Forging Democracy in the Flames: Strategies of Polish NGOs during the Full-Scale War in Ukraine

Democracy promotion encompasses endeavors undertaken by one or multiple states to stimulate democratic transition or consolidation in another country, from autocracy or within an evolving democracy. This capacious definition involves a spectrum of strategies, from diplomatic dialogue, military intervention, economic sanctions, and foreign aid to civil society support, electoral assistance, and economic incentives (Bush 2015; McFaul 2004). Existing literature also suggests that the rationale for democracy promotion is multifaceted. Since the late 1980s, most of what has been written on Central and Eastern Europe has focused on when and how external actors can most effectively support the shift from socialist economic and political institutions to representative elections, local governance, civil society development, respect for human rights, and the rule of law (McMahon 2001; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Regulska 1998; Sundstrom 2006; Wedel 1998).

In the Balkans and elsewhere in the world, democracy promotion emerged as a key component of conflict prevention approaches but also a strategy for peacebuilding in post-conflict environments (Fortna and Huang 2012; Ottaway 2002; Paris 2004; Pickering 2007; Watts 2023). In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration argued that democracy promotion was an effective way to counter anti-Americanism and undermine terrorism (Dobriansky and Carothers 2003; Gause 2005; McFaul 2004). Recently, the discussion of democracy promotion has focused on the backlash against this form of foreign aid as well as the shrinking civic space that often results in response to democracy promotion when targeted governments reduce the ability of civil society organizations, activists, or citizens to act (Brechenmacher 2017; Carothers 2006, 2016; Grimm 2015; Pospieszna and Pietrzyk-Reeves 2022; Samuels 2023). Since 2022, an innovative dimension of democracy promotion has been unfolding, particularly evident in ongoing conflicts. The case of Ukraine is especially intriguing—a democratic nation attacked by an authoritarian state—introducing novel facets to democracy promotion practices. This can offer insights beneficial to both scholars and practitioners.

Despite the vast literature on democracy promotion, little of it focuses centrally on questions related to democracy promotion during war, as opposed to postwar environments (Carothers 2006, 2010; McFaul 2004). The domain of democracy promotion in conflict zones has been limited largely to literature on US military interventions or civil wars (Hegre 2001; Zürcher, Roehner, and Riese 2009). However, the unfolding European interstate war introduces a new and important dimension. From existing literature, our understanding of democracy promotion reveals several important take-home lessons. First, democracy promotion can function as a preventive measure, fostering adherence to democratic norms (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993). Second, the potential of external actors to promote democracy during wartime must be underpinned by military might (Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2007; Meernik 1996; Von Hippel 2000). Third, post-conflict settings, mostly in the aftermath of civil wars, have been extensively studied, revealing not only numerous dilemmas but also potential negative consequences of actions labeled as democratization on peace processes in these countries (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Hegre 2001; Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

Challenges arise from devastated infrastructure that contribute to fragile economies, which, in turn, constrains democratic rights. Instability, power shifts, and increasing disputes and divisions further complicate the situation and make democratic processes even more difficult. Finally, from the literature on democracy promotion during civil wars, we learned that it is crucial to prioritize positive peace, state-building, and security as prerequisites for democratic elections to occur and the step-by-step introduction of democratization to take root. Additionally, for democracy to take hold, it is important that external actors maximize local ownership and adopt flexible approaches that fit changing circumstances (Barnett 2006; Fukuyama 2005; Ottaway 2002; Paris and Sisk 2009).

These findings take on renewed significance as we witness an interstate war unfolding on the European continent after more than 70 years of relative peace. The Ukrainian case, in particular, offers a unique opportunity to expand our understanding of democracy promotion in the context of full-scale war. This case involves the intrusion of an authoritarian country into a democratic country, presenting a novel and complex dynamic for exploration. There is also a belief that war in Ukraine is part of a larger struggle to defend democracy in Europe (IDEA 2022). This war has, indeed, resulted in a decline in democracy, not only within Ukraine but also in neighboring countries, fostering the rise of authoritarianism and nationalism, and eroded democratic principles and institutions. Russia’s media has undeniably played a role in shaping anti-democratic opinions, fostering fear, and aiding authoritarian leaders. Therefore, supporting an autonomous civil society, independent media, and democratic institutions is crucial to support and sustain democracy. Consequently, we should concentrate on ongoing efforts, the challenges encountered, and the strategies used.

The immediate effect of the war on Ukraine’s democracy involves the erosion of democratic structures, such as the rule of law, separation of powers, and electoral processes. The presence of armed conflict exacerbates these challenges, leading to a prioritization of security over democratic governance. Decision-making skews toward centralization, with a concentration of power in the hands of the president or a few individuals, thereby further diminishing the participatory nature of democracy.

