Supporting the War in Ukraine Compared to the Annexation of Crimea in Russia’s Bureaucratic Texts

Previous research related to support for Putin and his imperialist policies has primarily dealt with citizens’ support and its potential biases before and after the annexation of Crimea (Hale 2022; Alexseev and Hale 2016) and during the first year of war of aggression (Chapkovski and Schaub 2022; Krivushin and Glaser 2023; Kolesnikov and Volkov 2023). In other words, an effort has been made to assess citizens’ support of Putin in accordance with social and political preferences and pressures (Greene and Robertson 2019), showing, for example, how Putin’s popularity can affect citizens’ support for him (Buckley et al. 2024).

My starting point for the analysis of bureaucratic support for Putin’s policy priorities is that the war has not changed the regime’s patronal foundations. Rather, it seems to be a test for its resilience (Petrov 2023). The regime’s pivotal elements of governance have been based on rent-seeking, unofficial rewards and punishments veiled in official institutions (Magyar and Madlovics 2020; Gel’man 2022). In terms of the latter, Putin’s Russia has been a typical example of the importance of formal institutions and nominally democratic practices in legitimizing the power of an authoritarian ruler (Hale, Lipman, and Petrov 2019; Wengle and Evans 2018; Hale 2014; White 2017; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Support to the top of the vertical has been made a more important virtue than meritocratic expertise, for example, in the case of gubernatorial appointments (Reuter and Robertson 2012). Tying the roles and interests of subordinates to support of the top does not create genuine incentives for more effective problem solving as far as there is no guarantee that efficiency is transmitted as an activity that benefits the subordinate’s position. On the contrary, excessive activity or autonomous action can be perceived as a political challenge or disloyalty, as in the case of Governor Sergei Furgal² (Tairov and Malina 2021). The safer option is inaction, which materialized in the regime’s inability to respond decisively to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed mutiny (Lassila and Zavadskaya 2023).

The basis of Putin’s power and the support for his policies are related to the concept of legitimacy, especially of its meaningfulness in the case of authoritarian regimes (Gerschewski 2018). The complexity of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes is not so much related to its normative redundancy from the viewpoint of democracy as practically all modern authoritarian systems do not rely on repression exclusively. An essential challenge is related to how to define the support shown by subjects to an authoritarian regime (Gerschewski 2013, 18). I rely on Johannes Gerschewski’s (2018) research on authoritarian legitimacy, starting from his concepts of “specific” and “diffuse” support adopted from David Easton (1975) (Gerschewski 2013, 20), which he has since operationalized as instrumental and normative support (Gerschewski et al. 2022). Specific support is related to the performance of the authoritarian regime regarding the expectations of the benefits received by the subjects (Gerschewski 2013, 20). In other words, unless the authoritarian ruler can guarantee a good enough everyday life, the specific/instrumental support fades, and various measures from carrots to repression are needed to secure the regime, or in a more democratic case, an incumbent can lose the election.

Diffuse support concerns ideas, values, the leader’s charisma, as well as issues related to external threats (Gerschewski 2013, 20). In other words, it is the normative support enjoyed by the regime (Gerschewski et al. 2022). For example, increases in political leaders’ approval caused by wars and states of emergency indicate the existence of diffuse/normative support. For instance, an obvious “rally round the flag” was seen after Crimea’s annexation and immediately after the full-scale invasion (Levada 2024). Theoretically, the distinction between specific/instrumental and diffuse/normative support is relatively clear, but as Gerschewski (2013, 20) states, in authoritarian regimes both measuring legitimacy (2013, 20) and distinguishing forms of support (Gerschewski et al. 2022) have remained an open issue. In the next section, I examine these challenges and present an approach for analyzing them in bureaucratic texts under Putin.

In a repressive authoritarian system even the widespread dissatisfaction with the decisions of the political leadership cannot be brought up as open criticism. However, the lack of explicit support, passivity, or silence among subordinates suggests a reluctance to support the leadership’s decisions. By contrast, widespread positive treatment of the decisions indicates that they are accepted, or even endorsed, by the subordinates. The challenge is, however, how to assess the lack or presence of explicit support in those cases when subordinates mention something related to the leader’s political priorities (e.g., Crimea or “special military operation”).

