This paper examines the major reasons for limited crisis contagion to Poland in the period 2007–09. At this time Poland was the only European Union (EU) member that grew in the midst of the Great Recession and financial crisis. The following analysis focuses on domestic polices and economics structure which made this growth possible. Poland’s modest levels of private and public debt, low share of mortgages in bank assets, limited decline in real estate prices, and proactive policies by domestic and foreign banks substantially buffered Poland’s financial sector. At the same time, real economy was aided by a high share of domestic consumption as opposed to exports, a favorable labor market structure, and timely financial assistance from the EU, all that shielded it from major crisis contagion.

This study focuses on the effects of Poland’s reforms in the period 1990e2005 on corruption in the health care system. In the last 15 years Poland has transformed its economy drastically, introducing market-oriented reforms into almost every aspect of its economy. In this study we consider how different reforms changed incentives and mechanisms facilitating corruption in the medical care sector. Our conclusion is that corruption in Poland’s medical sector has worsened since the onset of the marketization reforms. We support this conclusion primarily by analyzing changes in incentives for corruption and the number of mechanisms facilitating it. In addition, where available, quantitative data are provided, though we recognize that numerical estimates of corruption are subject to substantial error. We focus on three major forms of corruption: patient payments to secure medical treatment or improve its quality, payments from industry (mostly pharmaceutical and medical equipment producers), and the use by physicians of free public facilities for private patients.