Currently, an innovative dimension of democracy promotion is unfolding, as countries like Poland are engaged in democracy promotion activities during the ongoing war. Ukraine presents a particularly compelling case, as a democratic country under assault by an authoritarian regime, adding new dimensions to the practice of promoting democracy promotion. A discussion of Poland’s support for democracy in Ukraine, as well as an analysis of its evolving strategies and the challenges encountered, is beneficial to both scholars and practitioners interested in democracy’s future in this region and beyond.

Ukraine has been the target of democracy promotion initiatives from a variety of actors (foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). The United States and the European Union have been the largest donors, but Poland is an acknowledged foreign partner in Ukraine (Monkos 2022; Petrova and Pospieszna 2021). Although the US and the EU have spent more money overall on democracy promotion in Ukraine, there are noticeable differences in both what Poland does and how it engages with its eastern neighbor. Other Central and Eastern European countries (specifically the Czech Republic) have also been promoting democracy since the 1990s, but Poland has been a leader in Ukraine since the early 2000s, with Polish leaders and Polish NGOs consistently prioritizing democracy assistance in Poland’s development initiatives.

The emphasis on promoting democracy and civil society, with initiatives focused on parliamentary practices, good governance, and human rights through financial and in-kind cooperation, has been a focus in the strategic and operational documentation of Polish Aid since its inception in 2003 (Ociepka 2017; Petrova 2014; Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015). In 2024, Poland marked 20 years since the adoption of its first strategic document on development cooperation; this was also 10 years since it joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) group. In May 2024, Poland celebrated two decades of membership in the European Union and Poland’s transformation from aid recipient to donor, facilitating its deeper integration into the European and global aid architecture. These milestones significantly influenced Poland’s engagement as a donor and the institutionalization of its bilateral aid through multilateral entities like the Development Cooperation Department (DCD) within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Polish Aid) producing documents like the Strategy of Polish Development Cooperation.

When providing aid, Poland typically has aligned with international donors’ frameworks. Many international actors, donor agencies, and forums or conferences, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, provided Poland with specific guidelines and requirements for distributing aid. Despite this, Poland reserved some independence in its funding from the beginning, choosing to allocate a significant portion of its aid to promoting democracy and human rights. Polish NGOs played an important role in this decision, influencing governmental aid programs by lobbying for specific goals, such as sharing experiences with democratic and transition countries, particularly with neighboring ones where the experience of NGOs is relevant and where they can form linkages. They also acted as key partners in the provision and distribution of aid (Chimiak 2016; Kaźmierkiewicz 2013; Ociepka, 2013, 2017; Zalas-Kamińska 2019). Importantly, Polish NGOs followed the government’s foreign policy goals, in part because of funding sources, available resources, organizational capacity, and political climate. Although some NGOs have more capacity and resources to pursue their goals effectively, others may face challenges due to limited resources and government restrictions.

Before Poland joined the EU in 2004, the largest share of international work carried out by Polish NGOs focused on activities and projects in Ukraine (Pospieszna 2014). However, when Poland joined the EU, its commitment to the democratic future of Ukraine was not shared by “older” EU member states. But since “newer” EU members, especially those in Central Europe that became EU members in 2004, were also providing democracy assistance to post-Soviet states as well as the former Yugoslavia, the EU’s interest in democracy promotion and civil society development in Ukraine and Belarus increased over time. In the years since, Poland has actively participated in the governance of EU development policies, contributing to the formulation of common strategies and initiatives. Its leaders have allowed Poland to influence the direction of EU assistance, promoting its own priorities, such as democracy promotion and good governance in neighboring countries. Even after 2015, when Poland’s Law and Justice Party was elected and the government itself was criticized at home and abroad for its democratic practices, Poland has consistently prioritized support for democracy promotion (Petrova and Pospieszna 2021).

Poland’s cooperation with Ukraine, primarily driven by geopolitical considerations, significantly influenced Polish foreign policy long before Ukraine became a priority for Polish Aid. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Polish government used various institutions and methods to promote democracy, including bilateral and multilateral assistance, expertise, public diplomacy to share knowledge and expertise on topics like making the government work better, fighting corruption, and improving the local democracy (Petrova 2014). Polish policy aimed to bolster Ukraine’s socioeconomic and political reforms, reflecting a broader effort to share successful transformation experiences and promote democracy in EU Eastern Partnership countries. Polish NGOs worked actively to influence the EU’s policies, especially since the EU concentrated on improving systems and institutions instead of civil society organizations and projects. According to Youngs (2022), the EU’s democracy promotion approach in Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has predominantly centered on technical support to Ukraine, while Polish NGOs instead directly and closely collaborated with local people, allowing them to be highly adaptable and responsive to local circumstances and needs.