Whereas instrumental support reflects well support’s compulsory function in an authoritarian regime (fear of punishment for disloyalty) regardless of normative (ideational) underpinnings, separating these two forms of support in the analysis is problematic. Ideally, one can assume that a regional bureaucrat dependent on state subsidies, not affected by the president’s foreign policy decisions in any way, will show support “as narrowly as possible.” Correspondingly, those who share the president’s foreign policy views demonstrate their support “as extensively as possible.” However, it is quite possible that a bureaucrat benefiting from state resources will show extensive normative support only to maintain these benefits in the future. This means that to distinguish instrumental and normative forms of support categorically is not a productive task. Instead, examining the relationship between them shows how the Kremlin has succeeded in integrating the bureaucracy’s inexorable need for instrumental support as part of legitimacy for its foreign policy choices. Here the point of the analytical distinction between instrumental and normative support is in the way bureaucratic representatives demonstrate their role and position in Putin’s system (instrumental support) vis-à-vis the Kremlin’s political priorities (normative support). I operationalize this relationship as follows:

Potential variations throughout Russia’s regions and administrations regarding their standards of showing support notwithstanding, I see the degree of support’s elaboration (starting with mentioning or not mentioning search terms) is a meaningful empirical criterion. The question on the relationship between instrumental and normative support leads to two hypotheses:

For this reason, in addition to classifications of instrumental and normative, I used the classifications of instrumental-normative and normative-instrumental in the qualitative analysis. Regarding the former, the issue is about a slightly broader treatment of official policies in addition to emphasizing one’s own role. In terms of the latter, the focus is on the broader treatment of policies, although, at the same time, one’s own role is brought to the fore. In the qualitative analysis, the texts are therefore classified as either instrumental, instrumental-normative, normative, or normative-instrumental.

I used Integrum’s database “Archives of Governmental Organizations.” It covers a wide range of Russian state and state-aligned actors at various levels, from the central federal agencies, like ministries and official parties, to the variety of organizations at the regional, municipal, and district level, a total of 11,076 sources. These texts are typically news and announcements on various partisan forums: party websites, websites of governors, regions, or districts under the Kremlin serving as their official information channels. Unlike news texts, whose main function is to provide information to the recipients, texts in the database can be understood as “support rituals” in the case of Putin’s Russia. There is a need to express one’s own existence and position in the prevailing system, regardless of whether someone reads these texts or not. What is essential is the author’s assumption that they were written with certain readers in mind, probably those higher up in the hierarchy (see, for example, Lassila 2014).

By using Crimea’s annexation as a comparative background for reactions to the war of aggression, I chose “Krym” (Crimea) for the search term and the time period January 18, 2014, to April 18, 2015. The role of January 2014 was for testing the connection of the search term to the time of annexation (February–March 2014). I made robustness checks for the search terms “DNR” and “LNR” (acronyms for Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics”), “Donbass,” “Novorossiia,” “Sevastopol,” and “Ukraina” regarding their potential resonance with the events of 2014 to see their relevance as possible alternatives for “Krym.” Except for “Ukraina,” their mentions were much lower³ in comparison with “Krym.” “Sevastopol” and “Krym” demonstrated identical dynamics in their mentions. However, its combined share of mentions was only 11.44% (for “Krym” it was 27.82%). For “Ukraina” the combined share was 33.84%, and it could be used as an alternative for assessing reactions in Russia’s bureaucracy for the annexation as well as for the 2022 invasion. In this case, one could examine the dynamics of attitudes toward Ukraine among the Russian bureaucracy from 2014 to the current war as part of its ways of showing support for the Kremlin’s imperialist priorities. Nevertheless, “Krym” as a search term is more focused, specifically related to the object of annexation, and to the event that strengthened Putin’s position in a significant way. This is why I chose it as the search term that obviously obliged the bureaucracy to react to the event in one way or another.

I chose the established acronym “SVO” (spetsialʹnaia voennaia operatsiia, “special military operation”) and the Latin letter “Z”—the main symbol of the Kremlin’s invasion, originally used by certain Russian military units—as the search terms for the invasion of Ukraine. Although these terms refer to the military operation per se and are not the object of the operation as the seizure of Crimea was, all three search terms are central indexes of authoritarian political flagships of their time. Their different nature may well affect the nature of support, and for this reason, “Krym” serves as a good background comparison for “SVO” and “Z” when evaluating the bureaucracy’s attitudes toward the radicalization of the Kremlin’s Ukraine policies. For “SVO” and “Z,” I chose February 24, 2022 through April 5, 2023, as the time period. This covers the failure of the initial blitzkrieg, Russia’s considerable losses as well as Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization in late September 2022.

