, nevertheless, does not exhaust aims of this article. Whether brief or detailed, any look at the coverage of the issue reveals that the Czech Republic and Poland have invariably been lumped together through the construction of the imagery of the New Europe as a homogeneous political bloc. It will be argued that such a view is flawed and needs refinement. In order to back the claim, the issue of the Third Site is put into a historical context, revealing that the differences between the Czech and Polish international-security preferences and expectations after the end of the Cold War have been quite stable – including the most recent development after the project has been shelved by the United States, and can thus be conceived of in dialectical terms.