Poland’s own democratic journey, its experience with transformation, civil society’s pivotal role, and accession to the EU, alongside its aspiration for a more secure neighborhood and its close ties to Ukraine, have collectively positioned Polish NGOs as valuable partners for many donors operating in Ukraine. US donors, including USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the US Department of State, have acknowledged Poland’s pivotal intermediary role, providing support and logistics for numerous cross-border initiatives implemented by Polish NGOs in Ukraine.⁶

The year 2022 was a pivotal time for Poland because of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting a swift response from Polish society that catalyzed and expanded the Polish government’s action, including increasing support for Polish aid. In the short term, this assistance involved providing immediate humanitarian assistance to the thousands of refugees arriving in Poland, reflecting the Polish nation’s solidarity with the Ukrainian people. It is important to consider whether Polish NGOs are continuing these efforts during the war and how they are collaborating with their Ukrainian partners. Additionally, we are interested in discovering whether the democracy promotion activities in Ukraine have adapted to the war and what specific challenges Polish NGOs have encountered as restrictions on democratic initiatives have expanded.

To answer these research questions, this study explores the behavior and decision-making of Polish NGOs that have prioritized democracy promotion activities and support for civil society in their work, and which have emerged as key promoters of democratic norms and values in Ukraine, since the 1990s. We do this through an examination of their policies and funding as well as twelve semi-structured interviews with foundation staff (see  Appendix). The sample includes Poland’s largest and most well-known NGOs engaged in democracy promotion, such as the Jerzy Regulski Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (FSLD), the Stefan Batory Foundation, the Education for Democracy Foundation (FED), the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), the Leaders of Change Foundation, the Democratic Society East Foundation (DSE), and the East European Democratic Centre (EEDC). Later, others were established, like the Information Society Development Foundation (FRSI) and organizations within the SPLOT Support Network for Non-Governmental Organizations. Some of these NGOs evolved out of Polish grassroots initiatives (e.g., the Solidarity movement, informal collective actions, and civic engagement), while others received support from US donors or were established by US-based foundations such as the Polish-American Freedom Foundation (which operates in Poland but is funded with American money). Additionally, organizations like the Solidarity Fund PL (FSM) were established under an initiative of the president of the Republic of Poland.

We interviewed NGO officials between June and July 2023 to understand their policy decisions as well as their perspectives on whether and how democracy should be supported in Ukraine.⁷ Our study does not include small local organizations that played a crucial role in mitigating the effects of humanitarian crises—related to both the escalation of the war in Ukraine and the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border (Klon/Jawor 2024). According to a Klon/Jawor Report, most Polish organizations working on foreign affairs as well as migrant issues experienced a change in their activities after 2022, with less than half (37%) needing to reformulate their goals. (Klon/Jawor 2024, 2). In fact, the refugee crisis has had a significant impact on Polish society and the Polish nongovernmental sector writ large, altering focus areas of many organizations, including those that had never been involved in migrant or foreign affairs. We contacted only older and larger organizations, as well as more established NGOs, which is a limitation of our study; at the same time, given their resources and reputation, these NGOs play a pivotal role in guiding Polish bilateral aid for democracy, providing financial and technical assistance to civil society groups, political parties, and media outlets in Ukraine. Strategically, their democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine encourage, and sometimes require close collaboration with, smaller local NGOs, grassroots initiatives, students, teachers, and local authorities. This “partnership-oriented approach” used by Polish democracy promotion NGOs distinguishes these NGOs, because it leverages the expertise of local groups while focusing on the specific needs of their targeted groups, creating ownership and accountability (Pospieszna 2019). However, within this approach, Polish NGO officials indicated that while they utilize various tactics to promote democracy, they rely on many of the same principles that have always defined Polish democracy assistance.

According to most Polish NGO officials, Polish democracy promotion initiatives, indeed, persist in Ukraine. Despite the conflict and the chaos they have created, these organizations have not given up on their mission. The engagement of Polish NGOs in initiatives that empower local communities, ensure transparent governance, and support civil society and human rights demonstrates the continuation of democracy promotion assistance. In fact, Table 1, which is synthesized from interview data, suggests that Polish NGOs are engaged in an ever-expanding array of activities that support education, local governance, and psychological aid for war veterans, as well as previously funded core democracy activities. Although not everyone agreed with the importance of maintaining democracy promotion as a priority, a few officials indicated that they viewed this assistance as crucial to safeguarding democratic values and strengthening democratic institutions in Ukraine, which they noted would contribute to the country’s resilience and future stability.