At first, I examined the total number and dynamics of mentions starting with “Krym” and then “SVO” and “Z” in the chosen search periods. After that, I examined the distribution of the mentions among the sources, assessing what kind of actors belonged to the ten most active and what kinds of differences appeared between the search terms. In a closer qualitative look, I analyzed the texts of the three most active sources for the search terms by selecting the first text of each month from each of the three selected sources. This random sampling showed that there was a clear saturation in the nature of the support by single sources as well as between the sources. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the qualitative sampling reflects the typical nature of support in the data throughout.

Compared to the mention of “Krym” during the year following the annexation (Figure 1), mentions of “SVO” and “Z” indicate that the invasion of Ukraine since February 2022 (Figure 2) has not mobilized the same degree of discursive activity. Mentions related to the 2022 invasion (the combined share of “SVO” is 12.57% and for the mentions of “Z” 15.1%) remain about half of the mentions of “Krym.”

In terms of the 2022 invasion, a striking feature is the low number of “SVO” mentions in relation to “Z” until the end of September 2022, and from October 2022 onward, the relatively more mentions of “SVO” in relation to “Z.” This indicates that Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization at the end of September 2022 shifted the focus of discursive support related to the operation from its overt military symbol (Z) to the bureaucratic euphemism (SVO), mentioned by Putin in his televised speech on the day the invasion started. The actual absence of “SVO” mentions in relation to “Z” in March–April 2022 reveals that the term was not seen to have a special weight in bureaucracy in the beginning of the invasion. Its dynamics is clearly linked to the duration of the war.

As for “Z,” it should be noted that it is a single letter that can be scaled to, for example, place names. The most famous example is probably the Kuzbass region, which announced right at the beginning of the invasion that the region’s name will be written using the Latin letter Z in the future (КуZбасс) (Chistiakov 2022). This is a visible symbolic gesture, although it does not reveal much about the nature of support for the war in single texts that mention a place name using the Latin Z. Next, let us see the overall distribution of mentions between sources.

Out of the 11,076 sources in the database, “Krym” was mentioned by 3,201 sources, a total of 92,416 mentions with an average of 28.87 per actor, ten more than for “SVO.” “SVO” was mentioned by an almost identical number sources, 3,203, but the total number of mentions was clearly smaller, 57,934. “Z” was mentioned by 2,383 sources, a total of 76,427 mentions, and as Table 1 indicates, these mentions are highly concentrated for certain actors (the least unique sources for at least 100 mentions).

In general, regarding the total number of sources in the database (11,076), it appears that the great majority of them have not been active at all in relation to search terms. Moreover, activity in their usage is heavily focused on certain sources. In terms of increased repression of the political atmosphere during the last ten years, as well as the absence and small number of mentions of “SVO” until September 2022 (see Figure 2), it is plausible that requirements and necessity for mentioning “SVO” have increased considerably among the various state-related actors. In other words, the use of “SVO” can be seen as reactive. An increase in its use after partial mobilization indicates instructions from further up the hierarchy, and conditions for ignoring it were greatly reduced. By contrast, in terms of “Z”—not pinpointed by Putin in the war declaration speech—a more proactive and possibly also normative support can be seen that decreases as the war drags on. Next, let us look at the ten most active actors in terms of search terms.

The role of the Kremlin’s ruling party United Russia (UR) as the most active contributor for “Krym” and “SVO” is the most expected result in Table 2. As for “Z,” the letter’s connection to place names becomes obvious and, along with Kuzbass, Zabaikalʹskii Krai is also the most active user of “Z,” thanks to this option. When they are excluded, the UR is also the most active mentioner of “Z,” as it does not have an equal letter game option.

The emphasized role of the UR shows that the support for Putin’s major geopolitical maneuvers is largely focused on their most important domestic flag-bearer. As for “SVO,” the UR has a 300-mention lead over the second, and for “Z” (excluding Zabaikalʹskii Krai and Kuzbass) almost 300 mentions over the next. This implies that there is no need for demonstrating support near the degree of the Kremlin’s ruling party among other state organizations. The difference from the time of the annexation of Crimea is visible in this respect. The lead of the UR to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) in terms of “Krym” is only 100 mentions. Hence, the interest in the annexation of Crimea shown by Russia’s most prominent parties—regardless of certain qualitative differences between the CPRF’s imperialist policies and Putin’s imperialist foreign policy—was more even than in the case of invasion in 2022.

Besides the letter games with their place names, Zabaikalʹskii Krai and Administration of the Government of Kuzbass as leaders for “Z” shed light on the nature of bureaucratic support for the invasion more generally. For both “SVO” and “Z,” the role of regions is clearly highlighted. Regarding “SVO,” the eight most active actors are regional. For “Z,” seven of the ten most active actors are regional. The difference in support for the annexation of Crimea is striking: nine out of Crimea’s ten most active contributors are connected to the central federal administration and the remaining regional actor is from the outskirts of the center, the Moscow region. Interestingly, the third most active contributor for “Krym,” Gubernatory.ru, a portal of the Federal Center for Russian Governors, is not among the most active for “SVO” and “Z,” although regions are highlighted in the most active sources. The forum may not have been considered appropriate for showing the support to the extent seen in regional forums.

