This paper shows that the dominant theory of European integration, the liberal inter-governmentalism, contains several assumptions about the process and character of national preference formation that may not be fully met in the post-communist EU member states. It argues that the primacy of economic and societal interests in influencing positions of national governments should not be taken for granted. Using Slovakia as an example, it demonstrates the autonomy of political and bureaucratic actors and importance of their preferences. It is also argued that ideational and exogenous factors should not be left out in constructing a realistic framework of national preference formation.

The contrast between Slovakia’s primary Communist successor party—the Party of the Democratic Left—and its own successor— Smer —offers considerable insight into the interaction between party ideology, organization and electoral success in post-Communist Europe. The Party of the Democratic Left and Smer offered relatively similar programmatic positions, but Smer managed to replace—and far outpace—its predecessor by offering a more charismatic public face, a smaller and more tightly centralized organization and an ideological flexibility that permitted it to take advantage of a shifting electoral environment.