Others argued that immediate security and humanitarian priorities should take precedence during wartime, and thus they reoriented funding and activities toward providing immediate relief. As one NGO official explained:

In discussing their activities, officials from Polish NGOs emphasized their engagement in various issue areas, many of which responded to the immediate needs of a society wrought by war. For example, an important priority became education, in the form of “collaborative partnerships” with Ukrainian educational groups that use adaptive strategies associated with crisis management, transparent governance, local leadership, social services, and support of civil society. This means that organizations must respond quickly but also adapt to conditions on the ground, and that there is a concerted focus on empowering individuals with specific knowledge and skills, including critical thinking and media literacy. Furthermore, Polish NGOs have actively contributed to the defense of democracy in Ukraine through grants for activists, support for Ukrainian civil society organizations, aid for refugees, as well as collaboration with Ukrainian NGOs.

A new democracy promotion arena for Polish NGOs, closely tied to the times of war that started for them in 2014, is psychosocial support and the documentation of war crimes. Efforts related to providing support not only for war veterans, but also for the general Ukrainian population affected by post-traumatic stress disorder in both Ukraine and Poland, represent a novel and significant focus for Polish NGOs working in Ukraine. Importantly, these efforts are carried out in cooperation with partnering NGOs in Ukraine but also Ukrainian organizations established in Poland before and during the full-scale invasion.

The documentation of war crimes plays an important role in promoting democracy in Ukraine, because it ensures justice, promotes rule of law, protests against human rights violations, and promotes human rights while increasing trust in institutions. Because of its importance to peacebuilding as well as democracy, Polish NGOs have developed new connections with international organizations as well as Ukrainian actors to ensure that these activities are adhering to international standards and legal documentation processes with the goal of bringing perpetrators before the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of the Polish NGOs, the Leaders of Change Foundation, collaborates with Ukrainian partners (with around 200 individuals) within a project funded by USAID. Although these efforts may not be promoting democracy directly, organizations perceive these actions as necessary and are “the right thing to do” now, because sustaining democracy in Ukraine will be impossible without considering and responding to the direct consequences of war:

In addition to providing humanitarian aid directly associated with the consequences of war, Polish organizations work in collaboration with Ukrainian counterparts to maintain democratic processes and safeguard democracy institutions and practices, as a representative of the Education for Democracy Foundation noted. Their priorities are efforts to strengthen oversight in specific institutions, anti-corruption systems, and in areas deemed particularly disadvantaged in Ukraine. These efforts need support, especially at the level of local self-government.

Since the Polish government has always supported political and economic decentralization as key ways of promoting democratic structures and institutions, in part because they help combat corruption and promote transparency, Polish NGOs have continued with these initiatives. These are also issues that people fear will deteriorate even more after the war ends, hindering both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the prospects for democracy. Current initiatives targeting decentralization include providing training assistance to enhance rule of law and courts’ capacity to monitor and fight corruption, improve judicial practices, and protect constitutional practices.

Fostering democratic engagement though the development of participatory mechanisms and tools was a long-standing practice of Polish NGOs working in Ukraine. The ongoing war, however, has made it challenging to try to empower Ukrainian society to actively engage in the political sphere. Previously, Ukraine utilized a range of active democratic instruments, including elections, national referendums, meetings with MPs/local representatives, petitions, public hearings and consultations, local community gatherings, local public initiatives, participatory budgets, civic expertise for governmental bodies, and consultative boards for NGOs/youth/females. Although elections are currently banned, participatory budgeting is not in place, petitions are still used, and gatherings and protests are not officially prohibited, though they are not advisable due to the need to support the Ukrainian president’s war effort. However, Polish NGOs stand ready to ensure that other democratic mechanisms do not vanish, through supporting training, projects, and discussions with civil society organizations and local authorities, especially in the context of Ukraine’s future rebuilding process.

One of the key aspects of democracy promotion by Polish NGOs is continuing to support local governance in Ukraine. This involves a focus on decentralization and the empowerment of local communities through strategic planning. The displacement of populations, the need to transition from military to civilian administration, and the complexities of maintaining democratic processes amid the war are all issues that create significant disruptions to Ukraine’s democratic reforms and its institutions. According to many NGO representatives, despite the challenges of war, the central government has displayed resilience in upholding democratic principles and continuing to support local institutions and authorities. To ensure this continues, Polish NGOs have supported study missions from Ukraine, primarily involving female local government officials, to Poland, which are regularly organized, as well as study missions by Polish local authorities to Ukraine.