Noteworthy for the regions that stand out for mentioning “SVO” and “Z” is their connection to both war deaths and poverty among Russian regions. For example, in the spring of 2022, in terms of deaths related to the invasion confirmed from public sources, the relative share of Dagestan per 100,000 men aged 18 to 45 was the eighth largest among Russian regions (second for “SVO” mentions) and the absolute largest share was also from Dagestan at that time (Bonch-Osmolovskaia, Nikolaeva, and Marokhovskaia 2022). In the same statistics, Altai district is fifth (fifth for “Z” mentions), seventh is Pskov oblast (seventh for “SVO” mentions), ninth is Zabaikalʹskii Krai (first for “Z” mentions), and tenth is Orenburg Oblast (ninth for “Z” mentions) (Bonch-Osmolovskaia et al. 2022). All these mentioned regions are also below the Russian average in terms of living standards, for example, in terms of the number of televisions per 100,000 households (Bonch-Osmolovskaia et al. 2022). By May 19, 2023, the number of confirmed deaths in the ongoing war collected from public sources was 23,286, and the average number of deaths per region (according to reported 85 regions) was 273.95 (Mediazona 2023). In terms of mentions of “SVO” and “Z,” the ten most active regions—except Iakutia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khantii-Mansiisk—exceed this average. There were 352 registered deaths in Primorskii Krai, 315 in Briansk Oblast, 602 in Rostov Oblast, and 323 in Kuzbass (Bonch-Osmolovskaia et al. 2022).

Of the 30 tabulated actors (Table 2), 12 appear more than once, and when central actors of political parties are not included, the number is 6. However, due to the highly centralized structure of UR, regional activities are also posted by the central party website. The same applies to large extent to the CPRF. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the regional actors of the party (Cherkessk and Kemerovo) are more active in terms of “SVO” and “Z” than the central party, unlike in the case of “Krym.” Next, I will examine the texts of the three most active mentioners of the search terms concerning their first texts from each month in the selected time periods (January 18, 2014–April 18, 2015, for “Krym” and February 24, 2022–April 5, 2023, for “SVO” and “Z”).

The first mention of “Krym” is from January 2014 by the CPRF in the story mentioning that “360 years ago (January 18, 1654) Ukraine was annexed to the Russian Empire and a historic decision was made about the unity of the countries.” Most obviously, there was concern about unfolding events in Kiev at that time and the story calls for the unity between the countries. The first mention by Gubernatory.ru from January 2014 is random and unrelated to the theme.

The first mention by the UR is on February 28, 2014, in which Vice Speaker of the State Duma, Deputy Secretary of the General Council of the UR Sergei Zhelezniak demands to facilitate the granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainians in a situation where “Russian parliamentarians will only have a dialogue with the legally elected authorities on the territory of Ukraine, which is why delegations from the Russian Federation are currently in Crimea.” A few days later (March 1, 2014), the UR headlined that “the State Duma urged Putin to stabilize the situation in the Crimea.” The first mention of April 2014 is titled “Kuzbass transferred 5.2 million rubles to assist Crimea” and the first mention of May is the ritualistic “The Far East welcomes May Day” (May 1), “whose posters did not forget about the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation.” The mentions of June and July again list the center’s actions, “Putin will present the Order of Parental Glory and “Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law ‘On Amendments to the Housing Code and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation,’” both of which mention Crimea as a subject of the federation.

In total, 7 of the 15 selected mentions of the UR discuss activities of its regional departments (stories about Ulʹianovsk, Kamchatka, Samara, Khantii-Mansiisk, and Buriatiia). In the authoritarian centralism, the regional aspect as such is related to instrumental support (need to emphasize one’s own role), yet the overall emphasis is on examining the actions of the state leadership, not on the party’s regional activities. Of the 15 selected UR texts, I classified 4 as instrumental-normative and 5 as normative-instrumental. Six were normative expressions of support in which the role of the party was not brought up. The average length of the texts was 386.2 words.

