The article attempts to make sense of recent developments in Hungary’s relationship with the EU and the US by explicating the logic behind the formation of its post-Cold War identity. The article’s central theoretical argument derives from social identity theory (SIT) in social psychology which argues that social groups strive for positive distinctiveness and provides concrete hypotheses concerning the identity management strategies that groups use to enhance their relative position. Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to international politics, I suggest that states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states (strategy of social mobility), trying to displace the higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of social creativity). The article argues that Orban’s government post- 2010 steps in domestic and foreign policy can be conceptualized as attempts to redefine Hungary’s identity by moving away from the strategy of social mobility pursued since the end of communism towards the strategy of social creativity.

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia’s new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger . The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness . If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame . Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia’s reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.

The article suggests a conceptual framework for understanding the logic and dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) organizational adaptation to market conditions and the consequences of this process for the trajectory and outcomes of the Chinese reform process. I define the CCP’s adaptation to market as ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ in nature with party cadres and agencies at different levels becoming not only oriented towards the goal of increasing local economic output and productivity but also directly involved in profit-making activities. I also argue that despite increased opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption, the CCP’s struggle for its organizational survival in the process of entrepreneurial adaptation has positively influenced the trajectory of Chinese market transition. By providing its agents powerful incentives to uphold the necessary degree of compliance with central policies, by limiting lucrative ‘‘easy avenues’’ for profit-seeking and value-subtracting behavior, by preventing the formation of powerful interests capable of hijacking the reform process, and by imposing painful but necessary economic rationalization measures, the party became an imperfect but crucial substitute for the lack of institutions necessary to guide the process of creating markets.