To support and reinforce Ukrainian civil society, Polish NGOs work directly with partners in Ukraine to emphasize democratic values and practices. Table 2 provides a synthesis from interview data which suggests that tactics include providing grants, collaborating with Ukrainian NGOs, as well as fostering initiatives that facilitate greater interaction between Ukrainians and Russians. These activities inherently try to uphold democratic values by promoting transparency, accountability, and active citizen participation. Despite the ongoing violence, Polish NGOs have continued to support activities aimed at strengthening local democracy and increasing security. For example, the Jerzy Regulski Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, together with an international consortium including the Ukraine Crisis Media Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), have implemented the USAID-sponsored “Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency” (DOBRE)⁸ Program, which has been expanded during the war.

The DOBRE Program supports and strengthens local-level governance, creating better conditions for new Ukrainian territorial units, increasing citizen engagement in decision-making, and ensuring transparency and accountability in public administration. This program is implemented in 100 Ukrainian communities located in 10 regions of Ukraine. The activities of the Polish NGO associated with this program include a series of webinars addressing various topics related to governance and community development. The webinars cover subjects such as the EU cohesion policy and the conditions for using European funds for development. Additionally, there are webinars on topics like the optimization of public services and infrastructure for communities directly and indirectly affected by conflict.

Although an explicit focus on democratic values and practices is not stated by Polish NGO officials, their tactics and activities inherently align with democratic principles. By fostering civic engagement, advocating for human rights, and promoting accountability, these NGOs contribute to nurturing and fostering democratic values within Ukrainian civil society. Also, when engaging in close collaboration with Ukrainian civil society, Polish NGOs seek to cultivate a sense of national identity that holds the potential to unify the nation. For example, the production of children’s books in Ukrainian reflects such a cultural and inclusive strategy.

Some Polish NGOs, however, prefer to support Ukrainian refugees and to fund activities within Poland, not in Ukraine. Polish NGOs have employed various strategies and initiatives to empower Ukrainian refugees in Poland, again, with an emphasis on democratic values and practices. These efforts include providing direct humanitarian aid, offering social integration programs, facilitating academic engagement, providing psychological support, as well as conducting educational and language classes. Organizations have continuously adapted their forms of support to meet the rapidly changing needs of refugees. By supporting refugees in terms of education, mental well-being, and integration, these NGOs indirectly promote an environment that values democratic principles. For example, the “Library for Everyone. Different. Equal. Important” and “Library for Everyone” are programs implemented in libraries that promote education and engagement. “My Place,”⁹ organized by the Information Society Development Foundation, in collaboration with Save the Children International, is conducting social and educational projects to support children and youth from both Ukraine and Poland; these activities leverage technology and encourage people to work together.

The objective of these programs is to facilitate joint learning, fun activities, and relationship-building for children and youth from Ukraine and Poland. Moreover, they aim to support youth from Ukraine and Poland in making educational and career choices, fostering integration, and building relationships through developmental activities held in libraries. The projects provide a modern and free program offered by libraries. Nearly 20,000 individuals have benefited from these activities, and almost 7,000 refugees have received support.¹⁰ Education and integration play key roles in building bridges between communities and promoting understanding. Thus, supporting Ukrainian refugees through education and integration initiatives is crucial not only for their well-being but also for the overall social cohesion in Poland. By providing a supportive environment, the programs aim to prevent discrimination, mitigate antagonistic attitudes, and indirectly contribute to the strengthening of democracy by fostering an inclusive society:

The assistance provided by organizations supporting refugees should primarily involve social aid and social services. However, organizations whose activities focus on supporting democracy emphasize education and law as their main areas of assistance, including the protection of human rights and the promotion of equality.

The number and breadth of Polish NGO initiatives are significant, but so are the principles underpinning their strategies, specifically, adaptation/flexibility and collaboration. Polish NGO officials were quick to note the differences in their democracy promotion efforts before the full-scale invasion in 2022. Previously, democracy promotion initiatives were geared toward long-term projects and partnerships, while post-invasion efforts have become more immediate and adaptable, addressing urgent needs like humanitarian aid and online collaborations. Adapting to challenges, especially in remote work, highlights the importance of flexibility and innovation. Adaptive strategies are used to navigate the extensive challenges associated with war and the need to adjust to its consequences. Therefore, with many organizations there are phases and sequencing of aid and support. For example, the first democracy promotion activity of the Solidarity Fund PL during the war was humanitarian aid—the fastest and most immediate way to aid. Other projects, such as the decentralization of education, on which it had worked for a long time, also during COVID-19, in collaboration with Swedish organizations and donors like Sida, needed to be postponed for the time being. Thanks to this collaboration, with funding and the distribution of textbooks on school management, study visits for teachers and principals, Ukrainian schools can efficiently educate students even during the war.