Regarding the communists, the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy is not criticized in general but exposed as “communist solidarity.” For example, the mentions of February and March 2014 are about the Communist Party of Ukraine, while April’s story is titled “Moldova. Liberals propose leaving the CIS, communists propose strengthening constitutional neutrality.” The May Day celebration is naturally not forgotten, “At the May Day rally in Blagoveshchensk, the communists presented a people’s candidate for the post of mayor,” and the first mention of June is about the press conference of a representative of the party leadership, Ivan Melʹnikov, in Penza Oblast. In July, the Crimea issue is highlighted by “The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPRF, [which] by secret ballot, nominated the list of the CPRF for the elections of deputies of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea.” In August, the plan for the bridge across the Kerch Strait is discussed critically (seeing it in terms of capitalistic speculation) and argued for the ferry connection in the story originally written in the newspaper Pravda. In September 2014, the communists highlighted their role in the seizure of the assets of the Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoiski in Crimea while in October it is told how “Communists of Penza took part in Lermontov celebrations in Crimea.” In November, the new administration in Crimea is criticized, “How long will the trust last? The new government has accumulated many unfulfilled promises,” and in December, it is told that “a meeting of secretaries of city and district branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was held.”

Broader geopolitical and historical themes receive attention in addition to the mention of January 2014: “the possession of Crimea and especially Sevastopol significantly strengthens the defense capability of Russia and creates additional obstacles for American fascist globalism to dismember our country with the help of NATO” (April 1, 2015), “Did the CIA shoot at the Maidan?” (January 2, 2015), and “The bloodless return of Crimea to the bosom of the Russian Federation is an outstanding event of the 21st century” (February 2, 2015).

Of the 16 CPRF selected texts, I classified 2 as instrumental expressions of support, 1 as instrumental-normative, 4 as normative-instrumental, and 9 as normative. On average, the texts were clearly longer than the UR’s, 778.06 words.

Gubernatory.ru’s mentions were the closest to the region-based instrumental support shown to the political center. Mentions were related to the regions showing aid or solidarity to Crimea, to the refugees who came to Russia from Ukraine, to local social policy activities in which Crimea is included (sanatoriums, summer camps for children, etc.), and two mentions of sports competitions organized in the regions, in which “representatives from Crimea” participated. The most revealing posture of instrumental support was the story about a demonstration for better wages in the capital of Altai region, in which it was loosely mentioned that “[regarding] the recent events in Crimea, we proved this by showing solidarity towards the fraternal people.” One mention dealt with Crimean puppet ruler Sergei Aksenovʹs congratulations to the leader of the Republic of Karelia, and two militant displays of support to the Kremlin by Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov. Of the 14 texts selected, 3 were instrumental expressions of support and 11 were instrumental-normative. The texts were the shortest, 211.06 words on average.

The UR’s texts of May (first mention), June, July, and August deal with the commemoration of individual soldiers who fell in the war in Stavropol, Dagestan, and Astrakhan Oblast. Whereas Stavropol and Dagestan in particular have been highlighted as the home regions of the fallen (Bonch-Osmolovskaia, Nikolaeva, and Marokhovskaia 2022; Mediazona 2023), the ruling party’s activities in these regions are obviously tied to the regional emphasis seen in the mentions of “SVO” and “Z” in the database (see Table 2). In the case of Astrakhan Oblast, the story mentions the proposal of the ruling party-controlled city of Kharabali to rename some city squares “in honor of locals who died during the fulfillment of SVO in Ukraine,” but this is discussed along with “problems associated with the maintenance of apartment buildings [and] the removal of household waste.” In other words, local problems are explicated and normative support (SVO) for the Kremlin in this context implies the desire and need to receive approval from higher instances in the future as well.

The August text is a story about UR’s action “Books to Donbass.” The focus is above all on the party’s activity in collecting and delivering Russian-language books to “liberated territories to replace Ukrainian nationalist literature” along with other aid delivered there. The September text about UR’s activities in Orenburg Oblast repeats the above-mentioned commemoration activities for those who fell in the war, not forgetting the role of the party.

Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization on September 21, 2022, shifts the focus of UR’s themes to helping relatives of the mobilized in Russia’s regions (October, November, December, and January texts). This focus implies instructions, presumably in terms of preventing potential discontent caused by mobilization, and in which UR aims to distinguish as a key actor. The first mention of February 2023 is about UR’s campaign “Warm for Heroes,” which underlines the party’s contribution to helping those at war. According to the story, (the campaign) “unites the people of Chita” (Zabaikalʹskii Krai) by mentioning, for example, “Irina Savochkina from Chita [who] brought a batch of warm fleece socks for servicemen participating in the SVO.” The first mention of March 2023 is about UR’s initiative in carrying out official war propaganda in schools, in this case in Tomsk, regarding the “necessity for preparation of a special course, a methodological manual on the heroes of their native land in the Tomsk region, so that children in schools know the names of participants and heroes of the SVO.” The first mention of April 2023 returns to the theme of relatives of the mobilized and is related to the activities of UR’s women’s division, in this case, its work with mentoring female candidates for the 2023 regional elections in Belgorod, Rostov, and Novgorod oblasts. It is mentioned separately how “a workshop on communication with the families of SVO participants was held” and “met with the children of SVO participants.”

