A particular aspect of path dependence and change is discussed here. To understand institutional change in transition economies, a game theoretic model that combines economic changes with changes in the social values system is proposed, in a mechanism where the two changes are interdependent and influence one another in a repeated game. The speed of change in this dynamic model is the result of two rates, the ‘‘learning rate’’, how fast agents are learning to play the new ‘‘capitalist’’ game and the so-called ‘‘going-over rate’’, the mix in every time period of economic agents playing according to the ‘‘old’’ communist values and those playing according to the ‘‘new’’ capitalist values.
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Research Article| March 01 2005
Modeling institutional change in transition economies
Nicholas C. Kyriazis;
Nicholas C. Kyriazis *
Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Argonauton Str. 38221 Volos, Greece
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +30 24210 74882; fax: +30 24210 74772. E-mail address:firstname.lastname@example.org (M.S. Zouboulakis).
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Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2005) 38 (1): 109–120.
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Nicholas C. Kyriazis, Michel S. Zouboulakis; Modeling institutional change in transition economies. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1 March 2005; 38 (1): 109–120. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.01.004
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