Organizations distributed humanitarian aid, but not on a national scale; instead, they worked at the local level in Ukraine, primarily with nongovernmental organizations. While humanitarian aid assumed a central role, organizations strategically utilized projects and networks established before the war began in 2022, emphasizing local ownership. For instance, the Leaders of Change Foundation launched a small grants program for its former Ukrainian graduates who participated in educational projects and other initiatives organized by the organization for young people from former Soviet states. The objective of this small grants program is to activate and integrate Ukrainian activists, encouraging them to find innovative ways to support their communities in Ukraine and implement various aid initiatives. Similar mini-grant programs were directed toward communities in Poland, with the inclusion of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and even Russians residing in Poland. The organization conducts fundraising campaigns through these individuals, aiming not only to provide financial aid but also to highlight stories of courage and innovation, inspiring them to act and share their experiences with others.

Another type of project that demonstrates adaptability and flexibility involves initiatives focused on bolstering civil protection and safety in Ukraine. While these projects may not be immediately associated with democracy, Polish NGO officials acknowledge that a secure and independent neighbor is also crucial for Polish security and democracy. Importantly, even these projects were organized through partnerships and built upon linkages established much earlier. For instance, projects supporting the civil protection of the population in Ukrainian local governments were initiated in 2014 by Solidarity Fund PL and involved Polish organizations identifying needs in collaboration with Ukrainian partners. These projects in turn assisted Ukrainian communities in creating safety plans—localized strategies for population well-being—which were achieved through the establishment and support of Ukrainian volunteer fire brigades.

The volunteer fire departments underwent training in firefighting aligned with European standards, were well-equipped, and were educated on drafting insurance protocols. As the war unfolded, these entities proved pivotal in the local community, swiftly ensuring safety and defending the civilian population. Consequently, Polish organizations sought improved funding for the equipment and technology of these volunteer fire brigades, including protective materials, hoses, and fire trucks. This effort also contributed to enhancing the prestige of these units at the local level.

Explicit and intentional collaboration with civil society organizations, local partners, and local governments distinguishes the approach of Polish NGOs to democracy assistance. These long-standing partnerships will be crucial to Ukraine’s reconstruction. Polish organizations, working with various stakeholders, are already diversifying their focus toward the needs associated with reconstruction and development. Some organizations are supporting a project for the adaptation and social integration of war veterans; others, however, are working on a project to prepare future leaders for the difficult process of reconstruction in Ukraine. Also, some organizations are engaging local experts and communities in planning, anticipating that when the reconstruction phase begins, there will be a demand for a skilled and qualified workforce. Thus, training people now is important.

Various post-conflict reconstruction issues are already identified in reports created within local communities, facilitated by collaboration within the framework of so-called sister cities programs, a form of cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian cities that has always aimed at cultural, economic, and informational exchange. Currently, renovations are taking place, but the more critical issue related to reconstruction is the availability of skilled personnel. It might turn out that, on the one hand, there will be significant unemployment because people are not qualified, and, on the other hand, there will be a need to bring in skilled workers from abroad because there will not be enough locally. Organizations are monitoring these changes and trends in the labor market and collaborating with the European Commission.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is preparing various instruments regarding reconstruction, aiming to address the potential lack of a qualified workforce. Thus, collaboration not only with Ukrainian entities, but also with international organizations and Western donors, particularly those from North America, has been pivotal for coordinating aid and facilitating information exchange. Prominent US donors and organizations like the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Soros Foundation continue to strongly endorse and support activities carried out by Polish NGOs aimed at assisting Ukrainian civil society.

Polish organizations have consistently supported various endeavors to align Ukraine’s institutions and society with the European Union institutions and principles, making this a crucial aspect of their democracy promotion efforts. This commitment has gained more prominence during the conflict, especially among elements of the Ukrainian population, which has increasingly identified with European values during the war. Ukrainian integration into Europe and into EU institutions is perceived by Polish NGOs as the only viable alternative for the country. The risks associated with potential integration with Russia underscore the urgency of Ukraine’s alignment with European values and institutions. In essence, Ukraine is compelled to grow into the standards of democracy through its integration with Europe:

However, the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the war poses challenges to the process of rebuilding and reconstructing Ukraine. The consolidation of democratic institutions and the internalization of democratic norms and values within the country will be an extended, time-consuming, and expensive undertaking. Despite these challenges, Polish NGOs believe that Ukraine exhibits a foundational understanding of democratic principles and values. Civil society in Ukraine has become even stronger and more engaged in response to Russia’s invasion, and NGOs are playing a crucial role in maintaining stability, aiding, and advocating for democratic values. This underscores the importance of civil society in upholding and promoting democratic ideals, even in the face of external aggression and conflict. While the invasion and conflict have undoubtedly posed challenges to democracy in Ukraine, the ongoing responses also highlight the determination of Ukrainian society and Polish NGOs to defend and promote democratic values, both in the immediate crisis context and in the long-term rebuilding efforts. All our interviews suggest that Polish NGOs, in cooperation with the Polish government, international organizations, and Western donors, stand ready to support Ukraine as it works to become a full member of transatlantic and European institutions.