The difference from UR’s “Krym” texts is clear in the ways of showing support. Of the 12 selected texts, I classified 10 as instrumental-normative and 2 as normative-instrumental. The texts were also shorter compared to “Krym”; the average length was 308.66 words.

The texts of Gumbetovskii District, the second most active contributor of “SVO,” are typical examples of patronal politics by Russia’s poor regions in showing their loyalty to Moscow in which, with two exceptions, either the leader of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, or the leader of Gumbetovskii District, Galip Galipov, is the main character. In this respect, the support for Putin’s foreign policy shown by the texts is highly instrumental, but they differ from the more restrained style of UR. The texts mention, for example, how “males from Gumbetovskii District became holders of the Order of Courage for the exploits shown during the special operation to liberate Ukraine from neo-fascism,” “to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine,” “Russia is a great country that liberated the world from the crematoriums of fascism, in which people were burned alive, and today we are fighting neo-fascism,” or “Dagestani artillerymen to SVO who defend the Motherland from the encroachments of Bandera, supported by the West.” The strong emphasis on soldiers’ relatives after mobilization that was apparent in UR’s texts, can be seen in only two texts. Instead, the main focus is on the “bravery” of the Dagestani soldiers and the help given to these fighters by the locals led by Melikov or Galipov. Of the selected 11 texts, I classified 4 as instrumental-normative expressions of support and 7 as normative-instrumental. The texts are also the shortest in the qualitative sample, 107.18 words on average.

The mentions of “SVO” by the Karachai-Cherkessk communists are distinctly different from those of UR and Gumbetovskii District of Dagestan. The key difference is related to the absence of the contributor’s role in the communists’ texts, replaced by the multifaceted focus on the war and the criticism in the implementation of the Kremlin’s war policy. They shed light on the arms aid provided by the West, their own losses, and the historical significance of the “special operation”; they criticize “the handing over of Ukrainian Nazis to Ukraine from captivity,” the corrupt capitalism represented by the Kremlin, although “the Kremlin activities at the moment coincide with the interests of the heroic Defenders of Donbass” (communist activist Sergey Udalʹtsovʹs writing), the actual presence of the “anti-USSR” machined by the West in Ukraine, also in Russia, the inadequacy of partial mobilization, the danger of a lost war and therefore the necessity to “go to the end,” and the demand for total mobilization also in the economy (longing for communism). Out of the 14 selected texts, 13 can be classified as elaborate treatment of the Kremlin’s foreign policy and/or the absence of one’s own role in showing support—in other words, as normative support—and 10 of these were critical in tone. Only one text dealt with the delivery of aid to soldiers, where Karachai-Cherkessk communists are mentioned as an actor (along with the UR), and I classified it as instrumental-normative. The texts were also the longest in the sample, 899.72 words on average.

The leading position of Zabaikalʹskii Krai in mentions of “Z”—an option by its place name—fits the picture concerning the military service in poor regions as a relevant opportunity for young males, as it is also an obligation that cannot be avoided to the extent seen in richer urban centers and it resulted in high casualties in the case of war (Bonch-Osmolovskaia, Nikolaeva, and Marokhovskaia 2022). By May 19, 2023, there were 596 registered deaths for the region, which is one of the highest figures among Russia’s regions (Mediazona 2023). The first mention (March 2, 2022) states how “drivers of Chita minibuses joined the action #We Don’t Leave Our Own, in which they pasted leaflets with the St. George Ribbon in the shape of the letter Z on the windows of cars.” The first mention of April introduces the “support” by the place name in relation to the same action (the action #We Don’t Leave Our Own was held in the village of Kokui of Sretenskii District, Zabaikalʹiia), and adds a normative aspect by stating how the local soldiers “eradicate nationalism and Banderism in the territory of Ukraine.” Only the post-mobilization text in October showed similar support for the war by listing weapons to be offered to the mobilized. Apart from these 3 instrumental-normative texts of the selected 14 texts, 11 texts could be classified as instrumental, being stories that demonstrate the region’s exemplary contribution to social and infrastructural matters. Given the region’s poor status, these are revealing in terms of highlighting local authorities’ need to demonstrate their willingness to be active in these matters. At the same time, the use of the letter Z becomes inconsistent. For example, Cyrillic З is used in a title while the Latin Z is used in the body text, or vice versa.