Our study demonstrates that democracy promotion is not confined to peacetime and remains an important foreign policy strategy for Polish NGOs working in Ukraine. The persistent efforts of Polish NGOs amid the complex landscape of war underscore the critical importance of innovative approaches; at the same time, they also demonstrate the importance of maintaining and expanding existing practices and partnerships that support democratic principles and long-term goals. The inherent tension during conflict, between responding to immediate needs and planning for the future, pushed Polish NGOs to consider their goals, strategies, and capabilities, as well as the immediate needs of the Ukrainian people. Although all NGO officials we interviewed recognized the urgency of addressing certain challenges wrought by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, adapting some of their tactics, Polish NGOs have not renounced the importance of democratic promotion in Ukraine. In fact, Polish NGOs, like the Polish government, continue to see this foreign policy goal and strategy as legitimate and perhaps even more necessary despite adverse conditions. Although this research only focused on Polish NGOs as a case study to examine democracy promotion activities in countries experiencing violent conflict, it provides broader insight into democracy promotion as a future foreign policy strategy in Ukraine while it reveals important realities about the post-communist region.

The experience garnered during the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been pivotal in shaping adaptive strategies of Polish NGOs. Amid ongoing conflict, Polish NGOs demonstrated the possibility of sustaining democracy promotion even in the face of adversity. Poland’s distinctive emphasis on civil society development over institutional frameworks aligns with the principles of peacebuilding and acknowledge the importance of flexibility and adaptation in navigating complex conflict environments. Polish NGOs have actively engaged in training, projects, and discussions with civil society organizations and local authorities, with a focus on rebuilding processes in Ukraine. Their commitment extends beyond conventional democracy promotion activities to include initiatives such as educational programs, humanitarian aid, people-to-people diplomacy, and the protection of democratic institutions. This comprehensive approach reflects the dedication of Polish NGOs to nurturing democracy while contributing to societal resilience.

The focal point and target of these efforts are people, education, and the creation of a normative environment for democracy, illustrating a nuanced understanding of the foundational elements needed for sustainable democratic practices. Polish NGOs further prioritize collaboration with individuals, social organizations, and cross-border partnerships, leveraging the country’s own experience with democratic transition. Polish NGOs also strategically utilize their relationships with the EU and the United States to advocate for Ukraine and foster regional networks and transborder groups dedicated to advancing democracy amid regional challenges. Our research does not make any claims about the effectiveness of Polish NGOs or their activities, but it does affirm the likely importance of this civil society, people-based approach in future policy toward Ukraine by other international actors.

Several reports by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) that discuss the future of Ukraine highlight many of the tactics already used by Polish NGOs to promote democracy in Ukraine.¹¹ According to the GMF, the war and devastation in Europe should encourage the international community to replicate one of America’s most successful foreign policy initiatives of the 20th century—the Marshall Plan—in Ukraine. However, since Ukraine has one of the most vibrant civil societies in the world as well as notable challenges with corruption, some elements of the Ukrainian Marshall Plan need to be adjusted to fit the needs of this country as well as the realities of democracies today, more than 70 years later. The Marshall Plan provides important lessons for how international actors should engage with Ukraine; they should plan the postwar future carefully, with an eye to creating a continuum of transparent reforms, from humanitarian relief to economic development. At the same time, there was something noticeably missing in the initial Marshall Plan that needs to be tailored to the Ukrainian context: engagement with Ukrainian civil society and local governments and municipalities.

Civil society in Ukraine has achieved broad legitimacy, and civil society specialists are drafting the country’s most important laws, advocating for their passage, and collaborating with the government to implement these initiatives. Thus, while the Marshall Plan was largely about government tools, future policies toward Ukraine should include mechanisms and tools that incorporate civil society organizations, which will help promote transparency and recovery as well as democratic institutions. Our research has highlighted how the activities of Polish NGOs have adapted in the context of war in Ukraine to address immediate humanitarian needs without, however, losing sight of the long-term need to foster trust and community engagement, which build social capital and are essential for democratic governance. Thus, while democracy promotion activities can change, these modifications are likely to be temporary, and democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective, form of aid, and strategy is likely to become even more important in Ukraine. In fact, since so many governments in Europe and North America, as well as international NGOs, donors, and foundations, have similar goals for Ukraine, and given the country’s unique and vibrant civil society, democracy promotion activities might assume more prominence as a way of engaging an already active society and fostering trust, cooperation, and civic engagement—foundational elements of a peaceful and democratic society.

Efforts in reconstruction and crisis management contribute significantly to the resilience of democratic institutions. By addressing immediate needs and restoring order, these activities create a stable environment where democratic processes can function effectively. Additionally, documenting war crimes supports democracy by reinforcing the rule of law and accountability, which is crucial in conflict zones where lawlessness can undermine democratic institutions. Ensuring justice and accountability helps restore public trust and supports the democratic principle of the rule of law.

The important and evolving democracy promotion activities of Polish NGOs in Ukraine also provide further evidence of the changes within the post-communist region, even while countries’ foreign policies are shaped by communist experiences and history. After a significant history as a recipient of democracy assistance, Polish NGOs, following the Polish government’s foreign policy goals, adopted democracy promotion as a goal and strategy, developing sustained activities and partnerships in several post-Soviet countries. In Poland, this form of foreign aid was also maintained regardless of the government in power, and even when the Polish government was itself criticized for its democratic practices. This emphasis on democracy promotion was shared by other countries in Central Europe, and the Visegrád Group (Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), as new members of the European community, became promoters of democracy abroad, seeking to make “secure a greater place for democracy promotion on the agenda of the EU” despite the skepticism among other EU members (Hornat 2021, 7).

After February 2022, in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Polish NGOs both adapted and expanded their initiatives. Yet, this was not the case for all the other Visegrád countries. Hungary, in particular, demonstrated that post-communist countries’ reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not the same. Indeed, in stark contrast to Poland and the activities of Polish NGOs, the Hungarian government, while condemning Russia’s invasion, has threatened to block all EU aid going to Ukraine. Thus, while Poland still sees democracy promotion in Ukraine as closely tied to its own security and national interests, this attitude and policy is not consistent throughout the post-communist region.

The war in Ukraine has helped transform Poland into a stronger supporter of democracy, demonstrating both the possibility and importance of innovative and adaptive approaches to promoting democratic values even during times of war. And while Poland’s activities do not necessarily reflect the foreign policies of other post-communist countries, they go a long way to further erode the East-West divide and the belief that democracy promotion is a strategy and foreign policy instrument of countries from the West.

This research was presented at the 9th Swiss Summer School in Democracy Studies on Democracy and Peace at the University of Zurich, as well as during the Democracy R&D annual meeting in Copenhagen in September 2023. The authors express sincere gratitude for the valuable comments received from participants of these events, including scholars and practitioners alike.

The study was supported by the research grant Sonata Bis NCN (UMO-2021/42/E/HS5/00155) and the National Endowment for Humanities Grant #13982558 Ordinary People: Poland’s reception and integration of Ukrainian refugees.

Published online: October 29, 2024

List of included and interviewed Polish NGOs engaged in democracy promotion:

• Democratic Society East Foundation (DSE)

• East European Democratic Centre (EEDC)

• Education for Democracy Foundation (FED)

• Information Society Development Foundation (FRSI)

• Institute of Public Affairs (IPA)

• Jerzy Regulski Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (FSLD)

• Leaders of Change Foundation

• Solidarity Fund PL (FSM)

• SPLOT Support Network for Non-Governmental Organizations: Boris Association

• Stefan Batory Foundation

Interview questions for Polish nongovernmental organizations (translated from Polish):

• During the war:

  • 1. How have the activities of Polish nongovernmental organizations, previously engaged in promoting democracy in Ukraine, changed?

  • 2. Please name the current challenges related to the activities of your organization in Ukraine. What has changed?

  • 3. Is there anything that is currently easier to implement?

  • 4. Please describe the main pillars of your organization’s activities in Ukraine.

  • 5. How have relations with the Polish government changed regarding your organization’s activities in Ukraine?

  • 6. What does cooperation with other organizations operating in a similar field look like?

  • 7. What new experiences have you gained during this year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

• Postwar:

  • 8. Some organizations are already taking actions related to peacebuilding; to what extent do these actions involve promoting democracy?

  • 9. In your opinion, what should peacebuilding in Ukraine look like? Are there certain social groups within Ukraine that could hinder this?

  • 10. Do you think a compromise between promoting peace and democratization is necessary?

  • 11. Apart from financial assistance, especially for infrastructure reconstruction, what other needs do you see in Ukraine postwar that Polish nongovernmental organizations can help meet?