Given its similar option to use Latin Z in its place name, the mentions by the Administration of the Government of Kuzbass show similarities with Zabaikalʹskii Krai. The first mention (March 2, 2022) is related to the state action “We Don’t Leave Our Own” (as in the case of Zabaikalʹskii Krai) and is dedicated to the defense of the conductor Valerii Gergiev, who is originally from the region: “We do not leave our own: KuZbass supported Valerii Gergiev, dismissed from the Munich Orchestra.” Another mention related to the war (October 1) appears after the mobilization, “The fifth group of mobilized residents of KuZbass went to training centers,” and lists how the mobilized are helped. The other 11 stories are similar with descriptions revealed in the sample of Zabaikalʹskii Krai, which emphasize activities of local authorities in the implementation of various social, educational, and infrastructural projects without connection to the war. Similar to the “SVO” sample of Dagestan’s Gumbetovskii District, the main character in almost all stories is the governor of the region of that time, Sergei Tsivilev (Minister of Energy since May 2024), whose wife, Anna Tsivileva, is Putin’s first cousin (Badanin et al. 2022). Tsivilev’s announcement that the Kuzbass name will be written with a Latin Z in the future right at the beginning of the invasion is unsurprising in this respect, given his family connection to the main patron and the considerable wealth connected to it, which then resulted in a kind of anticipatory support. However, the low number of the writings related to the war itself is worth noting. It seems that instrumental support in terms of an exemplary regional actor on non-war-related issues is seen as more important than any visible normative support to the war. Out of the 14 texts selected (as of April 2023, there were no more mentions), 11 were instrumental and only 3 were related to the war in terms of their content (instrumental-normative).

The mentions of “Z” by UR, as in the case of its mentions of “SVO,” are focused on regions. The most significant difference from “SVO” is in the way UR’s aid is aimed at those at war, not the relatives of the mobilized, or of the SVO participants. This shows the triumphalist implication of “Z,” which is seemingly not suitable in the context of helping relatives suffering from the war. The detached and tokenistic nature of Z also becomes visible by mentioning it without a direct connection to the war (for example, “We are for ZОЖ,” abbreviation for “healthy way of life,” June 1, 2022). Altogether there were 966 mentions of “Z” by UR, but the clear majority of these is concentrated in the first months of the invasion. The turning point in dynamics can be seen from August 2022 onward, when the first mentions of the months no longer fall on the month’s first day. The last mention falls on March 13. Of the selected 14 texts, all were instrumental-normative expressions of support whose average length was 331 words and thus coincide with UR’s SVO mentions.

An aggregate answer to the two hypotheses—bureaucratic support appears either as a non-elaborative contribution to Putin’s foreign policy (instrumental support), indicating a weak commitment to it, or as an elaborative treatment (normative support) of Putin’s foreign policy, indicating a stronger commitment to it—is that the war of aggression in Ukraine has produced less normative support in Russia’s bureaucracy than in the case of the annexation of Crimea. This suggests that radicalization of the Kremlin’s foreign policy with widespread domestic consequences does not manifest itself as the adequate ideologization of Russia’s bureaucracy.

It is noteworthy that a clear majority of the sources of the database were passive for all three search terms (approximately 29% mentioned “Krym” and “SVO,” and approximately 21% mentioned “Z”). Analyzing the active sources, the role of Russia’s main parties (UR, CPRF) is highlighted at the expense of the rest of the bureaucracy, and regarding the war of aggression, the nature of UR’s support speaks to the first hypothesis: on the one hand, its activities are focused in regions of high losses and, on the other, on helping relatives after mobilization, which speak of coordinated, bureaucratic control by emphasizing its own role rather than a more spontaneous normative support.

In terms of overall dynamics of search terms, the reactivity of “SVO” in relation to the duration of the war also confirms the first hypothesis. By the same token, the clearly higher frequency of “Z” in the general dynamics at the beginning of the war hinted to a more normatively weighted support, but the qualitative analysis shows that it is an emphatically instrumental, practically ritualistic, play with the letter Z in connection with place names (Zabaikalʹskii Krai and Kuzbass). Especially for the former, mentions are connected to the region’s poverty and high losses in the war.

A more normatively weighted support in the case of “Krym” comes out in its general frequency. The average number of its mentions per actor is higher than that of “SVO’s” and, in terms of qualitative analysis of UR’s contributions, texts are longer and more diverse than in the case of the party’s contributions to “SVO” and “Z.”

Instead, writings of the CPRF concerning “SVO” differ from actors directly dependent on the Kremlin and correspond to the second hypothesis. The communists of Karachai-Cherkessk hardly brought out their role or region (despite the region’s proximity to the war zone), but the focus was on the war in general and geopolitics. However, communists’ normative support is tied with criticism, calling for more radical and determined implementation of the Kremlin’s war policies while widely approving the Kremlin’s anti-Westernism. A corresponding normative support could also be considered possible for actors directly dependent on the Kremlin. However, this is not the case in practice. Support shown by UR—and regional actors in particular—is strongly reactive, presumably resonating with the lost blitzkrieg, casualties, and prolongation of the war (decline in the usage of “Z”). This, in turn, suggests that there exist instructions from above (Verstka 2023), as similar emphases can be seen in all texts, especially after the partial mobilization at the end of September 2022.

In the qualitative analysis, a clear difference between “Krym” and “SVO”/“Z” is seen in the mentions of Putin. There are six mentions of Putin in the sample of Krym of which three are in titles, while in the samples of “SVO” and “Z” Putin is not mentioned in any of the titles, only two mentions in the texts of SVO; one by Dagestan’s Gumbetovskii District and one neutral/positive by Karachai-Cherkessk communists (plus one mention with criticism). It is unclear why Putin is not mentioned, although it could also be related to the interests of instrumental support. Perhaps, excessive mentioning of Putin is seen as contrived, or even suspicious, if the actor does not feel a special need or obligation to elaborate official political ideals.

Regarding the 2022 invasion, relative passivity by those actors who were active in contributing to Crimea’s annexation (in practice, federation-level actors) suggests that they did not have the interest in showing equal support to Putin’s current war. Instead, the ten most active actors were generally concentrated in poor regions, where the number of people mobilized for the war (and the number of deaths) is high. As for the actors of and under Putin’s ruling party, it seems that the politically freer atmosphere at the time of the annexation of Crimea—most obviously also related to its successful outcome—produced a more normatively weighted support. As the war obliges many actors of the bureaucracy, whether they are departments of the ruling party or regional actors of the vertical, this obligation aims to highlight one’s own exemplary role and position in the vertical.

The silence of the great majority in the database regarding the search words can be interpreted, on the one hand, as a clear division of labor within the bureaucracy. Those actors whose role is not to comment on the Kremlin’s political priorities do not do so. On the other hand, considering Putin’s patronal regime, pleasing higher instances and securing one’s position are systemic features of bureaucracy, a kind of internalized necessity. In this sense, the majority’s passivity vis-à-vis the Kremlin’s political priorities—Crimea’s annexation and the “special military operation”—is significant. Silence does not mean opposing them, but neither does it indicate an active need to show support for them.

This article has contributed to the research of authoritarian legitimacy with an empirical approach to bureacratic texts in Putin’s Russia. While explicit criticism is excluded in today’s Russia, it is crucial to assess the nature of the official support. The dilemma in the relationship between instrumental and normative support for Putin’s political priorities that this study has identified raises two questions about the stability of his legitimacy. On the one hand, the instrumental support for the war shown by the regions fits well with the argument of the “tragic brilliance of authoritarianism” (Diaz-Caveros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Riddle Russia 2021): the support shown to poorly performing and poorly governed authoritarian regimes, especially from its most vulnerable subjects. Their support is tragic because tightening screws of authoritarianism paradoxically reinforces their need to show support in avoiding the situation becoming even worse, making the regime’s authoritarian grip on its poorest subjects brilliant.

On the other hand, the situation cannot become more tragic for the subordinates indefinitely, because then at some point their incentive for instrumental support presumably disappears and the regime is left with only repression (which also requires sufficient resources). A more normative support from actors directly under the Kremlin—which does not include the communists who demonstrated the clearest normative support—would reduce the risk of dwindling resources, because then the regime’s persuasion costs for its war would be lower. Now the costs seem to be higher, and the existing options are either to guarantee the balance in scarcity for sustaining the “tragic brilliance of authoritarianism,” to compensate for the lack of normative support (and higher persuasion costs) with unlikely greater benefits, or to resort to ever more comprehensive repression.

Author is grateful for comments from two anonymous reviewers for the first version of the manuscript, and for the earlier version from FIIA colleagues Margarita Zavadskaya and Ryhor Nizhnikau, as well as for feedback at the Aleksanteri conference and the Tartu conference in 2023.

Published online: December 06, 2024